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Preface 
This report is part of my PhD dissertation “Is education still the universal solvent? Why personality 
traits, intelligence and social context complicate our understanding of the role of education for good 
democratic citizenship”, written at the Department of Political Science at the University of Southern 
Denmark. The PhD project studies to what extent and why, or why not, education still remains “the 
universal solvent” with regards to good democratic citizenship when we take into account that 
people differ in their personality traits and intelligence. The project consists of four papers: 
1. Rasmussen, Stig Hebbelstrup Rye (2013): Education or personality traits as determinants of 
political sophistication (Working paper) 
2. Rasmussen, Stig Hebbelstrup Rye and Nørgaard, Asbjørn Sonne (2014): Cognitive Ability, 
Principled Reasoning and Political Tolerance  (Working paper) 
3. Rasmussen, Stig Hebbelstrup Rye (2014): Disentangling the role of education, intelligence 
and political knowledge in policy voting (Under review) 
4. Rasmussen, Stig Hebbelstrup Rye and Nørgaard, Asbjørn Sonne (2014): Disentangling the 
Role of Education and Personality Traits for Political Behavior: Cognition and Motivations 
vs. Resource Effects in External and Internal Efficacy  (Working paper) 
 This report primarily summarizes what the papers have in common and not what is particular to 
each of the papers or to paraphrase the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman’s notion of the 
general factor of intelligence g: (Spearman 1904, 284): “all branches of intellectual activity have in 
common one function (or group of functions), whereas the remaining or specific elements of the 
activity seem in every case to be wholly different from that in the others.”   
 Chapter 1 discusses the overall framework and outlines the research questions addressed in this 
dissertation. Chapter 2 outlines the causal framework. Chapter 3 discusses how to study the 
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theoretical framework and chapter 4 outlines the contents of the two important constructs 
personality traits and intelligence; in terms of what the construct of education actually is I will return 
to that in chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 5 describes the datasets used. Chapter 6 discusses the main 
findings and chapter 7 outlines the main implications of the findings. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and research questions 
Is education the universal solvent? 
Traditionally education has been conceived as a democratic liberator: Many political scientists in the 
1950s and 1960s foresaw a more democratic society pending the upcoming educational revolution 
(Brody 1978; Converse 1972; Stouffer [1955] 2009; Sullivan and Hendriks 2009). Current consensus 
in political science has it that those who are more educated are more politically tolerant, 
sophisticated, politically engaged and participate more at all levels; in short, the educated citizen is 
the democratic citizen (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Sullivan and 
Hendriks 2009; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This line of reasoning was most forcefully 
argued by Philip Converse in 1972 whose quite famous quote, has served as a leitmotiv for this 
dissertation (1972, 324): 
“Whether one is dealing with cognitive matters such as level of factual information about politics or conceptual sophistication in 
its assessment; or such motivational matters as degree of attention paid to politics and emotional involvement in political affairs; 
or questions of actual behavior such as engagement in any variety of political activities from party work to vote turnout itself: 
education is everywhere the universal solvent and the relationship is everywhere in the same direction.” 
 Some years later Richard Brody, writing about political participation, was puzzled why levels of 
turnout had not increased despite sizeable increases in levels of education (Brody 1978). Although 
not completely forgotten in the meantime, this debate on what can be termed “the causal effect” of 
education has had something of a renaissance in recent years.  
 There are critics who argue that the traditional effect ascribed to education is in fact confounded by 
predispositions and preadult experiences i.e. that predispositions and preadult experiences affects 
differences in levels of education as well as differences in political outcomes (Elwert 2013); I will 
elaborate on this point in chapter 2. Two of the most outspoken exponents of this view are Kam 
and Palmer who, using a matching procedure, study the effect of higher education on political 
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participation (2008, 616, emphasis added): “We suggest that the same preadult experiences and 
predispositions (values, intelligence and/or cognitive skills, and personality traits) that propel individuals to 
pursue education might also propel them into political participation in later life”. Their argument is 
that education is not a “cause” but a “proxy” for preadult experiences, such as parental 
socioeconomic status, and predispositions such as personality traits and intelligence (Kam and 
Palmer 2008). Somewhat similar findings on political participation has been presented by Berinsky 
and Lenz, using an instrumental variables technique (Berinsky and Lenz 2010), and Benjamin 
Highton also reports no effect of post-secondary education on political sophistication using panel 
data (Highton 2009).  
 There has of course been counter claims and counter critics. For instance Sondheimer and 
Green, using a field experiment, do find an effect of differences in education on turnout, 
(Sondheimer and Green 2010) and the study by Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulous as well as the 
study by Dee, both studies use an instrumental variables technique, find an impact of education on 
participation and civic engagement respectively (Dee 2004; Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos 2004). 
The major problem with all these referenced studies is that none of them actually have any measures 
of the factors that are purportedly confounding the effect of education on political outcomes. A 
major goal of this dissertation was therefore to theorize when and how education is likely to be 
confounded by personality traits and intelligence, as well as to actually test the theorized hypotheses 
by directly measuring and including the hypothesized traits into empirical models.  
 The increased focus on the potential confounding of education by predispositions is supported 
by a general focus on the role of personality traits in political behavior. Most political scientists, and 
most personality psychologists as well, take their point of departure in the consensus model for 
personality traits which state that most of individual differences in personality can be described by 
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five basic traits, the so-called Big Five model (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008). The traits are 
Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. I will elaborate on the 
contents of the traits in chapter 4 but the labels used to describe them provide an intuitive 
understanding of what they represent.  
 Political scientists have e.g. studied the effect of personality traits on political participation 
(Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010) ideology, vote choice and partisanship (Caprara, 
Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 1999; Gerber et al. 2011d; Gerber et al. 2010) and political knowledge 
and political discussions (Gerber et al. 2011b; Gerber et al. 2012; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 
2011). These studies have not had as their main goal to investigate the relationship between 
education and personality traits across different political outcomes although this topic has also been 
addressed at a general level. For instance Gerber et al., studying the effect of personality traits on 
political ideology, argue that (Gerber et al. 2010, abstract): “…the effect of Big Five traits is often as 
large as that of education or income” and Mondak has analyzed the overlap between personality 
traits and demographics and argued that the overlap is, generally speaking, fairly small (Mondak 
2010, chapter 3). This finding would seem to imply that Kam and Palmer are necessarily incorrect 
when they assert that education might be a “proxy”, but as argued below, we need to assess the 
overlap between education and predispositions on a case by case basis.  
 This dissertation builds on the results of this research in order to better understand the 
relationship between education and predispositions by focusing on the important predispositions 
personality traits and intelligence. In order to grasp the relationship between education and 
personality traits we need to first of all understand why education affects political outcomes. Two 
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primary reasons have been used: Because education affects (1) motivations and cognitions1 and (2) 
because education affects social positioning (Converse 1972; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).2  
 In terms of the first explanation, that education affects motivations and cognitions, we know that 
those who are more educated are more politically interested (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995), which is the archetypical example of a motivational factor in politics, 
and we also know that those who are more educated are more politically sophisticated (Bennet 1989; 
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jennings 1996; Lambert et al. 1988; Neuman 1986; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-
Barry 1996; Smith 1989), the archetypical example of a cognitive factor. 
 Personality traits are directly tapping into cognitive, motivational and affective factors. In fact 
personality can be defined as (Caprara et al. 2006, 3):  
“a set of dynamic, self-regulatory systems that emerge and operate over the life course in the service of personal 
adaptations (Caprara & Cervone, 2000). These internal systems guide affective, cognitive, and motivational processes, 
directing people toward achieving individual and collective goals.” 
 Personality traits are intimately linked to cognitive, motivational and affective factors. In fact they 
are, by definition, exponents of cognitive, motivational and affective factors. Seen in this light it is 
no wonder if they confound the effect of education. Furthermore intelligence, perhaps the most 
important cognitive factor, is clearly also important to take into account if we want to understand 
whether education has any independent impact on cognitive factors. Intelligence has been defined 
thus (Gottfredson 1997, 13): 
                                                 
1 This taxonomy consisting of cognitive and motivational factors builds on the distinction between cognitive, conative and affective 
factors (Hilgard 1980), but education has not traditionally been ascribed to affective factors in political behavior and I will therefore 
simply note that this is an important difference between education and personality traits as affective factors for personality traits have 
been integral. 
2 These two ways education affects politics roughly corresponds to what Converse termed “the education driven model” versus 
education as an expression of a “relative pecking order” (Converse 1972) and what Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry terms “the absolute 
education model” versus the “sorting model” of education (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).  
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“Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think 
abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience.” 
 Intelligence is clearly a cognitive construct. Although both personality traits and intelligence are, 
to some extent, both cognitive constructs, there are also important differences between them. 
Intelligence has primarily been used as a measure of cognitive abilities (Jensen 1998), and is usually 
related to maximal performance (Cronbach 1949), whereas personality traits have traditionally been 
used as measures of cognitive styles and are usually related to typical performance (DeYoung 2011). 
For those constructs which are highly cognitively demanding in terms of processing power there is a 
good chance the effect of education is therefore confounded by intelligence. For instance, it is 
reasonable to speculate that those who are more intelligent are better able to link their ideological 
affinities to a party choice which matches their preferences, i.e. to deduce how best to link abstract 
ideological principles to a specific party choice. Since I have measures of both personality traits and 
intelligence I am therefore able to investigate whether the effect on political outcomes is more 
confounded by: (1) Personality traits, i.e. motivations and cognitive styles, or (2) intelligence, i.e. 
cognitive abilities. Whenever I am referring to “motivations and cognitions”, in the following, I am 
referring to the influence of both intelligence and personality traits. Only when I am explicitly using 
the terms cognitive styles and cognitive abilities am I referring to either personality traits or 
intelligence.  
 The sternest advocates of the second explanation, that education affects social positioning, are Nie, 
Junn and Stehlik-Barry in their landmark book on education and democratic citizenship. Here they 
argue that education grants people resources in the forms of status, access and influence primarily 
via central social network positions (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). This framework has since 
been further tested and elaborated (Campbell 2009; Helliwell and Putnam 2007; Persson 2011; Tenn 
2005) but many of the main premises still stand. Whereas personality traits and intelligence are likely 
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to confound the effect of education when it comes to motivations and cognitions there is less 
theoretical reason to expect them to confound the effect of education when it comes to the effect 
education has on social positioning. It has been demonstrated that e.g. Extroversion affects the size 
of a person’s network (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010) but as put succinctly in paper 4 (Paper 4, 
6): “Even though being extrovert will help you gain friends and, hence, attain a larger social network, 
only education will ensure that these friends are people with proximity to political power. While 
personality will help you get friends, education will help you get the ‘right’ sort of friends.”  
 There is an important difference in the way education is theorized to affect social positioning 
versus how education is theorized to affect cognitive and motivational factors: Education can have a 
relative effect on social positioning whereas it should only have an absolute effect on cognitive and 
motivational factors (Campbell 2009; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Persson 2011; Tenn 2005). 
I will elaborate on this below but an example can illustrate the point. In paper 4 it is argued that the 
effect of education on internal efficacy, the feeling of competence in politics, is primarily cognitive 
and motivational whereas the effect of education on external efficacy, the perception that 
government is response to one’s needs, is primarily positional. In a given society there are only a 
finite number of important positions. This means that as more and more people are educated, 
wealthy or rich, the competition over the fixed number of positions increases and the effect of 
education on external efficacy decreases. In short education has a relative effect on external efficacy. 
Conversely, just because a person feels that he understands politics, i.e. is internally efficacious, does 
not imply that others cannot feel the same way: The effect of education on internal efficacy is 
absolute.  
 The effect of education on social positioning is only theorized to be relative when the construct 
itself is competitive however. The reason why the effect of education on external efficacy is theorized 
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to be relative is because there are only so many people toward which government can be responsive 
at the same time (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Nie, Junn, and 
Stehlik-Barry 1996). The fact that education grants people access to networks is also likely to affect 
the opportunity to become politically informed (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 1990). However, 
political information is clearly not a competitive construct; just because my neighbor knows who the 
prime minister, is does not imply that I cannot be aware of this fact.  
 This discussion highlights three important points: (1) The effect of education on cognitive and 
motivational factors is theorized to be absolute. The effect of education on social positioning is 
theorized to be (2) relative when it is a competitive context, i.e. the effect of education is moderated 
by the degree of competition, (3) absolute in a non-competitive context, i.e. the effect of education is 
not moderated in this setting.  
 Converse’ original universal solvent claim, as well as many current discussions of the claim, is 
fairly broad in scope, and therefore difficult to subject to empirical investigation. The phrase “the 
universal solvent” was originally used to describe a substance able to dissolve all other substances, 
while itself remaining unaffected, and was very much sought after by the alchemists; the so-called 
alkahest.3 Although education potentially has many effects on political outcomes, most current 
studies on the universal solvent claim have focused on constructs related to democratic citizenship, and 
for good reason. One of the reasons why education is such an important construct to study is 
precisely because of its democratic promise: More education leads to more democratic citizens. This 
dissertation therefore investigates the effect of education on democratic citizenship to investigate the 
universal solvent claim. More to the point, whereas most studies have focused on a single construct 
related to democratic citizenship, such as political participation I investigate different aspects of 
                                                 
3 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alkahest  
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democratic citizenship in order to understand in a more systematic fashion, when and why the effect 
of education on democratic citizenship is likely to be confounded.   
 According to Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry democratic citizenship consists of the two elements 
political engagement and political enlightenment, which they, explain thus (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 
1996, 20): “We describe the two dimensions of enlightened political engagement as the capability of 
identifying and acting on political interest and the recognition of democratic principles and the rights 
of all citizens to hold and express interests”. When a person is both politically engaged and 
enlightened I refer to this as “good democratic citizenship” (GDC). In this investigation these two 
elements of GDC are operationalized by studying the effect of education on the following 
constructs: 
Table 1: Outline of constructs chosen to investigate the confounding of education on good democratic citizenship 
Construct Definition of construct Measurement Element of GDC 
Political 
sophistication 
“the range of factual information about politics that is stored 
in long-term memory” (Carpini and Keeter 1996, 10) 
13 questions on factual  knowledge of politics covering 
the areas “people’s and players”, “the substance of 
politics”, and the “rules of the game” (c.f. Carpini and 
Keeter 1996, chapter 2) 
Political enlightenment/ 
political engagement 
Political tolerance “tolerance means putting up with that which one disagrees. 
It means allowing one’s political enemies to compete openly 
for political power. A tolerant citizen is one who would not 
support unreasonable or discriminatory restrictions on the 
rights of groups to participate in politics” (Gibson 2006, 23) 
Four items on granting civil liberties towards the Neo 
Nazis or the Far Right 
Political enlightenment 
Policy voting Casting a vote which is based on ideological principles 
(Goren 2013) 
The correspondence between  a person’s ideological 
principles, measured using a six item scale on left-right 
differences,  and a person’s vote and ideological self-
identification 
Political engagement 
Internal efficacy The extent to which individuals find that they understand 
politics and the process of governing (Balch 1974; Converse 
1972; Craig 1979; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig, Niemi, 
and Silver 1990; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991) 
Three item index of which two are the so-called 
UNDERSTAND and COMPLEX items (Niemi, Craig, 
and Mattei 1991) 
Political engagement 
External efficacy The extent to which individuals perceive the government to 
be responsive to one’s needs (Balch 1974; Converse 1972; 
Craig 1979; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig, Niemi, and 
Silver 1990; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991) 
Two item index using the so-called NOSAY and 
NOCARE items (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991) 
Political enlightenment 
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 Not all constructs neatly fit into either of the categories of democratic citizenship but they are all 
related to the overall construct GDC. Three points deserve elaboration. First of all political 
knowledge relates to both dimensions of GDC since the knowledge battery measures both “people’s 
and players” in politics, the “substance of politics”, as well as the “rules of the game” i.e. 
institutional rules in the process of government such as who is eligible to be a minister in Denmark 
(Carpini and Keeter 1996, chapter 2). The first two elements are part of the political engagement 
dimension whereas the last element is part of the enlightenment dimension (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-
Barry 1996, chapter 2). Besides, becoming knowledgeable about politics requires effort.  
 Secondly, Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry write that external efficacy (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 
1996, chapter 2, footnote 22): “may be more closely related to the democratic enlightenment 
dimension, but we did not include it because it does not signify a commitment to democratic values 
and principles”. Plenty of other scholars do however regard external efficacy as a measure of system 
support (Easton and Dennis 1967; Iyengar 1980; Sullivan and Riedel 2001).  
 The third and final comment concerns political participation, which I have not directly studied in 
this dissertation, although this construct is part and parcel of GDC. I do however reflect on the 
likely impact of education on this construct in light of the findings and the theoretical apparatus in 
the conclusion. Also, in the study of policy voting I cover at least one aspect of political 
participation, i.e. vote intention.  
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 Summing up this PhD builds on and extends current research investigating the confounding of 
education and the role of personality traits in politics by: 
 Investigating specifically the relationship between predispositions and education rather 
than the relationship between socio-demographics and personality traits generally. 
 Including intelligence as an important predisposition whereas previous literature has 
primarily focused on personality traits. 
 Focusing explicitly on the effect of education on different aspects of good democratic 
citizenship after personality traits and intelligence are held constant.  
 Based on the discussion above this dissertation set out to answer the following, so far 
unanswered, research questions:  
 To what extent does education influence good democratic citizenship, when we take into 
account that individuals differ in terms of their predispositions, independent of their level of 
education?  
 What explains the influence, or lack of influence, of education on good democratic 
citizenship? 
 The framework for understanding the confounding of education by predispositions is outlined in 
the figure below, as well as where the different papers fit in. The figure illustrates the three different 
pathways education has traditionally been perceived to affect GDC, i.e. its effect on social 
positioning, its effect on cognitive styles and motivations, and its effect on cognitive faculties. 
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Figure 1: Framework for understanding the confounding of education on good democratic citizenship by predispositions 
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Chapter 2: Causal framework  
This section discusses the overall causal model. The main focus here is on how the different 
elements of the causal model are related whereas the contents of the different elements will be 
discussed in the coming chapters. The figure below illustrates: 
Figure 2: Causal model for understanding the confounding of education by predispositions4 
 
 
 The causal model is primarily based on the framework outlined by Mondak and collaborators on 
traits in political behavior (Mondak et al. 2010), as this is the most relevant for this political science 
dissertation but in fact very similar frameworks have been proposed in psychology some years ago 
(McAdams and Pals 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003). A full account of this and similar frameworks 
can be found in (McAdams and Pals 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003; Mondak et al. 2010). 
 The main argument in this dissertation is that the effect of education on GDC is confounded by the 
predispositions personality traits and intelligence when it comes to the effect of education on 
cognitions and motivations. More technically this implies that education is, at least partially, caused 
by differences in predispositions and that, part of the reason, why education is associated with GDC 
is because of predispositions giving rise to both differences in levels education and differences in 
                                                 
4 Only the elements from (Mondak et al. 2010) with direct impact on this investigation are included; their framework is somewhat 
more general in scope and more detailed. Furthermore following the convention in graphical causal models this general framework 
does not make any assumptions about the parameterization of the causal framework, such as the importance of interaction effects, or 
any other type of relationship between variables (Elwert 2013). The parameterizations used can be found in the individual papers.  
Education 
Predispositions 
Good democratic 
citizenship 
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levels of GDC. This is also the reason why this type of relationship is called common cause 
confounding since predispositions is the common cause affecting both levels of education and levels 
of GDC (Elwert 2013). This is a theoretical assertion but it does have some testable implications 
which allow us to assess some of the implications of this hypothesized theoretical model.  
 First of all education and predispositions should be related, and secondly the aspect of GDC 
studied should be related to both education and predispositions. These preconditions are a necessary 
but not sufficient condition. In terms of the second requirement there are already, as discussed in 
the introduction, a multitude of studies demonstrating the importance of personality traits for 
political outcomes (Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 1999; Gerber et al. 2011a; Gerber et al. 
2011c; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010). Although 
less frequently used, there are also beginning to be studies on the importance of intelligence in terms 
of explaining differences e.g. vote choice and political ideology (Bouchard et al. 2003; Deary, Batty, 
and Gale 2008; Hodson and Busseri 2012; Stankov 2009). There are literally hundreds, if not 
thousands, of studies on the effect of education on the different aspects of GDC that I am focusing 
on here. Some overviews are found in (Abramson 1983; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Goren 2013; 
Sullivan and Riedel 2001; Sullivan and Hendriks 2009).  
 In terms of the first requirement, that education and personality traits should be related, there is 
also evidence of this fact (Goldberg et al. 1998). Below I have reproduced the correlations from an 
American study reporting correlations between years of education and the Big Five (Goldberg et al. 
1998). In addition I have calculated the same correlations for the two samples used in this 
dissertation. I will elaborate on the two samples below but they can for the purposes of the 
comparison below briefly be described in the following manner: 
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 The first sample is a representative sample of the Danish population employing a 
standardized measure of personality traits and also includes a measure of years of schooling 
 The second sample is an age restricted sample, consisting of young men and women 
primarily in the age group 19-23, which employs the same standardized measure of 
personality traits as in the representative sample, but also includes the intelligence test from 
the time they were drafted to the military, which is why this sample is termed the “draftee 
sample”. This sample also employs a very similar measure of years of schooling to the one 
used in the representative sample 
Table 2: Correlations between years of schooling and predispositions  
 Goldberg et al Draftee sample Representative sample 
Openness 0.34 0.19 
(0.12 – 0.25) 
0.26 
(0.22 – 0.29) 
Conscientiousness 0.11 0.08 
(0.01 – 0.15) 
0.11 
(0.08 – 0.14) 
Extraversion -0.03 0.05 
(-0.02 – 0.12) 
0.10 
(0.07 – 0.13) 
Agreeableness -0.12 0.10 
(0.03 – 0.17) 
0.03 
(-0.01 – 0.06) 
Neuroticism -0.06 -0.03 
(-0.10 – 0.04) 
-0.06 
(-0.10 – (-0.03)) 
Intelligence Not available 0.32 
(0.24 – 0.41) 
Not available 
*The correlations between years of schooling and the Big Five personality traits are based on the scale scores of the Big Five as outlined in the scoring manual. The 
correlation between years of schooling and the intelligence test is based on the total test score from the draft test.  
 The correlations between the draftee samples and the representative sample are fairly similar in 
terms of size and in all cases the sign is the same. The largest differences are between the 
correlations between years of schooling and Openness and between years of schooling and 
Conscientiousness but in both cases the confidence intervals overlap, so the differences could 
simply be a matter of sampling variation.  
 There are some differences between the Goldberg et al sample and the two samples used in this 
investigation. First of all the correlation between Openness and years of schooling seems to be 
higher in the Goldberg et al sample although they do not report confidence intervals so it is difficult 
23 
 
to know how precise their measurement is. Secondly the correlation between Agreeableness, as well 
as Extroversion and years of schooling is negative in the American sample.  
 These somewhat low to moderate relationships between personality traits and education could 
lead us to the same conclusion as Mondak, who focuses on demographics generally, and argues that 
there is (Mondak 2010, 83): “only a minimal overlap between personality and the demographic 
variables”, in his samples. The problem is of course that education, or any other demographic 
variable, is never explaining close to all of the variation in any of the constructs related to good 
democratic citizenship either; in fact far from it. For instance in paper 4 the correlation between 
education and internal efficacy is .17 and it would not take extreme amounts of confounding by 
personality traits to reduce the effect size of education on internal efficacy substantially. In fact we 
find that the effect of education on internal efficacy in the representative sample decreases roughly 
fifty percent after personality traits are taken into account. The correlations between education and 
personality traits need not be extremely large for the combined confounding to be substantial.  
 The correlation between years of schooling is .32 in the draftee sample which is slightly lower 
than typically reported since the correlation between these two constructs is usually estimated at 
around .5 (Deary and Johnson 2010). A likely reason for this discrepancy is that the draftee sample is 
young and the full variation in educational attainment has not yet been achieved. This is an 
important caveat which needs to be kept in mind and I will return to this point in the conclusion. 
Causal ordering 
The two requirements outlined above, i.e. that predispositions are correlated with both education 
and GDC, only provide the minimum requirement that the predispositions can confound the effect 
of education but not that this is the correct causal ordering. There are several pieces of empirical 
evidence in favor of choosing the causal ordering in figure 2 above, where predispositions are 
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influencing both differences in levels of education as well as differences in levels of GDC; this 
phenomenon is called common cause confounding since predispositions are theorized to be the 
underlying common cause of the relationship between education and GDC (Elwert 2013).  
 First of all personality traits and intelligence are established early in life (Fagan 2011; Rose and 
Fisher 2011; Shiner and DeYoung 2013). In relationship to personality traits Shiner and DeYoung 
argue that something resembling the Big Five personality traits, except Openness, are already present 
when children are toddlers or in the preschool years (Shiner and DeYoung 2013) and differences in 
intelligence are already present in infancy and childhood (Fagan 2011; Rose and Fisher 2011). That 
differences in personality and intelligence are already present at an early age would matter little if 
these were not stable over time.5 If there is a large amount of stability this would suggest that later-
in-life changes such as education is likely to have a more limited impact on differences in personality 
and intelligence compared to those already established. This is also generally confirmed and in line 
with most of current theorizing and empirical evidence. For instance two recent studies 
demonstrated a corrected correlation between intelligence scores at age 11 and intelligence scores at 
age 77 and 80 of .73 (Deary et al. 2000; Deary et al. 2004). Personality traits are also very stable but 
less so than intelligence (Almlund et al. 2011, 121-122): “Rank-order stability in measured 
personality increases steadily over the lifespan…7-year test–retest stability estimates for personality 
plateau at r = 0.74, which is about the same level as terminal stability estimates for IQ…However, 
measured personality does not reach this plateau until at least age 50, whereas IQ reaches this 
plateau by age six or eight”. This does not imply that the rank order correlation for personality traits 
is low in adolescence or young adulthood; as this is around .5-.6 (Roberts and DelVecchio 2000). 
Furthermore a recent longitudinal study spanning 20 years, from age 30 to age 50, demonstrated a 
                                                 
5 Different types of stability can be assessed (Roberts, Wood, and Caspi 2008). Here the focus is on rank-order stability since the main 
goal of this dissertation is to investigate whether individual differences in personality traits and intelligence in a given population 
explain differences in GDC. 
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median rank order consistency of .65 (Terracciano, Costa, and McCrae 2006). Thus although the 
stability of personality is slightly lower and established somewhat later, compared to intelligence, it is 
still (Roberts, Wood, and Caspi 2008, 378): “remarkably high”.   
 Biological factors also have an impact on the discussion of stability; especially the concept of 
heritability. Heritability is an estimate of the amount of individual variation which in a given population 
at a given point in time is due to genetic variation (Plomin 1990, 43).6 Both personality traits and 
intelligence are highly heritable; estimates of the heritability of intelligence and personality traits are 
typically around 50 percent (Bouchard and McGue 2003). Furthermore, for intelligence the 
heritability increases with age, to around 70 percent in adulthood (Deary and Johnson 2010), which 
could suggest that environmental factors becomes less salient as individuals become independent 
and able to choose the environmental stimuli they prefer based on their genetic predispositions 
(McGue et al. 1993; Scarr and McCartney 1983). The timing of the intelligence test used, is also 
ideally suited for using the framework in figure 2. At the time the respondents are tested they are 
around 18, which means there is, for most respondents, two years of differences in levels of 
education as people usually enter primary school when they are around two years old and leave this 
compulsory educational system when they are sixteen. This implies that most educational differences 
are post their intelligence testing since all the respondents answer the survey after they completed the 
test. Conversely there is also a fair amount of variation on the time from the draft board test until 
the time they took the survey to investigate the effect of education on political GDC; on average 
there is 3.5 years from the time they took the draft board test till the time they participated in the 
survey with a minimum of .8 years and a maximum of 6.1 years. Still, as already mentioned we are 
relying on a sample of young people, so the full educational variation has not yet been achieved. 
                                                 
6 It is important to stress that heritability does not imply immutability; the classical example is height, which has a heritability estimate 
of around .8 but nonetheless there have been secular increases in height in many countries (Visscher, Hill, and Wray 2008). 
Furthermore heritability is a measure of the phenotypic variation in a given population due to genetic variation not of the absolute levels 
of a studied outcome. 
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 Furthermore there are multivariate genetic studies which suggest that much, but not all, of the 
shared covariance between education and intelligence is genetic (Bartels et al. 2002; Johnson, 
McGue, and Iacono 2006) , which could suggest that the effect of education on GDC is, at least 
partially, “genetically confounded”. This obviously needs to be determined on a case by case basis, 
i.e. depending on which aspect of GDC is studied. 
 In addition, longitudinal behavioral genetic studies of change and stability for personality traits 
demonstrate a large genetic component to both change and stability, whereas the environmental 
factors which contribute to change and stability are primarily those unique to each individual  
(Bleidorn et al. 2009; Blonigen et al. 2008; Bratko and Butkovic 2007; Hopwood et al. 2011; 
Johnson, McGue, and Krueger 2005; McGue, Bacon, and Lykken 1993). That genes can be a cause 
of change might at first seem counterintuitive, since a person’s DNA does not change over the 
course of a life time. On second thought however, we are all familiar with biological changes 
encoded in our DNA such as aging, sexual maturation, and children’s cognitive development. Much 
the same line of reasoning has been applied to the development of personality traits as most people, 
seem to follow the same pattern of development: As people get older they become more 
conscientiousness, agreeable, socially dominant7 and less neurotic (Caspi, Roberts, and Shiner 2005; 
Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer 2006); this process of development has been termed the maturity 
principle.    
 Just because most of the changes in personality traits are genetic in origin or unique to an 
individual does not rule out that education can have an effect on changes in personality traits e.g. 
through those factors unique to each individual, although to my knowledge no studies have so far 
investigated this possibility. If most of the observed changes in personality traits should be attributed 
                                                 
7 Social dominance is an aspect of the broader trait Extraversion 
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to differences in levels of education this would probably imply that the changes caused by education 
should be large. A recent study demonstrated different trajectories for personality traits depending 
on whether they went to college or not but the changes observed were relatively small and only 
significant for Conscientiousness and Agreeableness (Ludtke et al. 2011) and a similar study 
documented that other factors than education, such as relationship quality, are also associated with 
changes in personality traits (Parker et al. 2012) lending further credence to the fact that it is unlikely 
that all, or even most, of the changes in personality traits are associated with different educational 
experiences.  In fact it is plausible that these changes could also be, at least partially, genetic in 
nature, since we know that a major part of differences in educational attainment are due to genetic 
dispositions and very little is due to unique environmental factors (Branigan, McCallum, and Freese 
2013), which would cast doubt on the size of the independent effect of education on personality 
traits. As for intelligence the shared overlap between education, personality and GDC needs to be 
determined on a case by case basis. Until the evidence is more conclusive on the nature of the effect 
of education on predispositions, arrow 3 remains dotted however. Or in the words by Mondak 
outlining a similar framework to the one depicted above: (Mondak et al. 2010, 90):  
“In our view, the empirical record supports three conclusions. First, biological factors account for the vast majority of influence 
on personality traits, and especially on the five-factor structure. Second, environmental forces that operate through alteration of 
biological processes are acknowledged. Third, direct environmental influences on personality may occur…however, to produce 
discernible impact on personality, the change in environment apparently must be quite stark.” 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical expectations and enquiries 
This chapter discusses how best to investigate the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 1 and 
taking the causal framework discussed in chapter 2 as a given.  
The first implication of the theoretical framework is that the degree of confounding should vary 
according to whether the effect of education on GDC is based on social positioning vs. cognitive 
and motivational factors. Personality traits and intelligence are prime examples of cognitive and 
motivational factors and are thus theorized to primarily confound the effect of education when the 
effect of education is cognitive and motivational. Conversely the effect of education should be less 
confounded when its effect is based on social positioning.  
This is primarily investigated in paper 4 by comparing the effect education has on internal 
efficacy, where the effect of education is primarily theorized to be cognitive and motivational, and 
external efficacy, where the effect of education is primarily theorized to be based on social 
positioning, when personality traits are taken into account.  
In paper 1 it is also indirectly investigated whether education affects political sophistication 
through social positioning i.e. in a context which is not competitive. Since both differences in 
motivations, cognitive styles, and abilities are held constant by including personality traits and 
intelligence; whatever educational effect is left, is likely to be partly related to social positioning such 
as the opportunity to become informed through social networks.  
The second implication has to do with the distinction made above between cognitive styles and 
motivational factors versus cognitive abilities. Education has been theorized to affect both cognitive 
styles and motivational matters as well as cognitive abilities. Since I have measures of both 
intelligence, which is primarily measuring cognitive abilities, and personality traits, which are 
primarily measuring cognitive styles and motivational factors, we have a way to test which of these are 
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mainly confounding the effect of education. This is investigated throughout the papers where 
different papers address specific aspects of this relationship.  
 Paper 1 studies the determinants of political sophistication, operationalized as political 
knowledge and includes both measures of personality traits and intelligence, and is 
therefore able to investigate the relative degree of confounding by personality traits vs. 
intelligence for this political construct 
 Paper 2 studying the determinants of political tolerance also includes measures of both 
personality traits and intelligence as is therefore also able to assess the relative degree of 
confounding by personality traits vs. intelligence for this political construct  
 Paper 3 investigates why some people are policy voters, by focusing on differences in 
levels of education and intelligence and thus also addresses the relative influence of 
learned styles of cognition vs. deep-seated cognitive abilities.  
 The third and final implication of the framework is the importance of social positioning: 
 In paper 1 it is investigated whether education affects the opportunity to become politically 
sophisticated through social positioning such as social networks.  
 In paper 3 the effect education has on the opportunity and to become informed is also 
investigated in relationship to policy voting, the effect of education on policy voting 
mediated by political information is investigated. 
 In paper 4 it is investigated whether the effect of education on external efficacy decreases 
when the competition over public attention increases. This would indicate that the effect of 
education on social positioning is relative when the construct is competitive. 
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 The table below outlines the papers: 
Table 3: Overview of papers 
Paper # 1 2 3 4 
Title Education or personality traits 
as determinants of political 
sophistication? 
Intelligence is an overlooked 
but important source of 
political tolerance 
Disentangling the role of 
education, intelligence and political 
knowledge in policy voting  
Disentangling the role of 
education and personality traits 
for political behavior: Cognition 
and motivations vs. resource 
effects in external and internal 
efficacy 
Dataset(s) used Draftee sample 
Representative sample 
Draftee sample 
 
Draftee sample Representative sample 
Research question What is the effect of education 
on political sophistication 
when personality traits and 
intelligence are taken into 
account?   
Are those who are more 
intelligent more politically 
tolerant? 
Why are those who are more 
politically sophisticated policy 
voters? 
When is the effect of education 
on political outcomes highly 
confounded by personality traits 
and when is it not? 
Dependent variable(s) Political sophistication Political tolerance Policy voting (Attitude centrality, 
Position matching) 
Political efficacy (Internal 
efficacy, external efficacy) 
Independent variables Age 
Gender 
Personal income 
Education 
Personality traits 
Intelligence  
Age 
Gender 
Personal income 
Education 
Personality traits 
Intelligence 
Perceptions of group threat 
Age 
Gender 
Personal income 
Education 
Intelligence 
Age 
Gender 
Education 
Personality traits 
 
Statistical method used SEM in Mplus version 7 using 
the MLR estimator 
SEM in Mplus version 7 using 
the MLR estimator 
SEM in Mplus version 7 using 
bootstrapped standard errors 
Multilevel analysis with cross-
level interaction using Mplus 
version 7’s MLR estimator 
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Chapter 4 Important constructs  
This section briefly outlines the contents of the constructs personality traits and intelligence. 
Personality traits 
Personality can be defined as (Caprara et al. 2006, 3):  
“a set of dynamic, self-regulatory systems that emerge and operate over the life course in the service of personal 
adaptations (Caprara & Cervone, 2000). These internal systems guide affective, cognitive, and motivational processes, 
directing people toward achieving individual and collective goals.” 
 In personality research it is customary to distinguish between traits and characteristic adaptations. 
Traits, such as personality traits, are stable, general dispositions to act, think and feel in a systematic 
fashion, whereas characteristic adaptations are less stable, specific structures, which develop as a 
function of traits in concrete situations (McAdams and Pals 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003). General 
examples of characteristic adaptations are beliefs, values and attitudes, and all the political constructs 
studied in this dissertation are also examples of characteristic adaptations.  
 Although there is potentially an infinite amount of differences between human beings, 
researchers have in recent years settled on a consensus model of five basic traits which capture most 
of individual differences in personality traits; the so-called Big Five model (Matthews, Deary, and 
Whiteman 2009).8 This consensus model is so well established that some speak of a “paradigm shift” 
to the Big Five  (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008). The Big Five traits are Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism.  
 The theorizing on the Big Five is still in its infancy but there are some promising developments in 
psychology to devise a theoretical explanation for the ontogenetic (Shiner and DeYoung 2013) and 
                                                 
8 For historical overviews of the process leading to the Big Five model see e.g. (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008; Matthews, Deary, and 
Whiteman 2009) 
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phylogenetic basis (Nettle 2006) of the traits as well as their likely biological underpinnings 
(DeYoung and Gray 2009). In addition the Big Five can also be explained in terms of a cybernetic 
control system (Van Egeren 2009). Below I outline the main features of the traits drawing on recent 
theoretical advances. 
The Big Five traits 
The main characteristic of Extraversion is sensitivity to reward and positive affect and perhaps not 
surprsingly Extraversion has been associated with approach behaviour (Denissen and Penke 2008; 
DeYoung and Gray 2009; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). There are quite a few studies 
demonstrating that Extraversion is linked to positive emotions and sensitivity to reward (Depue and 
Collins 1999; Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005).  
 The main characteristic of Neuroticism is sensitivity to threat and the tendency to experience 
negative emotions, which means that Neuroticism is helpful in terms of error detection (Denissen 
and Penke 2008; DeYoung and Gray 2009; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). More specifically there 
have been studies researching the link between Neuroticism and various negative emotions, such as 
sadness, depression, anxiety and fear (DeYoung and Gray 2009; Kotov et al. 2010).  
 Whereas Neuroticism and Extraversion are mainly emotional traits, Conscientiousness is a trait 
concerned with constraint and top-down control (Denissen and Penke 2008; DeYoung and Gray 
2009; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). This means that Conscientiousness is concerned with error 
control as opposed to error detection as with Neuroticism (Van Egeren 2009).  Whereas a multitude of 
studies point at a possible links between the traits Neuroticism and Extraversion and various 
biological systems, there is much less research on the trait Conscientiousness from this perspective, 
which is also the case for Agreeableness, and Openness (DeYoung and Gray 2009).  
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 Agreeableness is a trait mainly dealing with the regulation of social interactions and is thus in the 
service of attaining the help of others in the pursuit of an individual’s personal goals attainment 
(Denissen and Penke 2008; DeYoung and Gray 2009; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). In addition 
those who are more agreeable are generally more compassionate and polite (DeYoung, Quilty, and 
Peterson 2007); although a recent study demonstrated that these two aspects of Agreeableness are 
differentially related to political ideology leading the author’s to use the labels “compassionate 
liberals” and “polite conservatives” (Hirsh et al. 2010). 
 The personality trait Openness/Intellect is mainly concerned with the exploration of a person’s 
environment (Denissen and Penke 2008; DeYoung and Gray 2009; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). 
Those who are open to experience are more likely to discover new opportunities arising, as well as 
thinking about the world in novel ways. It is no surprise that this personality trait has often been 
used in the literature on politics and personality traits since the cognitive style of intellectual 
reflection and engagement is often paramount in explaining political differences; most obviously in 
relationship to political interest and political knowledge (Gerber et al. 2011b) but as discussed in 
paper 2 also in relationship to political tolerance. 
Intelligence  
I will take my point of departure in this rather lengthy consensus definition of intelligence to 
understand this important cognitive construct (Gottfredson 1997, 13): 
“Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think 
abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic 
skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings—“catching on,” 
“making sense” of things, or “figuring out” what to do”. 
 As the definition makes clear intelligence is a very general mental ability; put more concretely those 
who are good at math are also likely to be fairly good at learning a new language. This tendency for 
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people who are good at one type of mental task to also be good at other types of mental tasks is also 
why intelligence researchers use the word general intelligence to denote the construct intelligence and to 
distinguish this concept from various sub-types of intelligence identified below this general level. At 
the level of psychometrics this general factor of intelligence, or g factor as it is also called, usually 
accounts for around 40 percent of the variance in intelligence test scores (Deary, Penke, and 
Johnson 2010) which makes it a very decisive construct if we want to understand individual 
differences in cognitive abilities. Conversely this also implies that roughly 60 percent of individual 
differences consist of specific abilities which are not captured by the general factor of intelligence.9    
 As for the Big Five model there is so far no widely accepted theory of human abilities, although 
both cognitive and biological theories exist (Detterman 2002). In the words of a recent review on 
the history of intelligence: (Mackintosh 2011, 11): “Although most intelligence researchers today 
probably accept the general factor is here to stay they remain, sharply divided on its explanation”. 
 It is not difficult to imagine that those who are more intelligent are also more likely to gain 
knowledge of politics, which is investigated in paper 1, since many topics and discussions in politics 
are fairly complex and difficult to understand. There is however an even closer conceptual affinity 
between intelligence and policy voting. Those who are more intelligent are better at the (Spearman 
1927, 164-166): “eduction of relations and correlates”, which is exactly what policy voting entails 
(Goren 2013): Deducing how to link one’s general ideological principles to a vote choice which 
matches those principles in the best possible way.  
Intelligence and personality traits 
Personality traits and intelligence are usually considered separate constructs. There are three 
dichotomies, which are used to conceptually differentiate the concepts, all of which can be 
                                                 
9 There are currently a number of different taxonomies for specific abilities (Carroll 2003; Johnson and Bouchard 2005; McGrew 
2009). 
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questioned, where the first term of the dichotomies refer to attributes usually attributed to 
intelligence, and the second attributes usually attributed to personality (DeYoung 2011).  
 Cognitive vs. non-cognitive traits 
 Ability tests vs. questionnaire tests 
 Maximal performance vs. typical performance 
 The differences between personality traits and intelligence are a matter of degree rather than kind 
as both personality traits and intelligence possess the above attributes to some extent (DeYoung 
2011). What is important however, is the distinction between cognitive abilities and cognitive styles 
made above in figure 1. Insofar as personality traits are relevant for cognition, as in the case of 
Openness, they are primarily representing habitual styles whereas intelligence is primarily 
representing maximum ability. This distinction between cognitive styles and cognitive abilities builds 
on how personality traits and intelligence have typically been conceived as constructs. 
 In terms of the empirical findings on the correlations between intelligence and personality there 
has to date only been a single meta-analysis of the relationship between intelligence and personality 
traits (Ackerman and Heggestad 1997). The most consistent finding is between Openness and 
general intelligence, with a correlation of .33 in the meta analysis. There are no sizeable correlations 
between general intelligence and the rest of the personality traits.  
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Chapter 5 Samples, data and measures 
In order to investigate the confounding of education by predispositions in terms of the framework 
outlined above I have made use of two datasets: (1) A representative sample, and (2) what I above 
referred to as the draftee sample. The draftee data on the draftee sample was primarily collected for 
this investigation and I will therefore outline in some detail the process of collecting data on this 
sample.  
Draftee sample 
The intelligence test data was obtained from a random sample of 4400 Danish men from the Danish 
draft registry, as well as all the women in the registry; this data also included information on their 
current address. The sampling strategy pursued was one of simple random sampling but done 
separately for men and women because whereas the men are a random sample of the whole 
population, the women are not, since they are not subject to mandatory military service and 
therefore self-select into the military. This is also why all women were initially included in the sample 
from the Danish draft registry; to get an estimate of how many women self-select into the military.  
 In order to test the questionnaire a pilot study was conducted. Based on the results a few 
adjustments to the final questionnaire were made. A combination of a postal survey and an online 
survey was used. The sample participants were sent a letter with an invitation to participate in the 
survey, stating that they could access it online by using the password and webpage provided in the 
letter. If they participated they entered into a competition to win an iPhone. The questionnaire 
contained data on political attitudes and behaviors, a host of socio-demographic variables, as well as 
measures of personality traits; the measurement of personality traits are elaborated on below. 
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Figure 3: Illustration of the process of data collection for the draftee sample 
 
 The draftee sample has a response rate of 27 percent. In order to deal with unit non response a 
series of sampling weights were created by running a logistic regression, where the dependent 
variable is response and non-response, and the predictors are those demographics contained in the 
sample from Danish draft registry i.e. gender, age, years of schooling at the time of the draft, region 
dummy, a dummy indicating whether people were fit to perform military duty, and finally their score 
on the intelligence test (Iannacchione, Milne, and Folsom 1991). 
Random sample of 4400 men and all 
women from the Danish draft registry  
Random sample of 200 individuals for 
pilot study 
1072 responded to all questions 
(Response rate: 27 percent)   
Random sample of 2000 men and 
2000 women   
Sample received 04-10-2011 
Timeline Process 
Pilot study initiated 17-10-2011 
Pilot study ended 21-11-2011 
Final sample data collection 
intialized 02-03-2012 
43 responded to all questions  
(Response rat:e 22 percent 
Final sample data collection 
ended 30-03-2012 
Follow up letters sent to those 
who had not yet responded to 
the survéy 19-03-2012 
Current adresses for sample 
updated 22-02-2012 
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Representative sample 
The representative sample (N=3612) is an internet panel used by TNS Gallup and is constructed to 
be an accurate reflection of the entire Danish population. This study was originally fielded between 
May 25 and June 6, 2010 and has a response rate of approximately 45 percent. In order to deal with 
unit non response I have used the weights provided by TNS Gallup in the analyses where I am using 
this sample. 
 As for the draftee sample the dataset from this sample contains measures of political attitudes 
and behaviors, as well as personality traits. This sample does not contain a measure of intelligence.  
Comparison of draftee sample and representative sample 
Descriptive statistics for personality traits, intelligence and demographics are outlined in the table 
below: 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for draftee sample and representative sample 
 Draftee sample Full representative sample 
Representative sample 
ages 19-27 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Max  Min  count Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Max Min count Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Max Min count 
Income 1.8 .89 5 1 1010 3.5 1.7 11 1 3437 1.7 .93 5 1 231 
Age 23 1.9 33 19 1072 52 16 90 18 3612 23 1.8 26 20 252 
Gender (Male=1) .46 .5 1 0 1072 .53 .5 1 0 3612 .47 .5 1 0 252 
Openness 27 6.3 46 10 1072 26 6.1 46 5 3612 27 6.2 45 11 252 
Conscientiousness 32 6.1 48 12 1072 32 5.5 48 10 3612 31 6.3 42 13 252 
Extraversion 33 6.5 48 5 1072 29 6.4 48 5 3612 29 7.1 44 9 252 
Agreeableness 29 6.6 45 5 1072 32 5.5 48 5 3612 30 6.4 42 11 252 
Neuroticism 22 7.5 44 3 1072 19 7.1 47 0 3612 23 7.5 47 4 252 
Intelligence 46 8 69 13 1071 
          
Education 4.2 1.6 6 1 1056 2.7 1.7 1 6 3612 3.2 1.2 6 1 252 
*The measures of personal income and education are coded according to paper 1 whereas the personality traits and measure of intelligence are 
following the original scaling 
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 The draftee sample is, in terms of personality traits and demographics, very similar to the 
representative sample when the same age group is being compared, i.e. those in the ages of 19-27, 
which in the draftee sample includes 95 percent of the respondents. In fact, in terms of personality 
traits, the full representative sample and the draftee sample are also very similar in terms of 
descriptive statistics. The largest difference between the full representative sample and the draftee 
sample is in terms of personal income, which is higher in the full representative sample, and 
education which is lower in the representative sample which reflects that young people in Denmark 
today are receiving more education than previously.  
Measurement of personality traits, intelligence and education  
This study follows the consensus on how to study personality by using the Big Five Model. This will 
be done by using a short version of the NEO-PI-R, which has 60 questions, 12 for each domain, 
rather than the 240 questions that are included in the full questionnaire (Costa et al. 2003). There are 
several short versions of the NEO-PI-R. The most popular is the NEO-FFI, which is constructed 
by taking the items with the highest loadings on the five domains (Costa et al. 2003). I have used the 
Danish NEO-PI-R Short version, which also has 60 items, but where the items with the highest 
loadings on the facets of the big five domains are chosen. The test is an appropriate measure for 
people aged 17 and above (Costa et al. 2003, 11). The correlations between each of the five domains 
with the full Danish NEO-PI-R are .9 and above, which indicates that you can just as confidently 
use the short version as the full version if you only want to measure the domains (Costa et al. 2003, 
74). The same questionnaire is employed in both samples. 
 The g factor accounts for the single largest part of the variance in typical intelligence tests (Jensen 
1998); typically around 40 percent (Deary, Penke, and Johnson 2010). In the famous Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS), g accounts for about 30-37 percent of the variance, and the tests total 
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score has a correlation of .95 with g (Jensen 1998, 90). The test I am employing, Børge Priens Prøve 
(BPP), has a correlation of .82 with the full WAIS score (Mortensen, Reinisch, and Teasdale 1989), 
and a general intelligence factor accounts for approximately 50-60 % of the variance in the BPP 
(Hartmann and Teasdale 2004). This of course also implies that there is much of the variation, 
which is ability specific, and it is therefore also very interesting to investigate the effect of specific 
abilities or group factors as determinants of political attitudes and behaviors. The total BPP score 
has a correlation of .99 with g, which makes it an excellent measure of g (Hartmann and Teasdale 
2004). 
Context 
There is a final issue of relevance to the discussion on the relationship between education and 
predispositions which is related to the research design. The context is the country Denmark as the 
two studies used have sampled their respondents here. Two issues are important in this regard. 
 First of all Denmark represents a least likely case for the effect of education on GDC after 
predispositions are taken into account. Since Denmark has an educational system in which education 
is free and students receive a monthly stipend to cover living expenditures predispositions are likely 
to have a large impact on levels of education; i.e. most can pursue the level of education they are 
cognitively capable of finishing, intelligence, and have the inclination to pursue, personality traits. If 
education therefore has an effect in this context it is strong evidence that education is not 
completely confounded by predispositions.  
 Secondly, the educational system in Denmark is centered around a universal primary school in 
which most young people have typically attended. For this particular age group the percentage of 
students in private school is around 12-13 percent, with some regional differences,;10a number that 
                                                 
10 http://www.noegletal.dk/  
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by 2013 had risen to around 16 percent. That primary school is universal makes it less likely that 
educational experiences have very different effects on cognitive skills and personality traits as the 
goals, values and standards are very similar across the country. Furthermore, a recent analysis has 
demonstrated that between-school differences have very little effect on differences in graduation 
grades in primary school although in a given year there are some between schools effects on grades 
they are not particularly stable over time (Rangvid 2008) which suggests that educational experiences 
are likely to be homogeneous in terms of their cognitive effect.  
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Chapter 6 Findings 
This section outlines the main findings from the four papers in terms of the relevance for the overall 
research questions. Operationalization and definitions of constructs can be found in table 1 above. 
First the individual papers are briefly presented. After that the research questions are addressed i.e. 
whether, why and when education has an effect on GDC. 
Brief overview of papers 
In order to understand the summary of the overall research findings a brief overview of the 
individual papers is presented. 
 Paper 1 investigates whether education still has an effect on political sophistication, 
operationalized as political knowledge, after personality traits and intelligence are held constant. 
Both the representative sample and the draftee sample are used to investigate this research question. 
In both samples, education not only has an effect on political sophistication, but in fact the largest 
effect on political sophistication is represented by education. Being more intelligent, more open to 
experience as well as emotionally stable, is also associated with higher levels of political 
sophistication. It is speculated that part of the reason why those who are more educated are more 
sophisticated, even holding personality traits and intelligence constant, is because of the effect of 
education on the opportunity to become informed such as though social networks i.e. its effect on 
social positioning. 
 In paper 2 it is investigated whether cognitive abilities, in the form of general intelligence, have an 
effect on political tolerance. Political tolerance is measured by asking respondents whether they are 
willing to grant civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, to the Neo Nazis or the Far Right. In order 
to make as comprehensive an investigation of the possible of the effect of intelligence on political 
tolerance both cognitive styles, in the form of Openness and emotional factors, in the form of the 
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personality traits Extraversion and Neuroticism and in the form of feelings of threat, as well as 
socio-demographics, most notably education, are included in the final model specification.  We find 
the predisposition having the largest effect on political tolerance is intelligence but that those more 
open to experience and more introverted are also more tolerant; feeling threatened by the groups are 
strongly predicting intolerance, which is in accordance with the established literature. Furthermore 
intelligence moderates the degree to which respondents are willing to also grant civil liberties to the 
extreme group the Neo Nazis and not only the Far Right: Those who are highly cognitively able are 
equally likely to grant civil liberties to the Far Right and Neo Nazis whereas those who are less 
cognitively able are more likely to grant civil liberties only to the Far Right. We speculate that the 
reason for this finding is that those who are more intelligent are better able to perform “principled 
reasoning”; i.e. deduce that civil liberties should be granted to all groups, also those who are 
potentially threatening, violent and anti-democratic. The graph below illustrates the difference in 
levels of tolerance toward the Neo-Nazis or the Far Right as measured by a dummy variable; the Far 
Right is the reference group. The graph illustrates that as people become more and more intelligent 
they are more and more willing to also grant civil liberties to the Neo Nazis as evidenced by the 
effect in the size of the difference getting smaller and smaller; in fact it becomes insignificant at very 
high levels of intelligence. 
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Figure 4: Differences in the degree of political tolerance toward Neo Nazis compared to the Far Right conditional on levels of intelligence with 95 % confidence bands 
 
 In paper 3 it is investigated why those who are more politically sophisticated are policy voters, by 
focusing on the two antecedents of political sophistication intelligence and education. Policy voting 
is measured in two ways: The correspondence between a measure of left right ideological principles 
and ideological self-identification and the correspondence between the same measure of ideological 
principles and vote choice; the larger the correspondence is between the measure of ideological 
principles on the one hand and ideological self-identification and vote choice on the other, the larger 
the degree of policy voting. It is investigated whether education or intelligence moderates the degree 
of policy voting i.e. whether those who are more educated and/or intelligent are more likely to 
policy. It is argued that education primarily affects political sophistication via the motivation and 
opportunity to become informed, i.e. via political knowledge, whereas intelligence primarily affects 
political sophistication via the ability to structure a person’s belief system. These predictions are 
largely confirmed, since the effect of education is mediated by political knowledge, whereas 
intelligence is not. Furthermore there is a much larger moderating effect of intelligence on policy 
45 
 
voting compared to the moderating effect of education; an effect that is even equal to the 
moderating effect of political knowledge on policy voting.  
 Finally in paper 4 the differential effect of education on internal and external efficacy is 
investigated. Internal efficacy, the subjective feeling of competence in politics, is measured using a 
three item index based on standard items, and external efficacy, the perception of government 
responsiveness, is measured using a two item index also using standard items. As already argued, the 
effect of education is theorized to be confounded by personality traits when its effect is based on 
cognitive and motivational factors, such as its effect on internal efficacy. Conversely the effect of 
education should be less confounded by personality traits when it comes to the effect education has 
on social positioning i.e. its effect on external efficacy. These predictions are confirmed as the effect 
of education on internal efficacy is more highly confounded by personality traits compared to the 
effect of education on external efficacy. Openness is positively associated with feeling both 
externally and internally efficacious and Neuroticism is negatively associated with both external and 
internal efficacy. In addition those who are more agreeable and conscientious are more internally 
efficacious and those who are more extroverted are more externally efficacious.  
 The theorized mechanisms underlying the differential effect of education on internal and external 
efficacy, i.e. cognitions and motivations vs. social positioning, was subject to an empirical test. This 
was done by investigating whether the effect of education decreases when the amount of 
environmental competition, as measured by municipal wealth, income, average level of education 
and an index of the three, increases. Since external efficacy is a competitive construct the effect of 
education on this construct should decrease if its effect is based on social positioning whereas its 
effect on internal efficacy should remain constant it its effect is based on cognitions and 
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motivations. This is confirmed for all four measures of competitive environments. The figure below 
illustrates the effect of education as the index of environmental competition increases. 
Figure 5 Marginal effect of education on external efficacy as a function of degree of competitiveness 
 
Does education influence good democratic citizenship? 
This paragraph summarizes the main results for the first research question i.e. whether education 
influences good democratic citizenship when we take into account that people also differ in terms of 
their personality traits and level of intelligence independent of their level of education. The main 
results from this investigation are summarized in the table below. The table contains four pieces of 
information: (1) Whether education still exerts a significant influence on the GDC after taking into 
account differences in predispositions, indicated by a plus, meaning education exerts a positive 
influence on the construct, or a minus, meaning education exerts a negative influence on the 
construct or is non-significant (N.S); (2) the zero-order correlation11 between education and 
                                                 
11 Strictly speaking these are model implied correlations which means there can be some differences between these two figures (Bollen 
1989). However they convey the same type of information and all models are well fitting which means there is, generally speaking, a 
small difference between the model implied correlations and the z correlations. In addition for those models where the constructs are 
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predispositions and the construct studied, the first number in parentheses; (3) the standardized 
coefficient for education and predispositions without including the other, the second number in 
parentheses; and (4) finally the standardized coefficient for education and predispositions in the 
model in which they are both included, the last number in the parenthesis.  
 The general strategy used to investigate the extent to which the effect of education on GDC is 
confounded by predispositions followed a three pronged approach: First it was demonstrated that 
those who are more educated are more tolerant, sophisticated, internally and externally efficacious 
and more likely policy voters which is in accordance with the established literature. Secondly 
theoretical expectations were derived for the likely impact of one or more predispositions on the 
political constructs studied. These expectations were then tested in a model, without including 
education, to investigate whether they, independently of education significantly affected differences 
in GDC. Finally a full model in which both education and predispositions were simultaneously 
included was estimated, to investigate whether education still exerted a significant influence after 
differences in personality traits and intelligence were held constant. 
 In terms of the first analysis, education is in all cases positively associated with all the political 
constructs representing GDC as demonstrated by the zero-order order correlations for education 
ranging from .41 for political sophistication in the draftee sample to .12 for political tolerance also in 
the draftee sample; see the first number in parentheses in table 5 above. Education is also positively 
associated with all the political constructs studied after the effect of age, gender and income is held 
constant; the second number in parenthesis in table 5 above. The first part of the story, that 
education is associated with political tolerance, political sophistication, political efficacy and policy 
voting is thus confirmed. Put differently, the two samples used to investigate the first research 
                                                                                                                                                             
latent the only way to obtain correlations between constructs is via model implied correlations. For those models where there are no 
degrees of freedom, no missing values, and the constructs are not latent the model implied correlations and the zero order 
correlations are obviously the same. 
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question are confirming the results of literally hundreds of studies on the effect of education on 
GDC. 
 This is only half of the story. The other half is whether predispositions are also important 
constructs to take into account when explaining differences in GDC. As mentioned in the 
introduction there are already quite a few studies demonstrating that personality traits are important 
if we want to understand individual differences in e.g. political ideology, vote choice, partisanship, 
political participation, political discussion rates and political knowledge  (Gerber et al. 2011a, 2011b; 
Gerber et al. 2011d; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010). This is also confirmed 
here as illustrated in the table above. Especially Openness to experience and intelligence are 
predicting differences in GDC, those who are more intelligent and open to experience are more 
likely to ascribe to GDC; Extraversion, Conscientiousness and Neuroticism are also predicting 
differences in GDC although less consistently.  
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Table 5: Findings from the four papers 
 Political sophistication Political sophistication Tolerance Policy voting 
(position matching) 
Policy voting 
(Attitude centrality) 
Internal efficacy External efficacy 
Sample Draftee sample Representative sample Draftee sample Draftee sample Draftee sample Representative sample Rpresentative sample 
Openness + (0.15/0.15/0.13)  + (0.08/0.12/0.08) + (0.17/0.14/0.14) Not investigated Not investigated + (0.20/0.20/0.18) + (0.19/0.17/0.15) 
Conscientiousness + (0.14/0.16/0.13) N.S. (0.06/0.03/0.03) N.S. (-0.04/0.04/0.04) Not investigated Not investigated + (0.24/0.13/0.13) N.S. (0.12/0.01/0.01) 
Extraversion N.S. (0.00/-0.04/-0.05)  N.S. (-0.01/-0.07/-0.05) - (-0.15/-0.10/-0.10) Not investigated Not investigated N.S. (0.23/0.03/0.03) + (0.18/0.04/0.05) 
Agreeableness N.S. (-0.03/0.03/0.02) N.S.  (-0.01/0.02/0.02) N.S. (-0.08/-0.03/-0.03) Not investigated Not investigated - (-0.07/-0.07/-0.07) N.S. (-0.01/-0.03/-0.03) 
Neuroticism - (-0.22/-0.15/-0.14) N.S. (-0.12/-0.08/-0.07) N.S. (0.03/0.02/0.02) Not investigated Not investigated - (-0.28/-0.16/-0.16) - (-0.15/-0.13/-0.12) 
Intelligence + (0.39/0.36/0.26) Not investigated + (0.22/0.16/0.16) + (0.51/0.51/0.45) + (0.42/0.61/0.57) Not investigated Not investigated 
Education + (0.41/0.43/0.32)  + (0.15/0.17/0.14) N.S. (0.12/0.08/0.03) N.S. (0.37/0.25/0.17) N.S. (0.29/0.20/0.10) + (0.17/0.15/0.09) + (0.18/0.15/0.11) 
*Three numbers are referenced in the parentheses. The first number is the zero order correlations between the dependent and independent variables. The second number is the standardized coefficient for a 
model including only education or predispositions. The final number is the standardized coefficient for the model including both predispositions and education. For policy voting the numbers refers to the 
interaction term for education and intelligence. A + signifies the coefficient is significant at a .05 level and positively associated with the dependent variable in the model specification including both education 
and predispositions, whereas a – signifies it is negatively associated with the dependent variable.  
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 The third and final part of the investigation was to investigate whether there was still an effect of 
education on the GDC after predispositions were included i.e. whether the effect of education is 
confounded by predispositions. The results are mixed in terms of the degree of confounding, I will 
elaborate on some of the specifics in the next paragraphs, but for all political constructs studied the 
degree of confounding is quite substantial as evidenced by the differences in coefficients between 
the last and the second to last number in table 5 above. It is difficult to compare the changes in the 
effect size for education across constructs since the above estimates are standardized coefficients, 
and thus cannot be directly be compared across constructs, but they provide a general idea of the 
degree of confounding.   
What explains the influence, or lack of influence of education, on good democratic citizenship? 
The primary mechanisms through which education has traditionally been theorized to affect GDC, 
using the terminology introduced above in figure 1, are: 
 Through social positioning 
 Through cognitive styles and motivational factors 
 Through cognitive abilities 
 In order to understand when and why education influences GDC it is necessary to recap the 
results and terminology from paper 4. In this paper it is demonstrated that the effect of education 
on internal efficacy is highly confounded by personality traits whereas the effect of education on 
external efficacy is less confounded by personality traits. This difference in the degree of 
confounding is explained by making a distinction between the effect of education on (1) cognitive 
and motivational factors and (2) social positioning. Since personality traits are directly tapping into 
cognitive and motivational factors this is what we would expect. Conversely the reason why those 
who are more educated are more externally efficacious is because of social positioning, primarily 
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social network centrality, which is important because (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996, 45): 
“Centrality in politics is defined by proximity to governmental incumbents and political actors who 
make public policy and to those in the mass media who disseminate and interpret the issues, events, 
and activities of people in politics”. It thus seems that the effect of education is more highly 
confounded when its effect it based on cognitive and motivational factors as opposed to social 
positioning. 
 This is further corroborated in paper 1 on political sophistication. In paper 1 I find that, not only 
is education still an important determinant of individual differences in political sophistication after 
personality traits and intelligence are accounted for, it is in fact the strongest determinant of 
differences in political sophistication. This might initially seem puzzling since political sophistication 
is also a highly cognitive construct and there was not a large effect of education on policy voting 
after differences in intelligence was accounted for in paper 3. Combining the findings from papers 1 
and 3 provides a possible answer. A much cited definition of political sophistication posits that 
(Luskin 1987, p860): “A person is politically sophisticated to the extent to which his or her PBS 
[political belief system] is large, wide-ranging, and highly constrained”. Political sophistication is 
operationalized as political knowledge in paper 1 i.e. the size part of the definition. As demonstrated 
in paper 3 constraint is primarily affected by intelligence whereas knowledge is primarily affected by 
education. Social positioning, is likely to have a larger effect on political knowledge than on policy 
voting which is in large part a measure of constraint: Although you can gain knowledge of politics by 
being in the right information environment, i.e. via social positioning, or because you are interested 
in politics and therefore read the newspaper, i.e. via motivational factors, this does not mean that 
you can accurately use that information to link it to a party that matches your preferences i.e. policy 
vote. The reason why education still has such a large effect on political knowledge in paper 1 is 
therefore likely to be because the effect education has on social positioning.  
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 Using the framework outlined above in figure 1 we can elaborate on the finding that the effect of 
education on GDC is more confounded by cognitive and motivational factors compared to its effect 
on social positioning. We need to divide the effect of education into (1) cognitive styles and 
motivational factors, i.e. when the effect of education is confounded by personality traits, (2) and 
cognitive abilities, i.e. when the effect of education is confounded by intelligence.  
 The general result from papers 2-3 is that when the effect of education on the political construct 
studied is primarily related to cognitive abilities there is a large degree of confounding of the effect of 
education. In papers two and three, investigating political tolerance and policy voting, the effect of 
education is either small or not significant after individual differences in intelligence are held 
constant. At the same time the effect of intelligence is very strong and significant constant after 
education is held constant. Although different explanations have been set forth for why people 
differ in their degree of political tolerance and policy voting most explanations of why education 
should be linked to these also stress cognitive abilities. For instance in relationship to tolerance many 
have stressed that the ability to apply abstract principles of civil liberties to concrete applications 
toward specific groups is a major component of determining who becomes politically tolerant  
(Lawrence 1976; McClosky and Brill 1983; Prothro and Grigg 1960) what some have termed 
“cognitive sophistication” (Bobo and Licari 1989) and others “principled tolerance” (Sniderman et 
al. 1989).  
 Turning to policy voting this can, at an abstract level, be compared to the process of making 
tolerance judgments. Both require the ability to deduce the relationships between abstract principles 
and concrete applications; Political tolerance requires the ability to deduce the link between abstract 
notions of civil liberties and concrete groups whereas policy voting requires the ability to deduce the 
link between a person’s ideological standpoints and a party choice which reflects that standpoint. An 
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important part of being intelligent is that it makes one capable of the “eduction of correlates and 
relations” (Spearman 1927). It is therefore no surprise that the effect of education on policy voting 
and political tolerance decreases once differences in intelligence are held constant since we are in 
essence holding the ability to deduce the connections between abstract principles and concrete 
applications constant.  
 Internal efficacy is clearly also a cognitive construct but likely more related to cognitive styles 
rather than cognitive abilities. Whether people feel they understand politics and feels it is 
complicated i.e. are internally efficacious (Balch 1974; Converse 1972; Craig 1979; Craig and 
Maggiotto 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Lipset and Schneider 1983; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 
1991) could of course be related to abilities, but it is not a test of whether they actually understand it 
but rather whether they perceive they understand it. Arguably, general perceptions of one’s own 
capacities are more related to personality traits than actual ability. The correlation between 
intelligence and self-perceived intelligence is also fairly low and generally no higher than .3 
(Chamorro-Premuzic, Moutafi, and Furnham 2005; Paulhaus, Lysy, and Yik 1998). The zero order 
correlation between intelligence and internal efficacy in the draftee sample, although not reported in 
any of the papers, is also very low with a correlation of .03. 
 The results seem to suggest that the degree of confounding is largest when the effect of 
education on GDC is primarily based on cognitive abilities, somewhat smaller when its effect is 
primarily based on cognitive and motivational factors, and finally smallest when the effect is based 
on social positioning.  This is illustrated in the figure below.  
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Figure: 6: Graphical illustration for understanding when predispositions confound the effect of education on GDC 
 
 A brief elaboration on what the figure depicts is needed. It summarizes, what this dissertation 
have argued, are the primary reasons why education is associated with the different aspects of GDC 
studied. For instance, the primary reason why education is associated with policy voting is because it 
is confounded by intelligence, thus creating a partly spurious association; this paper also 
demonstrates that some of the effect is mediated by its effect on political knowledge, i.e. via political 
knowledge, so the word “primary” is important. Secondly it depicts when the degree of confounding 
is largest, illustrated by the height of the boxes and the increasing arrow. Focusing again on policy 
voting, it demonstrates that the effect of education on this construct is highly confounded, whereas 
the effect of education on political sophistication in paper 1 is primarily based on social positioning 
and the degree of confounding is therefore smaller.  
Cognitive abilities Cognitive styles and motivational 
factors 
Social positioning 
External efficacy 
 
Political knowledge 
 
Political participation 
 
Internal effiacy 
Political tolerance 
 
Policy voting 
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 In addition to those constructs investigated in this dissertation I have also added political 
participation to the figure since this is probably the most discussed and researched constructs in 
relationship to the debate on the causal effect of education although not addressed in this 
dissertation. Most researchers have argued that an important part of the reason why those who are 
more educated are also more likely to participate more is because they have a central network 
position (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and in fact, recent 
studies have demonstrated that, for some types of political participation, education has a relative 
effect when competition increases which suggests that this construct is also based on social 
positioning (Campbell 2009; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Persson 2011; Tenn 2005). We can 
therefore speculate that it is unlikely to be highly confounded by predispositions.  
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Chapter 7 Discussion and implications 
Is education still the universal solvent? 
So based on the results, what have we learned about education and its political effects? Two general 
lessons present themselves. First of all, that the effect of education on GDC is highly confounded 
by predispositions when education’s effect is based on cognitive and motivational factors; especially 
for those constructs where the primary reason why more educated people differ in them is because 
of cognitive abilities. This is the case with, for example, policy voting and political tolerance. 
Secondly, that there is still a large effect of education on political knowledge and external efficacy. 
This is likely to be because the effect education has on social positioning such as the opportunity to 
become informed and gain political knowledge and to get access, influence and status and feel 
externally efficacious. 
 The results in this dissertation suggest that the most likely function of education in politics is a 
social distributor. Education is e.g. an important determinant of network centrality, as well as an 
important determinant of status, power and access in a given society and by implication affects a 
host of important political constructs such as external efficacy, political knowledge, and most likely 
political participation, since education affects all of these via positional factors. Although this line of 
reasoning is not typical in political science it is becoming more frequent (Campbell 2009; Helliwell 
and Putnam 2007; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Persson 2011; Tenn 2005), and it is not 
uncommon to use this way of theorizing education in economics e.g. the signaling model (Spence 
1973) nor in sociology e.g. in functionalist theories and critical theories (Collins 1971; Davis and 
Moore 1945).  
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Democratic implications 
What are the democratic implications of the findings that education exerts a smaller effect on 
cognitive and motivational matters than previously held and that the primary function of education 
is on social positioning? To answer this question we can return to its overall effect on GDC. 
 Originally Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry argued that, the primary function of education differed for 
the two components of GDC, political engagement, i.e. “the capability of identifying and acting on 
political interest”, and political enlightenment, i.e. “the recognition of democratic principles and 
rights of all citizens to hold and express interests”. The primary effect of education on political 
engagement was sorting, whereas education has an absolute effect on political enlightenment. This 
distinction was actually already proposed by Converse in his famous 1972 article (Converse 1972) in 
which he distinguishes between a context in which education has an absolute effect what he termed 
“the education driven model” and a context in which education has a relative effect, what he termed 
“the sorting model” (Converse 1972). These two types of effects correspond to the effect of 
education on internal and external efficacy respectively. This means that the primary way education 
enhances GDC is through political enlightenment according to Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry. What we 
have added to this story is that democratic enlightenment, can be highly confounded by 
predispositions such as the effect of education on political tolerance. On the face of it, this 
dissertation thus limits the scope of education as a force for good democratic citizenship even 
further. Things are however more complicated than Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry originally 
suggested. 
 As argued forcefully by Campbell their statement that education only affects political engagement 
through sorting, is too sweeping and needs theoretical refinement (Campbell 2009). The most 
important refinement in the present context is the argument that not all constructs related to 
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political engagement are competitive and thus not subject to sorting effects. We demonstrated above 
that the effect of education on external efficacy decreased when the proportion of rich, wealthy or 
educated persons in a given municipality increases but this only happens because external efficacy is a 
competitive construct. Education generally grants a person access, influence and power in the form 
of social network positions, and therefore makes people feel more externally efficacious, but when 
the proportion of rich, wealthy and educated persons in a municipality increases, any individual’s 
education no longer has as strong an impact on social network centrality and the effect on external 
efficacy decreases.  
 Another more technical way to frame it is to say that external efficacy is a zero-sum construct 
(Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Not all political engagement constructs are zero-sum based 
however. For instance political knowledge, which is partly reflecting the political engagement 
construct, is not a zero-sum construct: Knowing who is prime minister does not negatively affect 
other’s knowledge of this fact. This is clearly a positive sum outcome. 
 Thus although some of the effect of education on GDC is confounded by predispositions, 
notably constructs where the effect is based on cognitive abilities, there is still an absolute effect of 
education on GDC through social positioning as long as the construct is not competitive, such as 
for political knowledge. Furthermore we cannot, based on the data at hand, rule out that mass levels 
of education has, over the course of the last hundreds of years, affected mass levels of GDC 
although education in the relatively affluent country of Denmark does not seem to affect individual 
differences in levels of GDC today.  
Limitations and directions for future research 
Although this dissertation has relied on excellent measures of personality traits and intelligence, and 
covered most aspects of its effect on GDC after personality traits and intelligence are held constant 
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a few limitations and directions for future research are in order. The limitations are mentioned in 
bullet form below and are in essence a summary of the limitations already mentioned in this 
document and other limitations mentioned in the individual papers. General limitations, such as the 
fact that the results need to be replicated and that the generalizability is pending empirical 
verification are not mentioned. 
Table 6: Limitations and directions for future research 
Limitation Directions for future research 
This dissertation has relied on a general terminology consisting of cognitive and 
motivational factors and situational factors to describe the interplay between 
predispositions and education 
Develop a more elaborate theoretical model accounting for whether education 
affects specific cognitive, motivational or situational factors  
The variance for the level of education in the draftee sample is somewhat lower 
than in the population at large which could attenuate the effects of education on 
GDC.  
Confirm the results using samples where the variation in the level of education is 
larger 
The samples are cross-sectional and the full interplay between the development of 
differences in levels of education and predispositions and GDC are not observed 
Conduct panel study of young adults before differences in levels of education are 
large including measures of GDC and predispositions 
Personality traits and intelligence are broad traits and the effect of education could 
be confounded by lower level attributes of these broad traits 
Conduct study including measures of lower order traits 
+ see elaboration below 
There are other important predispositions to consider other than personality traits 
and intelligence  
Conduct study including measures of different predispositions 
+ see elaboration below 
Another important source of confounding is pre-adult experiences such as parental 
socio-economic status 
Conduct study including measures of preadult experiences 
+ see elaboration below. 
 
 My dissertation has investigated whether education still has an effect on political tolerance, 
political sophistication, political efficacy and issue voting after the predispositions personality traits 
and intelligence are accounted for. I find significant partial confounding, which suggests that the 
educational effect found in most studies is substantially inflated.  
 However, there are more to predispositions and pre-adult influences than personality traits and 
intelligence, although these broad traits are capturing a very large part of individual differences. A 
complete account of the effect of education on political behaviors requires methods that take into 
account, more generally, how people differ genetically as well as in their family background before 
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entering secondary and post-secondary education (Branigan, McCallum, and Freese 2013).  
Investigating genetic confounding and the importance of pre-adult socialization can be done by 
studying monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins. Using twins, it is possible to estimate the 
degree of confounding, i.e. does education retain some or all of its explanatory power, and to 
distinguish between genetic and environmental sources of confounding. Using twin methods to 
investigate the causal effect of education on GDC would thus provide an important direction for 
future research.   
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English summary 
This dissertation explores the extent to which education influences good democratic citizenship 
(GDC) after taking into account that people also differ in terms of their personality traits and 
intelligence, independent of their level of education, and what explains this influence or lack of 
influence. 
 Classic studies of political behavior have argued that education is important for a host of political 
behaviors and attitudes, which are all aspects of GDC, such as political sophistication, political 
tolerance, policy voting, and internal and external efficacy. In fact to such an extent that education 
was termed “the universal solvent”. Recent studies have questioned this consensus and argued that 
those factors which lead people to pursue higher levels of education are the same factors which lead 
people to also possess GDC. More to the point it has been suggested that personality traits and 
intelligence are confounding the effect of education on GDC. So far no one has however thoroughly 
investigated this claim and this dissertation therefore set out to do just that, by focusing on the 
aspects of GDC mentioned above. 
 The results demonstrate that in most cases there is still an influence of education on GDC but 
that it depends on the political construct studied. In order to explain the divergent results it is 
necessary to distinguish between whether the effect of education on the political construct is based 
on education affecting: (1) Cognitive abilities, (2) cognitive styles and motivations, or (3) social 
positioning. When the effect education on the aspect of GDC is primarily based on cognitive 
abilities, such as its effect on political tolerance and policy voting, there is a high degree of 
confounding. When the effect of education on GDC is primarily based on cognitive styles and 
motivational factors, such as the effect of education on internal efficacy, there is a moderate degree 
of confounding and finally when the effect of education on GDC, is based on social positioning, 
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such as the effect of education on external efficacy, the degree of confounding is fairly low. In other 
words the effect of education on GDC is highly confounded by intelligence (cognitive abilities), 
moderately confounded by personality traits (cognitive styles and motivational factors) and less 
confounded in terms of social positioning. These results suggest that the impact on education on 
cognitive and motivational factors is less than previously held but that education is still important in 
terms of ensuring access, influence and status via. social networks i.e. social positioning. 
 The democratic implications of the finding that some of the effect of education on GDC is 
confounded and that education primarily acts as a social distributor are discussed. 
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Danish summary/dansk resume 
Jeg undersøger i denne afhandling i hvilken grad uddannelse påvirker, ”godt demokratisk 
medborgerskab”, (GDM) når man tager højde for, at mennesker også er udstyret med forskellige 
personligheder og niveauer af intelligens, samt hvad der forklarer hvorfor, eller hvorfor ikke, 
uddannelse påvirker GDM. 
 Klassiske studier af politisk adfærd har argumenteret for, at uddannelse er vigtigt for en række 
politiske adfærdsformer og holdninger så som politisk sofistikation, politisk tolerance, et konsistent 
partivalg, om man føler sig kompetent i politik, samt om man føler, at regeringen er responsiv. 
Nyere studier har stillet spørgsmålstegn ved denne udlægning og argumenteret for, at de faktorer der 
gør, at man får en højere uddannelse, er de samme faktorer som påvirker GDM. Nogle forskere har 
argumenteret for, at personlighedstræk og intelligens både påvirker uddannelse og GDM, og de er 
den egentlige årsag til, at uddannelse er forbundet med GDM. Indtil videre har ingen dog undersøgt 
denne påstand, hvilket denne afhandling derfor gør, ved at fokusere på de ovenfornævnte aspekter 
ved GDM.  
 Jeg demonstrerer i afhandlingen, at uddannelse i de fleste tilfælde stadig påvirker de forskellige 
aspekter af GDM, men at det afhænger af, hvilket aspekt af GDM, man undersøger. For at forklare 
resultaterne, er det nødvendigt at skelne mellem, om effekten af uddannelse på GDM er baseret på 
en påvirkning af: (1) Kognitive evner, (2) kognitiv stil eller motivationelle faktorer, eller (3) social 
positionering. Når effekten af uddannelse på GDM primært er baseret på påvirkning af kognitive 
evner, såsom effekten af uddannelse på politisk tolerance, og at foretage et konsistent partivalg, har 
uddannelse en lille effekt, når vi tager højde for personlighed og intelligens. Når effekten af 
uddannelse på GDM primært er baseret på påvirkning af kognitiv stil eller motivationelle faktorer, så 
som effekten af uddannelse på, om man føler sig i stand til at forstå politik, er der en moderat effekt 
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af uddannelse, når vi tager højde for intelligens og personlighed. Endelig når effekten af uddannelse 
på GDM primært er baseret på social positionering, påvirkes effekten af uddannelse på GDC ikke 
meget af at tage højde for personlighed og intelligens. Effekten af intelligens på GDM er således 
meget påvirket af, om effekten af uddannelse er baseret på kognitive evner, kognitiv stil og 
motivationelle faktorer, eller social positionering. Resultaterne demonstrerer, at effekten af 
uddannelse således er mindre ift. kognitive og motivationelle effekter, men at uddannelse stadig har 
en effekt ift. at sikre adgang, indflydelse og status via sociale netværk dvs. via social positionering. 
 De demokratiske implikationer af, at effekten af uddannelse i noget omfang skyldes 
personlighedstræk og intelligens, og at uddannelse primært er vigtig ift. social positionering 
diskuteres. 
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Education or personality traits and intelligence as determinants of political 
sophistication? 
 
Abstract 
Recently the causal influence of education on political sophistication has been 
questioned. Rather, pre-adult predispositions such as personality traits and intelligence 
are proposed as the real causal agents. This article investigates in two studies whether 
education retains its explanatory power on political sophistication when personality 
traits and intelligence are taken into account. One study draws on a draftee sample and 
has excellent measures of both personality traits and intelligence; the other study draws 
on a representative sample and has excellent measures of personality traits. Openness to 
experience and intelligence are found to be positive predictors of political sophistication 
and Neuroticism a negative predictor of political sophistication. In both studies 
education remains the single strongest predictor of political sophistication.  
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Introduction 
Education, the consensus was for decades, fosters a host of valued political behaviors, 
including political sophistication. As phrased by Philip Converse (1972, 324):  
“Whether one is dealing with cognitive matters such as level of factual information about politics or conceptual 
sophistication in its assessment; or such motivational matters as degree of attention paid to politics and emotional 
involvement in political affairs; or questions of actual behavior such as engagement in any variety of political 
activities from party work to vote turnout itself: education is everywhere the universal solvent and the 
relationship is everywhere in the same direction.” 
 Attention paid to, and factual information about, politics, are both necessary to be 
politically sophisticated. Thus, following Converse ‘cognitive matters’ and ‘motivational 
matters’ are essential in accounting for why education influences political sophistication. 
Richard Luskin also stresses ability and motivation, in addition to opportunity, in his 
AMO model of political sophistication (Luskin 1990). Focusing on education, Delli 
Carpini and Keeter argue: “the primacy of formal education as a facilitator of political 
knowledge lies in its relevance to all the components of the opportunity-motivation-
ability triad” (1996, 190). The question is, however, if the causal role of education can be 
sustained? 
 In a recent panel study, Benjamin Highton showed that most differences in political 
sophistication are already present before people enter college (Highton 2009). Highton 
speculates that pre-adult experiences and dispositions such as cognitive ability may 
partly explain why education does not have the causal effect often found in cross-
sectional studies. In a study of political participation, Kam and Palmer also highlight 
confounding and selection problems: “predispositions (values, intelligence and/or 
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cognitive skills, and personality traits) that propel individuals to pursue education might 
also propel them into political participation in later life” (Kam and Palmer 2008, 616). 1 
 Even if sophistication is important for several behaviors related to “good democratic 
citizenship” (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996), so far no one 
has examined if motivational and cognitive predispositions confound the effect of 
education on sophistication. Extant research shows that an individual’s intelligence and 
personality traits are largely set in late adolescence (Caspi, Roberts, and Shiner 2005; 
Deary et al. 2004; Roberts and DelVecchio 2000; Shiner and DeYoung 2013), i.e. before 
deciding whether to enter post-secondary education. Besides, both intelligence and 
personality traits are important predictors of educational attainment (Deary et al. 2007; 
Poropat 2009). Thus, as the recent literature argues these two constructs are among the 
most likely candidates of pre-adult motivational and cognitive dispositions to explain 
why education may not matter to political sophistication.2 The present analysis is the 
first to explicitly address the question: What is the effect of education on political sophistication 
when personality traits and intelligence are taken into account?   
 The analyses use two independent samples to examine this question. Both samples 
include the 60-item NEO-PI-R test of personality, and one of them includes an 
extensive and highly validated intelligence test, the so-called Danish intelligence test 
Børge Priens Prøve (BPP), which is administered to all draftees appearing before the 
Danish draft board.3 The analyses show that intelligence and personality partially 
confound the effect of education on political sophistication, but in both studies 
education retains its predictive power and remains the single strongest determinant of 
                                                          
 
1 See also (Berinsky and Lenz 2010) 
2  Like in most studies, I operationalize political sophistication as political knowledge. I therefore use 
“political knowledge” and “political sophistication” interchangeably. 
3 The BPP score has a correlation of .82 with one of the most used and validated measures of intelligence, 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) score; cf. (Mortensen, Reinisch, and Teasdale 1989)  
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sophistication. In addition, most individual differences in levels of education are not 
explained by predispositions.  
Education and the determinants of political sophistication 
According to Robert Luskin, political sophistication is a function of three interrelated 
causes (Luskin 1990): ability, opportunity and motivation (AMO). The first element in 
the ability-opportunity-motivation triad is ability. Motivation and opportunity are not 
enough, if the ability to process and store the political knowledge is lacking (Luskin 
1990).  Some facts in politics are difficult to learn if they cannot be comprehended in 
the first place or put into their right context. The motivation to learn about politics is 
important because motivated people will seek out political information and therefore be 
more likely to learn more political facts. They also spend more time thinking about 
politics when they encounter political information (Chaiken 1980) and are thus more 
likely to actually store the knowledge in long-term memory. The last element in the 
ability-motivation-opportunity triad opportunity refers to context such as the availability of 
information (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen 2006).  We can use 
this framework to understand both the role of education and individual predispositions 
as determinants of political sophistication as discussed below.  
 Verba, Schlozman and Brady argue that (1995, 514): “educational attainment…has 
consequences for the acquisition of…income earned on the job; skills acquired at work, 
in organizations, and to a lesser extent, in church; psychological engagement with 
politics...”. Although Verba, Schlozman and Brady mainly focus on political 
participation in their landmark book, it nicely summarizes the important pathways 
between education and political sophistication, which are also stressed in the AMO 
model.  
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 In fact, the empirical evidence in favor of viewing education as an important 
construct explaining differences in political sophistication is overwhelming, as 
numerous studies find a strong, significant effect of education on political sophistication 
(Bennet 1989; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jennings 1996; Lambert et al. 1988; Neuman 
1986; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Smith 1989). The link between education and 
sophistication has cogently been phrased in AMO concepts by Carpini and Keeter 
(1996, 190):  
“…it [education] promotes the opportunity to learn about politics by transmitting specific information and 
influencing career paths and social networks; it increases motivation by socializing students to the political 
world and stimulating their interest in it and it develops the cognitive ability necessary for effective learning”.  
Personality traits as causes of political sophistication 
Although not traditionally included in studies of political sophistication, there are, using 
the AMO model, very good theoretical reasons to consider the potential influence of 
personality traits and intelligence. There are two reasons why taking predispositions into 
account may imply that education does not exert an independent influence on 
sophistication as traditionally argued. First of all, the relationship between education and 
political sophistication might simply be spurious. In the extreme case in which the effect 
of education on political sophistication is completely confounded by personality traits and 
intelligence, the relationship between education and political sophistication should 
disappear after controlling for predispositions.  
 Secondly, educational differences might be explained by differences in 
predispositions. In the extreme case in which individual differences in education are 
completely determined by predispositions, we should get a very high R-square when 
using predispositions as predictors of differences in levels of education. Both 
explanations, ‘predispositions as confounders’ and ‘predispositions as determinants of 
education’, will be entertained in the analyses below.  
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 Personality traits are theorized as general inclinations and dispositions or, as it were, 
a person’s general motivational structure (Denissen and Penke 2008). As such, there is a 
good theoretical rationale for including them as motivational determinants also of 
political sophistication. In recent years, researchers have converged on five basic traits, 
which capture the most important individual differences in personality traits; in fact to 
such a degree that some speak of a paradigm shift toward the Big Five (John, Naumann, 
and Soto 2008): Openness/Intellect, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness 
and Neuroticism. All five traits may to varying degrees contribute to a fuller explanation 
of differences in political sophistication.  
 Individuals who score high on Openness to experience value intellectual matters and are 
generally open to new experiences (Denissen and Penke 2008; DeYoung 2010; 
DeYoung and Gray 2009; McCrae and Costa 2003; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). 
Politics often deals with the exchange of new ideas and abstract constructs such as 
ideology and fiscal crises. People who are open to experience are therefore more likely 
to be politically engaged and thus gain knowledge of politics, irrespective of their level 
of education as recent studies also demonstrate (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008). We know that people who are more open to experience 
are more likely to excel academically (Poropat 2009; Richardson, Abraham, and Bond 
2012). Openness is therefore a likely confounder of the relationship between education 
and political sophistication as well as a likely determinant of education. 
 Conscientiousness taps into the personality dimensions of productivity and aspiration, 
i.e. a person who has a large drive for issues that are deemed important (Denissen and 
Penke 2008; DeYoung 2010; DeYoung and Gray 2009; McCrae and Costa 2003; Nettle 
2006; Van Egeren 2009). However, politics may or may not be seen as important to 
conscientious individuals. There is thus no reason to unconditionally expect 
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conscientious people to be more politically knowledgeable, which is in accord with 
recent evidence (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). 
Although Conscientiousness is not likely to influence political sophistication, it does 
influence educational attainment (Poropat 2009; Richardson, Abraham, and Bond 
2012). Conscientiousness may therefore partially explain differences in education but it 
is not a likely confounder of the relationship between education and political 
sophistication. 
 Extraversion is sensitivity to reward and positive affect and deals with approach 
behaviour such as liking social situations and being assertive (Denissen and Penke 2008; 
Depue and Collins 1999; Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005; DeYoung 2010; 
DeYoung and Gray 2009; McCrae and Costa 2003; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). 
Being social and being assertive does not necessarily make you more knowledgeable. In 
addition, being sensitive to reward does not make you unconditionally more likely to be 
knowledgeable (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). People 
who are more extraverted generally perform more poorly academically speaking 
(Poropat 2009; Richardson, Abraham, and Bond 2012). While Extraversion is not a 
likely confounder of the relationship between education and political sophistication, it 
may be a potential determinant of education. 
 Neuroticism is sensitivity to threat and the tendency to experience negative emotions 
such as depression and anxiety. Neurotic people also have a tendency to be irritable and 
self-conscious (Denissen and Penke 2008; DeYoung 2010; DeYoung and Gray 2009; 
McCrae and Costa 2003; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). Because politics is combative 
and conflict-ridden they therefore are likely to disengage from politics and to have little 
interest in politics. The findings so far on the relationship between Neuroticism and 
political knowledge are indeterminate, however (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008). Individuals who are neurotic are less likely to excel 
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academically (Poropat 2009; Richardson, Abraham, and Bond 2012) and more likely to 
experience test anxiety (Ackerman and Heggestad 1997). Neuroticism is thus a potential 
confounder of the relationship between education and political sophistication as well as 
a likely determinant of differences in levels of education. 
 Finally, the personality trait Agreeableness deals with the regulation of social 
interactions; people who are more agreeable are more cooperative and altruistic 
(Denissen and Penke 2008; DeYoung 2010; DeYoung and Gray 2009; McCrae and 
Costa 2003; Nettle 2006; Van Egeren 2009). There is little reason to expect people who 
are agreeable to be more politically knowledgeable; this has been confirmed in previous 
studies (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). Being more 
agreeable is, however, associated with the ability to excel academically (Poropat 2009; 
Richardson, Abraham, and Bond 2012). Whereas Agreeableness is not likely to influence 
political knowledge directly and, thus, confound the educational effect, it is likely to 
affect differences in levels of education. 
Intelligence as a cause of political sophistication 
In addition to personality traits, the predisposition most often referred to in the 
literature on the causal role of education for political behaviors is cognitive ability or 
intelligence. According to a common definition (Gottfredson 1997, 13): “Intelligence is 
a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, 
plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and 
learn from experience...”.  
 Intelligence thus tracks closely with the AMO model’s focus on ability. The human 
ability measured in this study is general intelligence, or g as it is also called, which is 
arguably what most people have in mind when they think about the construct 
intelligence  (Mackintosh 2011, 11). People with a high level of g are better able to rotate 
mental objects in their mind’s eye, are perceptually faster, have a larger memory, a better 
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ability to acquire knowledge as well as apply it in new and novel settings. The list could 
go on (Carroll 2003; Johnson and Bouchard 2005; McGrew 2009). This positive 
manifold, i.e. the tendency for people who are cognitively able in one type of the mental 
domain to also be cognitively able in another mental domain, is exactly what general 
intelligence is all about (Jensen 1998). This is arguably what most laypeople think about 
when discussing the construct intelligence: Intelligent people are simply “smart” when it 
comes to solving mental tasks. General intelligence usually explains approximately 40 % 
of the variance in test scores, which means that we are able to account for most of the 
important individual differences in intelligence by focusing on general intelligence 
(Deary, Penke, and Johnson 2010).4  
 At a conceptual level, personality traits and intelligence are usually considered 
separate constructs: Personality traits are mostly non-cognitive, less focused on ability 
and more concerned about inclinations and motivations. Besides, personality traits are 
usually seen as relevant for “typical performance”, whereas intelligence relates to 
“maximal performance”, irrespective of motivations (DeYoung 2011). Empirically, 
intelligence and personality traits are fairly separate constructs, thus lending credence to 
the conceptual differentiation, although studies have demonstrated a small overlap 
between Openness and Intelligence (Ackerman and Heggestad 1997).5  
 Research demonstrates that people who are more intelligent are also more politically 
sophisticated (Hamil and Lodge 1986; Harvey and Harvey 1970; Luskin 1990; Neuman 
1986; Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992). Sticking to the AMO model, we would indeed 
expect this to be the case: People who are more intelligent are more able to 
“comprehend complex ideas” and “think abstractly”, which a full understanding of 
                                                          
 
4 In this test it is around 50-60% as discussed below 
5 Their meta-analytic estimate is .3. In this sample the correlation is 0.1. 
10 
 
politics requires, to paraphrase the definition of intelligence above. We also know that 
those who are more intelligent are also more likely to excel academically (Deary et al. 
2007; Poropat 2009; Richardson, Abraham, and Bond 2012). Intelligence is thus both a 
potential confounder as well as a potential determinant of individual differences in 
education. 
Environments and predispositions 
Personality traits are highly stable over time (Roberts and DelVecchio 2000; Roberts, 
Walton, and Viechtbauer 2006) and established early in life (Shiner and DeYoung 2013), 
to some extent even genetically influenced in terms of change and stability (Bleidorn et 
al. 2009; Hopwood et al. 2011), although current evidence suggests that important 
environmental changes might be associated with changes in personality traits  (Bleidorn 
et al. 2009; Hopwood et al. 2011; Ludtke et al. 2011; McCrae et al. 1998; Roberts, Caspi, 
and Moffitt 2003; Roberts and Helson 1997; Specht, Egloff, and Schmukle 2011; Sutin 
and Costa 2010) but in most cases only to a limited, extent. In general, however, for 
most people in most situations personality traits crystallize early in life and remain stable 
over the life course (Shiner and DeYoung 2013). Studies also show that the amount of 
schooling also affects your level of intelligence, although the relationship between these 
two constructs is complicated (Deary and Johnson 2010; Nisbett et al. 2012). Thus, the 
causal direction is notably from personality to later in life experiences, achievements and 
political sophistication. I will return to this point in the discussion. The table below 
summarizes on the expectations: 
Table 1: Summary of expectations for individual predispositions and education 
Constructs Hypotheses  
Political knowledge 
Intelligence + 
Openness + 
Conscientiousness N.A. 
Extraversion N.A. 
Agreeableness N.A.  
Neuroticism - 
Education + 
N.A. refers to no association hypothesized  
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Datasets and measures of constructs 
The analysis draws on two independent datasets; a representative sample of the Danish 
population and a draftee sample, which consists of young people in Denmark; the mean 
age for this sample is 23 years. The representative sample (N=3612) is an internet panel, 
fielded between May 25 and June 6, 2010 with a response rate of approximately 45 
percent. The draftee sample was contacted by regular mail and asked to take the survey 
online. The survey was fielded in the period March 2 to April 10, 2012. The sample size 
is 1072 with a response rate of approximately 28 percent. The males are a random 
sample of the Danish population for the draftee sample, the women are not. The reason 
is that the dataset consisting of young people is drawn from the Danish draft registry, 
and all males in Denmark are required to appear before the draft board when they are 
18, whereas women are not. They are thus by definition a self-selected group. However, 
they are representative in terms of personality traits and demographics compared to the 
appropriate age group in the representative sample, as discussed in appendix 1. 
 The data for the analysis basically consists of three types of variables: Measures of 
predispositions, measures of political sophistication, and measures of environmental 
variables and controls. In terms of individual predispositions, the draftee sample has 
data on personality traits and intelligence, whereas the representative sample has data on 
personality traits. 
 The Big Five are in both samples measured by the perhaps most used personality 
inventory in psychology namely the NEO-PI-R, more specifically the 60 item NEO-PI-
R (Costa and McCrae 2003). Correlations between each of the five domains with the 
full Danish NEO-PI-R are .9 and above (Costa and McCrae 2003, 74). We are thus 
relying on a validated and highly reliable measure of personality traits in this 
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investigation (Costa and McCrae 2003, 78). In addition, the reliability of the instrument 
is taken into account by the use of structural equation modelling as discussed above. 
 The measure of intelligence is called Børge Priens Prøve (BPP) and is a test all 
Danish men have to take when they appear before the military draft board.6 The women 
who self-select into the military also take the test. The general factor of intelligence 
accounts for around 50-60 % of the total variance in BPP scores (Hartmann and 
Teasdale 2004; Teasdale et al. 2011).  The total BPP score has a correlation of around 
.99 with g both for high and low ability groups. BPP has a correlation of .82 with the full 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) score (Mortensen, Reinisch, and Teasdale 
1989).  The test is highly valid and reliable (Hartmann and Teasdale 2005; Kousgaard 
2003; Rasch 1980; Teasdale et al. 2011).  
 Political sophistication is measured in the same way in the two surveys, namely by asking 
a series of factual questions in the two surveys, which is the most common 
measurement method for assessing levels of political knowledge (Carpini and Keeter 
1996).7 Thus, political sophistication is operationalized as political knowledge.8 
 Measures of income and education are also fairly similar across the two samples. In both 
cases a measure of personal income is included. The measure of personal income in the 
draftee sample is recoded to match the categories in the representative sample. The 
educational variables in the draftee sample are recoded into one continuous variable to 
match the educational variable in the representative sample. Descriptive statistics and 
full question wording are outlined in appendix 1.  
                                                          
 
6 Actually, some 5% do not take the test, mainly on documented medical grounds, stating they are unfit 
for military duty. (Teasdale and Owen 1989) 
7 This approach is debated: (Gibson and Caldeira 2009; Luskin and Bullock 2011; McGlone, Aronson, 
and Kobrynowicz 2006; Mondak and Davis 2001; Prior and Lupia 2008) 
8 Carpini and Keeter’s definition of political knowledge as: “the range of factual information about 
politics that is stored in long-term memory” is the most cited (Carpini and Keeter 1996, 10) 
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 In terms of scaling, all individual predispositions and our measure of political 
knowledge are rescaled to have a range of 0-1, as they do not have a natural metric. In 
order to ease comparison of coefficients, education is also rescaled to have a range of 0-
1. The scaling and metric of the other constructs can be found in appendix 1.  
Model estimation 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is used to estimate the models.9 This allows us to 
take into account measurement error of our constructs, which leads to less parameter 
bias (Bollen 1989).10 As recently demonstrated by Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 
measurement error can have very substantive implications for how we understand 
traditional issues studied in political science such as stability of policy preferences 
(Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008). Using SEM also allows us to use a strong 
technique for handling missing data, namely full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML) (Schafer and Graham 2002; Yuan, Yang-Wallentin, and Bentler 2012).11 Unless 
missing data are Missing Completely at Random (MCAR), i.e. completely independent 
of observables and unobservables, we obtain biased parameter estimates and standard 
errors if we use listwise deletion (Little and Rubin 1987).  FIML only requires the 
assumption of Missing at Random (MAR), i.e. that the missing values of the dependent 
variable are unrelated to the values of the dependent variable conditional on observables 
(Enders 2010).  
  A number of constructs are usually included as either predictors or controls in 
studies of the determinants of political sophistication, namely: education, income or 
occupational group, gender, and age (Bennet 1989; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jennings 
                                                          
 
9 The results of an OLS regression with robust standard errors, using listwise deletion, provide similar 
results. Available upon request. 
10  In addition, survey weights are used in both samples. 
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1996; Lambert et al. 1988; Neuman 1986; Smith 1989). For this analysis, personal 
income, age, and gender are included in all models as controls. 
 Traditional studies illustrating the effect of education on political knowledge and the 
ability, motivation and opportunity to be informed, do not control for individual 
predispositions. The few studies that do include personality traits generally confirm that 
education is still important for explaining differences in political sophistication (Gerber 
et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). No studies so far have included 
both the Big Five personality traits and intelligence to explain individual differences in 
political sophistication.  
 To test the “predispositions as confounders explanation”, I will estimate three 
models: one with individual predispositions and controls, one with education and 
controls, and one with individual predispositions and education as well as controls. To 
test the “predispositions as determinants of education” explanation model, I will specify 
education as a dependent variable; the variance explained in education, measured by R-
squared, should be high once personality traits and intelligence are used as explanatory 
constructs, if the “predispositions as determinants of education” is correct. 
 A three-pronged approach to data analysis was applied: First a well-fitting 
measurement model at the item level for personality traits and political knowledge was 
created.12 This involved doing an exploratory factor analysis to determine the number of 
factors for the constructs, as well as determine the performance of the items. Based on 
this first step, item parcels were created in order to better approximate our normality 
assumption, which requires special modeling techniques13 or the use of item parcels. 
The knowledge items have fewer than five categories, which are needed when we use an 
                                                          
 
12 Results of these analyses are available upon request.  
13 Such as the robust categorical least squares.  
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estimator that relies on multivariate normality (Rhemtulla, Brosseau-Liard, and Savalei 
2012). Furthermore, we are able to reduce the idiosyncratic noise of the items and to 
simplify our model estimation considerably when using parcels. The third and last step 
consists of estimating the measurement models and structural model simultaneously.  
 All analyses were performed in Mplus version 7. Unless otherwise noted, Mplus’ 
MLR estimator is used, which provides robust standard errors and robust fit statistics 
(Browne and Cudeck 1992). Appendix 2 outlines fit statistics for the various models, as 
well as the measurement models for the latent constructs. 
Study 1: Personality traits and intelligence – draftee sample 
First we will investigate the “predispositions as confounders” explanation and then turn 
to the “predispositions as determinants of education” explanation. The results of the 
model estimation for the draftee sample are illustrated in the table below: 
Table 2: Determinants of political knowledge for the draftee sample 
 Only education Only personality traits and intelligence All predictors included 
Construct Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized  
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Openness (0-1)       0.199*** 
(0.061) 
    0.169*** 
(0.056) 
   0.133 
 
Conscientiousness (0-1)      0.288*** 
(0.103) 
  0.224** 
(0.100) 
  0.127 
 
Extraversion (0-1)  -0.055  
(0.072) 
-0.063 
(0.068) 
-0.047 
 
Agreeableness (0-1)  0.033 
(0.059) 
0.026 
(0.055) 
 0.021 
 
Neuroticism (0-1)        -0.159*** 
(0.066) 
 -0.146**   
(0.062) 
 -0.137 
 
Intelligence (0-1)      0.597*** 
(0.085) 
    0.425*** 
(0.076) 
   0.260 
 
Education (0-1)      0.301*** 
(0.034) 
     0.233*** 
(0.031) 
   0.319 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Controls are age, gender, and personal income in all models. 
 In terms of individual predispositions, most but not all of our expectations are met. 
Openness is associated with being more politically knowledgeable in both models, and 
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Neuroticism is as expected associated with being less politically knowledgeable. 
Agreeableness and Extraversion are not significantly associated with being more or less 
politically knowledgeable. Being more conscientious is associated with having more 
political knowledge, which we did not expect.  
 More importantly, for our discussion above about the relative importance of 
education and individual predispositions, we notice that education still exerts a strong 
influence on political sophistication after controlling for intelligence and personality 
traits, although the coefficient decreases by approximately .068 on our zero to one scale, 
after controlling for individual predispositions. If we only include personality traits and 
leave out intelligence, the effect of education decreases by .026. The rest of the drop, i.e. 
a decrease of .042, is thus due to intelligence. Education is therefore partially 
confounded by predispositions but retains a strong independent impact on 
sophistication. 
 Education still has the largest effect with a standardized effect size of .319. The 
second largest effect sizes are represented by Intelligence and Openness with 
standardized effect sizes of .260 and .133, respectively. Not only is education still 
significant after controlling for the effects of personality traits and intelligence, it is in 
fact still the single strongest determinant of political knowledge. 
 We now return to the “predispositions as determinants of education” explanation. In 
order to further test whether education is determined by predispositions, it is specified 
as a dependent variable and predispositions as the independent variables. When this is 
done we get an R-squared of 0.129 for education. Based on this we cannot claim that 
most of the variance in education, generally speaking, is accounted for by using 
predispositions as predictors of education. In fact, around 87 percent of the variance is 
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unaccounted for, while there is plenty of room for the effect of education to have an 
independent effect on political sophistication.   
 We are of course left wondering whether these results are replicable across the entire 
population and not just our draftee sample. This will be investigated in the following 
with the caveat that the replication sample does not have a measure of intelligence. 
Study 2: Only personality traits – representative sample 
The same procedure for analyzing the effect of education on political sophistication will 
be pursued here: First we will look at the “predispositions as confounders” explanation 
and then turn to the “predispositions as determinants of education” explanation. 
Table 3: Determinants of political knowledge for the representative sample 
 Only education Only personality traits All predictors included 
Construct Unstandardized  
coefficient  
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Openness (0-1)      0.195*** 
(0.049) 
   0.125*** 
(0.052) 
0.078 
Conscientiousness (0-1)  0.096 
(0.102) 
0.079 
(0.101) 
0.028 
Extraversion (0-1)     -0.123**  
(0.057) 
-0.093 
(0.057) 
-0.053 
Agreeableness (0-1)  0.040 
(0.053) 
0.036 
(0.052) 
0.021 
Neuroticism (0-1)      -0.141** 
(0.069) 
-0.115* 
(0.068) 
-0.065 
Education 0.163*** 
(0.022) 
     0.132*** 
(0.024) 
0.138 
Standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Controls are age, gender, and personal income in all models. 
 In terms of our predictions regarding personality traits, Openness is strongly 
associated with being more politically knowledgeable; people who are more open to 
experience are also more politically knowledgeable. Neuroticism is negatively associated 
with being politically knowledgeable, although not after control for education. The 
effect of Conscientiousness and of Agreeableness is not statistically significant in any of 
the models for this sample. Extraversion is a negative predictor in the model that only 
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includes personality traits but not at a .05 level once we have controlled for differences 
in education.  
 Education is still associated with having a higher level of political knowledge after 
also controlling for personality traits in this study. The coefficient of education 
decreases by .031 once personality traits are included, which is almost exactly the same 
decrease as above of .026 when personality traits are included, and this sample thus 
confirms this finding quite nicely. In terms of effect sizes, education is still the single 
strongest determinant with a standardized effect size of .138, and Openness is the 
second largest predictor with a standardized effect size of .078. Here, we are able to 
confirm the finding above: Education is partially confounded by predispositions but 
retains a strong independent impact on sophistication.  
 When we specify education as a dependent variable and the predispositions as 
independent variables as above, we get an R-squared for education of 0.114, the 
“predispositions as determinants of education” explanation can thus not 
unconditionally be confirmed here either. In fact, this estimate is fairly similar to the 
estimate above, so the relationship between education and predispositions found in the 
draftee sample is replicable in this study. It is, of course, likely that R-squared would 
increase further if we also included intelligence as a predictor.  
Similarities and differences across samples and generality of findings 
The results for the effects of education and individual predispositions on political 
knowledge are very similar in the two samples also in terms of size of coefficients. In 
only one case is a hypothesized relationship not significant in both samples, although 
the direction and magnitude are very similar; the effect of Neuroticism is only just not 
significant after controlling for education in the representative sample (p=0.089).  
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 This also applies to our controls in both samples as shown in appendix 3, which 
illustrates the effects of our controls in the “classic model”, which only includes 
controls and education. The coefficients are very similar in magnitude across the two 
samples. For both samples, the results of the controls are very much in accordance with 
the established findings in the established international and Danish literature on 
sophistication: Being older, male and having a higher personal income are all positive 
predictors of political knowledge (Bennet 1989; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lambert et al. 
1988; Neuman 1986; Smith 1989).14  
 Two constructs stand out with markedly different coefficients: Education and 
Conscientiousness. I will only focus on education, as this is our primary construct of 
investigation. The effect of education, which is measured in the same way in both 
studies, on political knowledge is .233 in the draftee sample and .132 in the 
representative sample. The effect is thus almost two times larger in the draftee sample. 
We might speculate that the effect is different across the two samples because it is 
moderated. Even though the two samples differ according to socio-demographics, e.g. 
by income, the most obvious moderator is age, as the draftee sample only consists of 
young people. Furthermore, a recent study demonstrated that the effect of education on 
political sophistication is likely to diminish with age.15 I have therefore created an 
interaction term for education and age in the representative sample, as this has the 
larger age span. The interaction term is statistically significant (p=0.003) and negative 
with an unstandardized coefficient of -0.004.  
                                                          
 
14 And also in accordance with the Danish election studies’ results, see (Hansen 2007). Age is not 
significant in the draftee sample but in the representative sample, probably because of the restriction in 
range in this variable in the draftee sample. See appendix 3. 
15 (Highton 2009) 
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 The mean age in the draftee sample is approximately 23 years. The impact of 
education on political knowledge for those aged 23 in the representative sample is 0.267 
(95% CI [0.157, 0.378], which is very close to the estimate of .233 (95% CI [0.172, 
0.293]) in the draftee sample. In other words, we are able to reproduce, within a margin 
of error, the same effect size across samples for the same age cohort. The results for 
our draftee sample are thus likely to be fairly representative of the entire population for 
this particular age group. The graph below illustrates the marginal effect of education as 
a function of age in the representative sample. 
Figure 1: The marginal effect of education on political knowledge as a function of age with 95 % confidence bands 
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Discussion 
In this study we have demonstrated that education is still very important, if we want to 
understand individual differences in sophistication. This is a quite different result than 
Highton, who essentially demonstrated that differences in levels of sophistication are 
already in place by the time people enter college (Highton 2009). There may be three 
reasons why the results diverge.  
 First of all, the education measure is different. Highton only focuses on college 
education, i.e. whether people have some college or an actual bachelor’s degree or not. 
In the present analysis education is treated as a continuous variable, from those with 
only primary school to those having a master’s degree, and we are therefore capturing a 
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greater amount of differences in schooling. If we only focus on college education,16 i.e. 
treat education as a dummy variable in the full model specifications above, we obtain an 
unstandardized coefficient for the representative sample of 0.041 (p=0.013), which is 
much smaller than the effect of 0.132 obtained above.17 By only focusing on college 
education and not the full extent of educational differences, Highton thus 
underestimates the full effect of differences in levels of education. Or, to paraphrase, 
the effect of education in the present study is smaller but remains when we employ a 
concept similar to Highton. 
 Secondly, the knowledge battery he uses does not have many items and the mean 
political knowledge for those with a college education is already at three point five on a 
five point scale when they enter the panel (Highton 2009), and the potential for within 
variation over time is thus very small; in essence, he is estimating whether more people 
gets the last two questions right without making a single mistake. A larger sampling of 
knowledge questions would be appropriate and with a larger potential for within 
variation, Highton’s results may have been different. 
 Thirdly, we need to acknowledge that this investigation has been a specific 
investigation of the effect of education on political sophistication after taking into 
account personality traits and intelligence (2011, 657).  This does not prevent that 
education might be confounded by other predispositions of course, or preadult 
experiences. Personality traits and intelligence are probably the most likely candidates as 
confounders, however. In addition, when we control for father’s level of education in 
                                                          
 
16 I.e. those with a medium-term long education in the Danish educational system. For further discussion 
on the coding of the variables see appendix 1. 
17 Doing this for the draftee sample makes less sense as not all have had time to finish a medium-term 
education as the sample is young. Here it is more relevant to only investigate the effect of increases in levels 
of education i.e. the slope, as we have done above.  
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the two samples,18 to control for some of the preadult experiences highlighted by 
Highton and Kam and Palmer, the effect of education on political sophistication 
decreases, but only very little: The effect of education in the representative sample is 
then 0.120 (p= 0.000), compared to 0.132 above, and in the draftee sample 0.218 
(p=0.000), compared to 0.233 above. This does not exclude other preadult experiences 
of course but goes some way in terms of controlling for preadult experiences as well.  
Conclusion  
This study has engaged the larger debate on the role of education as a universal solvent 
with a specific focus on the effect of education on political sophistication. The skeptics 
argue that the effect of education on political sophistication might be confounded by 
predispositions such as personality traits and intelligence. No studies have been able to 
test this supposition, however. We find that education is still an important construct to 
consider if we want to explain differences in political sophistication. Even when we 
control for father’s level of education, the effect of education on political sophistication 
is strong. The findings regarding the “predispositions as confounders” explanation as 
well as the results for education are summarized in the table below: 
Table 4: Overview of hypotheses and findings 
Constructs Political knowledge 
   Hypotheses   Finding 
Intelligence + + (2/2) 
Openness + + (4/4) 
Conscientiousness N.A. N.A. (2/4) 
Extraversion N.A. N.A. (3/4) 
Agreeableness N.A. N.A. (4/4) 
Neuroticism - - (3/4) 
Education + + (4/4) 
* The ratio refers to the number of times a finding is confirmed out of the potential number of times it was possible to confirm it. 
 The personality traits Openness and Neuroticism account for some of the motivational 
predispositions to be politically informed usually attributed to education, and the effect 
                                                          
 
18 The representative sample asks for the level of education for the ”main provider” which in 83 percent 
of cases is the father. Full results of these analyses are available upon request. 
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of education decreases after control for these traits. Openness is associated with being 
more politically knowledgeable, and Neuroticism is associated with being less politically 
knowledgeable. Intelligence accounts for some of the ability needed to become 
politically informed which is usually ascribed to education, and the effect of education 
decreases in size after including intelligence; people who are more intelligent are also 
more politically informed. The most important result is, however, that education is still 
a significant and strong determinant of political knowledge, even after controlling for 
individual predispositions. In fact, the single strongest effect on political knowledge in 
both samples is education. This model specification is likely to overestimate the effect 
of predispositions on education as we know that there is some, even if limited, reverse 
causality between education and intelligence and education and personality traits. To 
fully tease out the relationship between predispositions and education, a logical next 
step is to use panel data as discussed below. 
 Regarding the “predispositions as determinants of education” explanation we can 
also confirm the independent contribution of education on political sophistication. 
Most of the variance in education is left unexplained, and there is therefore plenty of 
room for education to play an independent role in explaining differences in political 
sophistication.  
 This finding, that education still matters, of course calls into question why education 
still matters. Using the AMO framework, three candidates come to mind – one more 
obvious, the other two less so: First of all we have not touched upon the issue of 
opportunity in this investigation, and we know that education socializes people into 
different networks which give them opportunities to be exposed to political facts and 
become politically engaged (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996) 
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This is therefore a very likely candidate for how education affects levels of political 
sophistication. Secondly, there is obviously more to motivation and ability than 
personality traits and intelligence. It is possible that education affects specific abilities and 
facts, such as how to understand politics by reading a newspaper, or education teaches 
specifically how parliament works, above and beyond the effect of personality traits and 
intelligence (Carpini and Keeter 1996, chapter 5). Finally, it is also likely that education 
affects specific motivational aspects of importance to gaining knowledge of politics above 
and beyond the effect personality traits and intelligence have on political sophistication, 
e.g. the importance of keeping up to date on current affairs by following the news. 
Studies on the effect of education on either the importance of networks or the 
importance of specific abilities or motivational factors on gaining political knowledge 
after taking into account personality traits and intelligence are well worth undertaking.  
We have examined the interplay between education and predispositions in a setting 
which arguably makes it extremely difficult to demonstrate a strong and consistent 
effect of education on political sophistication: In Denmark, education is free and higher 
education is supported by a general tax-financed stipend covering costs of living. 
Hence, if anywhere, Denmark is a place where almost everybody should be able to 
attain education according to his or her abilities and motivation. In this sense, Denmark 
is a least-likely case for demonstrating the effect of education on political sophistication  
(Gerring 2007). Even in this context we still find a strong relationship between 
education and sophistication. We therefore expect that the findings hold far and beyond 
the Danish case and thus also in the US where most current studies on education and 
sophistication are conducted. There are two caveats however; one regarding intelligence 
and one regarding timing.  
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 Both personality traits and intelligence work in tandem to reduce the effect of 
education on political knowledge, but the effect of education is still significant and 
substantial. The effect of education on political sophistication is reduced by almost the 
same amount after taking into account personality traits in two independent studies, and 
we can therefore be fairly certain that this is a reproducible finding. Our measure of 
intelligence is not included in the representative sample, and we are, therefore, unable to 
determine whether the effect of intelligence is also moderated by age. However, as the 
effect sizes and significance of our constructs and controls are very similar across the 
two samples, the most likely finding is that the effect of intelligence on sophistication is 
not moderated markedly by age. 
 The second caveat concerns timing. One of the main points of the skeptics of the 
causal effect of education such as Kam and Palmer and Highton is that educational 
attainment is largely a result of preadult experiences and predispositions. Although we 
argued above that both personality traits and intelligence are established early in life and 
remain stable across the lifespan, we would ideally like to use panel data to further 
investigate the interplay between personality traits, intelligence and education in 
determining political behaviors. Although Highton has panel data on political 
sophistication, he does not have panel data on personality traits and intelligence. Ideally 
we would therefore need a panel design which also has measures of personality traits and 
intelligence, i.e. a combination of this study and Highton’s study. The timing of such a 
study is of course crucial; preferably, adolescents should be surveyed at the time 
compulsory education ends, and when differences in levels of education become relevant; 
which in Denmark is by the end of primary school. Seeing as there is ample evidence 
that personality traits and intelligence are established early in life and remain quite stable 
throughout life, it would be surprising if the results of a panel study at a substantial level 
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differed markedly from those obtained here.19 As discussed above, several 
environmental changes are also associated with changes in personality traits, among 
others differences in schooling.20 If anything, we are therefore underestimating the effect 
of education on political sophistication by not taking this reverse causation into 
account.  
 To reach a more nuanced understanding of the role of education as the universal 
solvent, we need to research the effect of education on other important political 
behaviors after taking predispositions into account. Although education is important for 
acquiring political knowledge, it is far from obvious whether education is also important 
for explaining differences in political behaviors which are more distally related to 
education, such as internal efficacy, which we know is established early in life and 
exhibits characteristics closely resembling those ascribed to personality traits.21  
                                                          
 
19 The intelligence test used for the draftee sample is taken when respondents are 18 years old. The largest 
differences in schooling are post-18 years in Denmark. We can therefore be fairly certain that our 
measure of intelligence is not overly influenced by differences in schooling.  
20 (Ludtke et al. 2011)  
21 (Abramson 1983; Easton and Dennis 1967) 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics and question wording 
The NEO-PI-R short version is copyrighted so questions from this battery are not shown. Also the 
BPP battery is protected against publication. 
Question wording for draftee sample 
 
Questions measuring political knowledge 
Here is a series of questions about politics generally speaking. Politics can be complicated but try to answer the 
following questions as best you can.    
How large do you think the expenditures for the health care sector in Denmark were as a percentage of GDP in 
2009?  
Approximimately 5 % 
Approximimately 12 % 
Approximimately. 22 % 
Approximimately. 54 % 
Don’t know 
 
Which of the following are referred to as the executive power? 
The Ministry of Justice 
The Police 
The government  
The Parliament  
Don’t know 
 
 Which of the following persons is Denmark’s minister of finance? 
A B C D 
    
 
 
    
A B C D 
 
 
Is it a requirement that you are a Member of Parliament (Folketinget) in order to be eligible for cabinet minister in 
Denmark? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
 
 Which party is the politician in the picture a member of? 
The Social Democrats 
The Danish Social-Liberal party 
The Conservative People’s Party 
The Socialist People’s Party 
Liberal Alliance 
The Christian Democrats 
The Danish People’s Party 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Red-Green Alliance  
Don’t remember party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which of the following parties would you consider to be most rightist? 
The Liberal Party of Denmark 
The Social Democrats 
The Socialist People’s Party 
The Red-Green Alliance  
Don’t know 
 
 What percentage of GDP do you think Denmark spent on foreign aid in 2010? 
Approximately 0.9 % 
Approximimately 0.5 % 
Approximimately 2.4 % 
Approximimately 5.1 % 
Don’t know 
 
Who was Denmark’s Prime Minister from 1982-1993? 
Poul Schlüter 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
Anker Jørgensen 
Poul Hartling 
Don’t know 
 
How many members does Parliament have if we do not include the four from Greenland and the Faroe Islands? 
Number __________ 
Don’t know 
 
 
Which of the following persons is not a member of Parliament? 
A B C D 
 
 
A B C D 
 
 
What is the number of member states in the EU? 
Number __________ 
Don’t know 
Which party do you think the politician Mette Frederiksen is a member of? 
The Social Democrats 
The Danish Social-Liberal party 
The Conservative People’s Party 
The Socialist People’s Party 
Liberal Alliance 
The Christian Democrats 
The Danish People’s Party 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Red-Green Alliance  
Don’t know 
 
Which party do you think the politician Søren Pind is a member of? 
The Social Democrats 
The Danish Social-Liberal party 
The Conservative People’s Party 
The Socialist People’s Party 
Liberal Alliance 
The Christian Democrats 
The Danish People’s Party 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Red-Green Alliance  
Don’t know 
 
 
Questions measuring education and controls 
Approximately how large is your yearly gross income i.e. the total income before taxes and other deductibles but 
including salary, pension and other incomes?  
Below 100,000 DKK 
100,000-124,999 DKK 
125,000-149,999 DKK 
150,000-174,999 DKK 
175,000-199,999 DKK 
200,000-249,999 DKK 
250,000-274,999 DKK 
275,000-299,999 DKK 
300,000-324,999 DKK 
325,000-349,999 DKK 
350,000-374,999 DKK 
375,000-399,999 DKK 
400,000 DKK or above.  
Don’t know 
 
What is your schooling?1 
Primary school 7 years or less 
Primary school 8/9 years  
10th grade 
High school  
Don’t know 
 
                                                          
1 The two educational variables are recoded to fit the recoded educational variable for the representative sample. This 
strategy is chosen to reflect the “years of school education” also used to categorize people according in the 
representative sample. The categories are: 
1. 9 Years or less (Primary school) 
2. 10-11 Years (Basic vocational education and vocational education) 
3. 11-12 years of education (High school) 
4. 13-14 years of education  (Short-term higher education) 
5. 14-16 years of education (Medium term higher education) 
6. 17-18 years of education (Long-Term higher education) 
 Which vocational or higher education have you completed or are in the process of completing apart from your schooling?  
(If you have taken multiple degrees, please only indicate the highest level of education). 
Basic vocational education  
Vocational education  
Short-term higher education (1-2 years) 
Medium term higher education (3-4 years)  
Long-term higher education (more than 4 years) 
None  
Don’t know 
 
Question wording for representative sample of Danish population 
 
Questions measuring political knowledge 
Which parties are ruling parties in the current government? 
Don’t know 
 
How many members does Parliament have if we disregard the four from Greenland and the Faroe Islands? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Social Democrats 
The Liberal Party of Denmark, The Conservative People’s Party 
The Liberal Party, The Conservative People’s Party, The Danish People’s Party 
The Social Democrats, The Socialist People’s Party 
The Social Democrats, The Socialist People’s Party, The Red Green Alliance  
The Social Democrats, The Socialist People’s Party, The Danish Social Liberal Party 
171  
175  
179  
183  
187  
Don’t know  
 Which party is Troels Lund Poulsen a member of? 
 
 
 
 
Which party is Christine Antorini a member of? 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Social Democrats  
The Danish People’s Party  
The Danish Social Liberal Party  
The Socialist People’s Party  
 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Social Democrats  
The Danish People’s Party  
The Danish Social Liberal Party  
The Socialist People’s Party  
 Questions measuring controls and education 
What is your last finished education?2 
Primary school 
High school  
High school (Vocational highschool) 
Vocational education 
Short-term higher education (1-2 years) 
Medium term higher education (3-4 years)  
Bachelor (3-4 years) 
Long-term higher education (more than 4 years) 
Researcher/PhD  
 
 
                                                          
2 This question was not asked but ascertained through registry data. The variable is recoded to reflect “years of school 
education”, which means “Vocational education” and “High school” changes place. The two high school categories are 
collapsed and the “Researcher/PhD” category is combined with the long-term higher education as this category does 
not exist in the draftee sample. The categories are: 
1. 9 Years or less (Primary school) 
2. 10-11 Years (Vocational education) 
3. 11-12 years of education (High school + vocational high school) 
4. 13-14 years of education  (Short-term higher education) 
5. 14-16 years of education (Medium term higher education + Bachelor) 
6. 17-18 years of education (Long-Term higher education + Researcher/PhD) 
 
 What is your current personal income before taxes?  
 
Up to 99,999 DKK, 
100,000 – 199,999 DKK 
200,000 – 299,999 DKK 
300,000 – 399,999 DKK 
400,000 – 499,999 DKK 
500,000 – 599,999 DKK 
600,000 – 699,999 DKK 
700,000 - 799,999 DKK 
800,000 - 899,999 DKK 
900,000 - 999,999 DKK 
1,000,000 DKK and above 
Don’t know/don’t want to answer 
    
 
 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the representative sample of the Danish population3 
Construct Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Political knowledge Political knowledge item 1 (Ruling parties) 1972 0.92 0.27 0 1 
Political knowledge item 2 (Members of government) 1972 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Political knowledge item 3 (Troels Lund Poulsen) 1972 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Political knowledge item 4 (Christine Antorini) 1972 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Openness Openness parcel 1 3612 0.54 0.20 0 1 
Openness parcel 2 3612 0.49 0.20 0 1 
Openness parcel 3 3612 0.61 0.23 0 1 
Neuroticism Neuroticism parcel 1 3612 0.38 0.19 0 1 
Neuroticism parcel 2 3612 0.39 0.20 0 1 
Neuroticism parcel 3 3612 0.40 0.23 0 1 
Conscientiousness Conscientiousness parcel 1 3612 0.67 0.15 0 1 
Conscientiousness parcel 2 3612 0.63 0.18 0 1 
Conscientiousness parcel 3 3612 0.73 0.15 0 1 
Extraversion Extraversion parcel 1 3612 0.63 0.18 0 1 
Extraversion parcel 2 3612 0.71 0.16 0 1 
Extraversion parcel 3 3612 0.63 0.19 0 1 
Agreeableness Agreeableness parcel 1 3612 0.72 0.19 0 1 
Agreeableness parcel 2 3612 0.62 0.19 0 1 
Agreeableness parcel 3 3612 0.64 0.19 0 1 
Education Education 3612 0.45 0.28 0.17 1 
Age Age 3612 52.25 16.19 18 90 
Gender Gender (male=1) 3612 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Personal income Personal income 3437 3.47 1.67 1 11 
 
                                                          
3 The measures of political knowledge in the representative sample are collected at a second point in time, starting in 
October 2011, which not all participants in the first survey answered. See appendix 1 for the number of observations 
 Descriptive statistics for draftee sample 
Construct Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Political knowledge Political knowledge item 1 (Expenditures for health) 1072 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Political knowledge item 2 (Executive power) 1072 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Political knowledge item 3 (Ministry of finance) 1072 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Political knowledge item 4 (Who can become minister) 1072 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Political knowledge item 5 (Party of politician on picture) 1072 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Political knowledge item 6 (Most rightist party) 1072 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Political knowledge item 7 (Expenditures on foreign aid) 1072 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Political knowledge item 8 (Prime minister 1982-1993) 1072 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Political knowledge item 9 (Members of Parliament) 1072 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Political knowledge item 10 (Not a member Parliament) 1072 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Political knowledge item 11 (Members in EU) 1072 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Political knowledge item 12 (Party of Mette Frederiksen) 1072 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Political knowledge item 13 (Party of Søren Pind)  1072 0.73 0.45 0 1 
Openness Openness parcel 1 1072 0.51 0.22 0 1 
Openness parcel 2 1072 0.51 0.25 0 1 
Openness parcel 3 1072 0.61 0.24 0 1 
Neuroticism Neuroticism parcel 1 1072 0.53 0.23 0 1 
Neuroticism parcel 2 1072 0.43 0.24 0 1 
Neuroticism parcel 3 1072 0.38 0.22 0 1 
Conscientiousness Conscientiousness parcel 1 1072 0.73 0.16 0 1 
Conscientiousness parcel 2 1072 0.70 0.18 0 1 
Conscientiousness parcel 3 1072 0.75 0.16 0 1 
Extraversion Extraversion parcel 1 1072 0.73 0.19 0 1 
Extraversion parcel 2 1072 0.77 0.18 0 1 
Extraversion parcel 3 1072 0.71 0.20 0 1 
Agreeableness Agreeableness parcel 1 1072 0.57 0.22 0 1 
Agreeableness parcel 2 1072 0.62 0.22 0 1 
Agreeableness parcel 3 1072 0.60 0.21 0 1 
Education Education 1056 0.71 0.26 0.17 1 
Age Age 1072 22.92 1.92 19.17 33.31 
Gender Gender (male=1) 1072 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Personal income Personal income 1023 1.82 0.90 1 5 
Intelligence BPP score 1071 0.66 0.12 0.19 1 
 
Comparison of descriptive statistics for draftee sample and representative sample 
In order to compare the demographics and personality traits for the draftee sample and the 
representative sample this comparison is done separately for men and women, as the women are 
self-selected and thus might be hypothesized to distort the comparison. I only compare in the age 
group of 19-27 since 95% of the draftee sample is between the ages 19 and 27, although the total age 
span is 19-38. This gives an N of 118 for men and an N of 134 for women in the representative 
sample. For the demographics, simple descriptive statistics are used to illustrate similarities and 
differences, but for personality traits we are able to investigate measurement invariance. I will look at 
the last thing first. 
 
 
Representativeness of personality traits in the draftee sample 
When we compare constructs we need to make sure that they actually measure the same thing in the 
groups we are employing them in, so that we with some confidence can say that they are referring to 
the same construct. This might seem obvious but is seldom done. There are different ways of 
discussing measurement invariance and there is not total agreement on the necessary steps and tests 
involved. I will focus on configural invariance, metric invariance and scalar invariance as these are 
the most frequently used terms in the measurement invariance literature. 
 The weakest level of measurement invariance is configural invariance (Horn and McArdle 1992; 
Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998), which means that the model we use to measure our constructs 
has the same general structure, e.g. a five factor model with regard to personality traits, all contexts. 
The second level of invariance is termed metric invariance and deals with equality of the scale, in 
different contexts. More concretely it requires that people respond to the items in the same way, so 
that we can say the same construct is being measured in the different contexts and thus that they 
understand it the same way. This can be tested by imposing equality of factor loadings, across 
contexts. The third level is scalar invariance, which deals with whether it makes sense to make 
comparisons of latent factor means. This is done by imposing equality of item intercepts, and at the 
same time constraining factor latent factor means to zero in one of the groups.4 An example where 
this is not the case is termed additive bias, which happens when for a given level of the latent mean 
score, one group has a higher mean overall because of a larger intercept in this group for a particular 
item (Meredith 1993).  
 There are basically two approaches to assessing measurement invariance. One is a classical 
hypothesis test, using a chi-square test to test for a significant decrease in fit, and one looks at fit 
                                                          
4 For a recent critique of this common practice, see (Raykov, Marcoulides, and Li 2012). 
indices. The problem with the first approach is basically the same as in our discussion of model test 
statistics in appendix 2, when discussing fit statistics: For larger N it becomes difficult to not reject 
the null hypotheses of a non-significant decrease in model fit  (Chen 2007; Cheung and Rensvold 
2002; French and Finch 2006). The following guidelines for when to impose measurement 
invariance have been suggested: a change in CFI of ≤-.01 and a change of ≥.015 in RMSEA, and 
≥.030 in SRMR for sample sizes above 300 for testing metric invariance; and a change in CFI of ≤-
.01 and a change of ≥.015 in RMSEA, and ≥.010 in SRMR for sample sizes above 300 for testing 
scalar invariance  (Chen 2007). It is also possible to have partial measurement invariance, where one 
or more items are not invariant, and still compare factor latent factor means  (Byrne, Shavelson, and 
Muthen 1989). There is some debate on exactly how many items are needed to be invariant for it to 
make sense to still compare latent factor means.5 The table below summarizes the results: 
Model fit for different measurement invariance models 
 Model Chi-
square 
Scaling 
correction 
Degrees 
of 
freedom 
Δdf Difference 
test scaling 
correction 
Satorra-
Bentler 
scaled chi-
square 
difference 
CFI TLI RMS
EA 
SRM
R 
M
en
 
Configural 
invariance 
340.545 1.1208 160  
  
0.922 0.898 0.061 0.056 
Metric invariance 342.606 1.1370 170 10 1.396 5.630 0.926 0.908 0.057 0.057 
Scalar invariance 366.107 1.1349 180 10 1.99 23.610 0.920 0.907 0.059 0.059 
W
om
en
 Configural 
invariance 
351.725 1.2030 160  
  
0.921 0.896 0.058 0.058 
Metric invariance 359.626 1.2041 170 10 1.222 8.104 0.922 0.903 0.056 0.059 
Scalar invariance 371.164 1.1980 180 10 1.094 10.627 0.921 0.908 0.055 0.059 
 
 Based on fit indices we cannot reject neither metric nor scalar invariance. ΔCFI is never above 
.01, ΔRMSEA is less than .015 and ΔSRMR is less than .030. We can therefore conclude that there is 
measurement invariance. The table below outlines the differences in latent means: 
 
                                                          
5 Some say that only one item, in addition to the item constrained to equality for identification purposes, is needed: 
(Byrne, Shavelson, and Muthen 1989); and others that a majority should be invariant: (Reise, Widaman, and Pugh 1993). 
The same parcels are created in the two groups to compare the results. 
Differences in latent factor means 
 Women Men 
Openness -0.030 0.042* 
Conscientiousness 0.028* 0.042* 
Extraversion 0.068* 0.077* 
Agreeableness -0.025 -0.051* 
Neuroticism -0.031 -0.034 
*Reference category with latent mean constrained to zero is the comparison sample 
 The differences between the two samples are very slight given that the scale on which they are 
compared is ranging from zero to one; although the differences for extraversion are slightly larger 
than for the other traits for both women and men. Somewhat surprising more of the differences are 
significant in the sample comparing our two samples of men, as only the men are a non-random 
sample of the Danish population in the draftee sample. All in all there are no huge latent mean 
differences, and in terms of personality traits this sample seems to be fairly representative of this 
particular age group. To sum up, personality traits are measured on the same scale, metric invariance, 
and the items are equally difficult, scalar invariance, and finally there are no large differences in latent 
factor means. 
Representativeness of demographics 
Descriptive statistics for women in the draftee sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income 535 1.78 0.78 1 5 
Education 569 0.71   0.25 0.17 1 
Age 574 22.98 1.96 19.17 31.58 
 
Descriptive statistics for women in the representative sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income 119 1.70 0.85 1 4 
Education 134 0.55 0.23 0.17 1 
Age 134 23.23 1.88 20 26 
 
Descriptive statistics for men in the draftee sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income 475 1.87 1.00 1 6 
Education 487 0.70   0.28 0.17 1 
Age 498 22.86 1.91 19.50 33.31 
 
Descriptive statistics for men in the representative sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income 112 1.78 1.02 1 5 
Education 118 0.51 0.17 0.17 1 
Age 118 23.38 1.77 20 26 
 
 As we can see from the age variables, by restricting the comparison to the 19-27 age group, the 
mean of the age is roughly the same across the two samples. Also the mean and standard deviation 
of the personal income variable is extremely similar across the two samples both for men and 
women. The mean of the educational variable is higher in the draftee sample for both men and 
women. This probably has to do with the question wording in the two samples and the fact that we 
are not using sampling weights here, as we are in the model estimation. The question on education 
in the draftee sample asks about both the highest current level of education and finished education, so 
we would expect the mean to be a bit higher since not all have finished their highest level of 
education when we contact them. In the representative sample we are only looking at finished level 
of education. If we restrict the sample in the draftee sample to only those who say they have finished 
their degree and use sampling weights in both samples we end up with this table: 
Comparison of men and women in draftee sample and representative sample restricting the sample in the draftee sample to only those who have finished their 
degree and using sampling weights 
 Mean CI N 
Women representative sample 0.54 (0.50-0.58) 134 
Women draftee sample 0.47 (0.44-0.51) 143 
Men representative sample 0.50 (0.47-0.53) 118 
Men draftee sample 0.42 (0.38-0.45) 142 
 
 Although the confidence intervals do not overlap for men, the differences are very slight. The 
rest of the difference could simply be due to sampling error – the sample sizes are quite small in the 
comparison above. 
 Summarizing, we can therefore say that the draftee sample is very representative of the entire 
population when compared to the appropriate age group in the representative sample. Personality 
traits are extremely similar in terms of latent means and measure the same constructs as illustrated 
above using measurement invariance as a technique to compare the two samples. In terms of 
demographics, the two samples are extremely similar on personal income and also quite similar on 
levels of education.  
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Appendix 2: Results for measurement models and fit statistics 
Fit statistics 
The classic model test statistic is model chi-square, which measures the difference between the 
actual covariance or correlation matrix and the covariance or correlation matrix implied by the 
model. If the difference is larger than would be expected by chance chi-square is rejected; optimally 
we would therefore not like to reject the so-called exact-fit hypothesis. There are many problems with 
this test - the two main problems concern sample size and parameters – and it is not used widely in 
practical applications as a criterion for judging whether a model has failed or not. It is easier not to 
reject the exact-fit hypothesis with a small sample size, which is an undesirable property. If we just 
add more paths and correlations the likelihood of not rejecting the exact fit hypothesis also 
increases. Finally it is unrealistic that any model is without error  (Browne and Cudeck 1992). Many 
applied researchers therefore turn to so-called approximate fit indices. 
 Below are reported various approximate fit statistics for the different models. There is some 
controversy regarding what information they actually convey. I agree with Kline that they are best 
regarded as qualitative measures of fit and should not be used to either support or reject a certain type 
of model (Kline 2011, 205).6 Even so, it is common practice to assess them according to various 
“cut points”. When using Mplus’s MLR estimator, we also get fit statistics which are adjusted 
according to the degree of non-normality. 
 In terms of the value of RMSEA a perfectly fitting model has a value of 0,7 which happens when 
the degree of misfit is zero. Some argue that a value of RMSEA≤0.06 indicates excellent fit and 
acceptable model fit is between 0.06-0.08  (Hu and Bentler 1999), and others a value of .05 (Browne 
                                                          
6 C.f. also (Marsh, Hau, and Wen 2004) 
7 Or rather “set to zero” if it is less than zero 
and Cudeck 1992), when using ML estimation techniques for model estimation. For SRMR some 
have argued that an SRMR≤0.08 indicates acceptable fit (Hu and Bentler 1999), and for CFI some 
argue that a value of .95 (Hu and Bentler 1999) indicates great fit, although earlier work suggested 
that a value of .90 was sufficient (Bentler 1990). All fit statistics take their point of departure in a 
robust chi-square (Satorra and Bentler 1994). 
Fit statistics for different models: 
Number Model CFI RMSEA SRMR Model chi-square (df), 
P-Value 
1 Draftee sample only education 0.966 0.052 0.027 31.005 (8), 0.0001 
2 Draftee sample only personality traits and general intelligence 0.915 0.045 0.044 536.905 (168), 0.0000 
3 Draftee sample both personality traits, general intelligence and education 0.914 0.045 0.044 576.015 (180), 0.0000 
4 Representative sample only education (saturated model) 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0), 0.0000 
5 Representative sample only personality traits  0.920 0.050 0.041 1198.845 (120), 0.0000 
6 Representative sample both personality traits and education 0.919 0.049 0.040 1275.609 (130), 0.0000 
7 Representative sample with moderation education moderated by age 0.946 0.048 0.039 1294.640 (140), 0.0000 
  
 In no cases can we accept the close-fit hypothesis as signified by our non-significant p-value. 
Approximate fit indices all look fine for the draftee sample i.e. CFI above .9, RMSEA below .05 and 
SRMR below .08. SRMR is fine for all models, and RMSEA is below or equal .05 in all but one 
model. CFI is above .9 in all models and in one case above .95. The saturated model has a perfect fit 
and fit indices and chi-square are thus uninteresting to look at. In a sense the most important fit 
statistics to look at are those for the final model specifications, model 3 for the draftee sample and 
model 7 for the representative sample. For both models fit statistics are fine according to all criteria.  
Measurement models 
Only the measurement models for the final model specification are illustrated. The results for the 
other models are very similar. 
 Results for measurement models for draftee sample 
Latent construct Item Unstandardized 
coefficient 
P-value Standardized 
coefficient 
Intercept 
Political knowledge Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.640 0.049 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 0.898 (0.083) 0.000 0.576 0.339 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 0.966 (0.081) 0.000 0.683 0.055 
Openness Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.742  0.517 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 1.093 (0.115) 0.000 0.695  0.511 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 0.877 (0.072) 0.000 0.566  0.600 
Conscientiousness Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000)  Not defined 0.685  0.733 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 1.252 (0.087) 0.000 0.786  0.705 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 0.908 (0.067) 0.000 0.645  0.756 
Extraversion Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.806  0.748 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 0.846 (0.050) 0.000 0.708  0.787 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 0.974 (0.050) 0.000 0.743  0.722 
Agreeableness Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.721  0.609 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 1.017 (0.075) 0.000 0.756  0.661 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 1.012 (0.074) 0.000 0.750  0.635 
Neuroticism Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.806  0.586 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 0.939 (0.049) 0.000 0.738  0.479 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 0.892 (0.053) 0.000 0.740  0.426 
*Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Results for measurement models for representative sample of population 
Latent construct Item Unstandardized 
coefficient 
P-value Standardized 
coefficient 
Intercept 
Openness  Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.799 0.567 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 0.792 (0.036) 0.000 0.630 0.515 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 0.856 (0.036) 0.000 0.600 0.635 
Conscientiousness Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000)  Not defined 0.613 0.680 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 1.368 (0.061) 0.000 0.701 0.639 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 1.066 (0.053) 0.000 0.650 0.735 
Extraversion Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.795 0.651 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 0.817 (0.024) 0.000 0.760 0.732 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 1.077 (0.028) 0.000 0.800 0.650 
Agreeableness Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.761 0.756 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 0.892 (0.041) 0.000 0.682 0.655 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 0.814 (0.035) 0.000 0.647 0.664 
Neuroticism Parcel 1 (0-1) 1.000 (0.000) Not defined 0.744 0.420 
Parcel 2 (0-1) 1.135 (0.030) 0.000 0.790 0.431 
Parcel 3 (0-1) 1.221 (0.034) 0.000 0.773 0.450 
*Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Appendix 3: Coefficients for controls 
  
Regression coefficients for controls in the draftee sample and the representative sample for the “education only” model 
 Representative sample Draftee sample 
Control Unstandardized coefficient  Unstandardized coefficient  
Personal income 0.005 
(-0.002, 0.012) 
0.010 
(--0.015, 0.035) 
Age 0.001* 
(0.001, 0.002) 
-0.001   
(-0.008, 0.006) 
Gender 0.079*   
(0.053, 0.104) 
0.111* 
(0.078, 0.146) 
A single star signifies the effect is significant at a .05 level. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
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Cognitive Ability, Principled Reasoning and Political Tolerance  
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This study investigates the role of cognitive abilities in making tolerance judgments, toward Neo 
Nazis and the Far Right, using a standardized and validated measure of intelligence. We also 
include measures of habitual cognitive styles and emotional reactions, in the form of the Big Five 
personality traits, sociotropic threat and social ideology; all of which we know are related to 
political tolerance. We find that intelligence has a strong effect on political tolerance, even after 
accounting for differences in personality traits, perceptions of threat, and social ideology. 
Furthermore, those who are more cognitively able are equally likely to extend civil liberties to the 
Neo Nazis, an extreme group, as to the Far Right, a non-extreme group, whereas those who are 
less cognitively able are more likely to extend civil liberties only to the non-extreme group. We 
speculate that the reason why those who are more intelligent are more politically tolerant is 
because they are able to engage in “principled reasoning” i.e. the ability to link abstract notions 
of civil liberties also to disliked and extreme groups such as the Neo Nazis 
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Political tolerance is essentially about which rights and liberties political groups you dislike 
should enjoy (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979). 
Without some amount of political tolerance liberal democracy in large complex societies is 
impossible, but individuals vary considerably in the extent to which they tolerate diversity, 
difference and dissenting views, notably because their psychological and political dispositions 
vary. Individual predispositions and values have been featured as important determinants of 
individual variation in political tolerance. Constructs like ‘rigidity of categorization’, 
authoritarianism, dogmatism, ethnocentrism, social conformity and self-esteem are all related to 
political intolerance (Altemeyer 1981; Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Kinder and 
Kam 2010; Sniderman 1975; Stenner 2005; Stouffer [1955] 2009; Sullivan et al. 1981). Depending 
on conceptualization these individual predispositions include blends of motivational, cognitive 
and emotional factors that more or less habitually influence political tolerance and related 
concepts such as prejudice, negative stereotyping and social conservatism. There is, in the study 
of political tolerance, an increasing focus on getting a fuller understanding of the deeper 
psychological roots of political tolerance and the role of emotions and cognition (Kuklinski and 
Riggle 1991; Marcus et al. 2005; Marcus et al. 1995). Constructs like authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism are influenced by more deep-seated individual differences in personality traits 
(Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Sibley and Duckitt 2008; Stenner 2005) and so is political tolerance 
(Marcus et al. 1995). 
 In the exploration of the deeper psychological roots of the individual variation in political 
tolerance it is somewhat surprising that little attention has been devoted to examining the role of 
one of the most prominent deep-seated dispositions, cognitive ability or intelligence (cf. however 
Stenner 2005,). Intelligence is associated with a cognitive (Gottfredson 1997, 13) “ability to 
reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and 
learn from experience”. One of the ‘mental routes to tolerance judgments’ (Kuklinski and Riggle 
1991), the cognitive route, presumes a capacity of “principled reasoning” (Sniderman et al. 1989) 
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i.e. an ability to link abstract democratic principles to concrete application, even to political 
groups one dislikes. Although reasoning in tolerance is targeted a particular object, the least liked 
groups, the faculties involved in tolerant thinking strongly resemble the construct of intelligence. 
That, of course, does not automatically imply that individuals of high cognitive ability will use 
their faculties to develop more tolerant attitudes. Capacity does not guarantee use, and conscious 
reflection may lose to more reflexive reactions. Habitual cognitive styles and emotional 
dispositions may be more important. Whether cognitive ability matters for individual variation in 
political tolerance is an empirical question. A question we will try to answer in this paper. We will 
make the argument and show that the cognitive ability route to political tolerance has been 
neglected in recent research on the deep-seated sources of political tolerance. 
 To do so we have to entertain competing explanations of individual differences in political 
tolerance, notably personality traits and emotional dispositions associated with perception of 
threat. In addition we know intelligence is associated with holding social liberal values (Deary, 
Batty, and Gale 2008; Schoon et al. 2010), which is therefore also an explanation for why 
intelligence might be associated with political tolerance that needs to be investigated. Our 
purpose is not to demonstrate the detailed mechanisms involved in the emotional paths to 
political tolerance, a topic that has received much attention in recent years (e.g. Kuklinski and 
Riggle 1991; Marcus et al. 2005; Marcus et al. 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982), but to 
interrogate the cognitive antecedents of political tolerance and examine when cognitive ability 
matters. Demonstrating the precise mechanism involved in using cognitive abilities to arrive at 
political attitudes and judgment we will leave for future research.  
 In the following we first review the literature on the role of psychological dispositions for 
political tolerance. When the focus is deep-seated individual antecedents of tolerance we argue 
that personality traits as conceptualized in the Big Five Model, which has become the dominant 
framework in both in personality psychology (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008) and political 
science (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010), is the best point of departure. The Big Five Model 
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both includes traits associated with cognitive style, notably Openness to Experience, and traits 
more strongly associated with emotional dispositions, notably Extraversion and Neuroticism. 
Therefore, by entertaining the Big Five Model we test the argument about the role of cognitive 
ability in the most rigorous way. We will also discuss the influence of sociotropic threat, and its 
relationship with intelligence, since this is one of the most important predictors of differences in 
political tolerance (Gibson and Gouws 2003). Then we explicate why cognitive ability, 
intelligence, is also a likely source of political tolerance and we consider when intelligence should 
matter most. Next we present measures of central constructs, data and the method of estimation. 
The analysis that follows shows that intelligence strongly predicts differences in political 
tolerance; its positive effect on political tolerance is larger than any personality trait and is even 
larger than sociotropic threat, which in the literature on political tolerance is one of the most 
consistent and largest predictors of political tolerance (Gibson 2007).  
 We also demonstrate that intelligence matters most when tolerance judgments are most 
challenged: Those who have high cognitive abilities are able to resist the impulse to deny civil 
liberties to the most extreme, undemocratic groups, in this study Neo-Nazis, as compared to 
other disliked groups such as the Far Right. We take these findings to imply that those who are 
more intelligent are more tolerant because they engage in principled reasoning and that this 
effect is most pronounced when individuals are asked about the extent to which civil liberties 
should be granted to extreme groups that they profoundly dislike such as Neo-Nazis. The 
conclusion outlines the implications for our understanding of the role of intelligence in making 
political tolerance judgments. 
 
Predispositions  
Authoritarianism is probably the predisposition most often found to be associated with political 
intolerance, and authoritarianism is also related to concepts like prejudice, negative stereotyping 
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and punitiveness. In Adorno and associates classic treaty The Authoritarian Personality 
authoritarianism, and ethnocentrism, was seen as a personality syndrome rooted in Freudian 
dynamics (Adorno et al. 1950). In Freudian psychodynamics it is hard to distinguish emotional 
from cognitive dispositions. Both on empirical and theoretical grounds this conceptualization 
has been heavily criticized (Feldman 2003) 
 Subsequent work by Rokeach (1960) emphasized dogmatism and closed-mindedness as the 
predispositions associated with constructs like intolerance. Altemeyer’s work in the 1980s (1988; 
1981) redirected the focus to the authoritarianism construct, but he re-conceptualized it as a 
cluster of social and political attitudes rooted in social learning and socialization (Altemeyer 
1996). Now the ‘syndrome’ was not a personality characteristic but associated with a package of 
values and attitudes and a general hostility towards (minority) groups. As argued by Feldman 
(2003) and Stenner (2005) Altemeyer succeeded in separating authoritarianism from personality 
and Freudianism, but in doing so he created a host of new theoretical and empirical problems 
where he ended up predicting social and political attitudes with these very same attitudes, hence 
the reference to ‘syndrome’. 
 More recent work has argued that authoritarianism is an individual predisposition associated 
with varying perceived needs for social conformity (Feldman 2003) and group authority (Stenner 
2005) rather than individual autonomy and diversity (cf. also Duckitt 1989). However, as argued 
by Feldman (2003) and shown by Stenner (2005) authoritarianism conceptualized in this way 
may be associated with a general intolerance of ambiguity as a component of the more deep-
seated Big Five personality trait, ‘openness to experience’.  Lack of “openness to experience is 
both substantially related to authoritarianism, however it is measured, and characterized by a 
variety of traits that can reasonably be supposed to figure prominently in inclining one to 
intolerance of difference” (Stenner 2005, 146). 
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 A recent meta-analysis by psychologists Duckitt and Sibley corroborate this finding. Focusing 
on prejudice rather than political tolerance the substantial effect of openness on prejudice is 
strongly mediated by authoritarianism, conceptualized as Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
(Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Sibley and Duckitt 2008, 2009). Examining the direct effects of 
personality traits on political tolerance Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood (1995) found a 
substantial effect of openness to experience, neuroticism and enthusiasm on individual 
differences in political tolerance. 
 
Personality Traits 
The literature increasingly agrees that deep-seated personality traits influence the predispositions 
often found to be associated with political tolerance. But so far we have not explicitly discussed 
what personality traits are, nor have we discussed more specifically which Big Five traits may be 
related to political tolerance and how.   
 Personality traits can be conceptualized as “broad individual differences in behavior, thought, 
and feeling that account for general consistencies across situations and over time” (McAdams 
and Pals 2006, 212). Traits are general dispositions that have behavioral implications in concrete 
situations, or “characteristic adaptations” as it coined in the literature (McAdams and Pals 2006; 
McCrae and Costa 2003). This is not the place to discuss in detail the sources of these deep-
seated individual differences in personality traits, but research in behavioral genetics has 
consistently shown that personality traits is partially heritable, with the genetic component 
accounting for about half of the individual variation in personality traits, depending on trait, and 
it is the major source of stability in personality traits across time (Krueger and Johnson 2008) . 
Three things concerning personality traits are important to note here.  
 First, in personality psychology it is fully to be expected that individual behavior and 
judgment is also informed by situations and that individuals occasionally engage in “contra-trait 
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behaviors” (Gallagher, Fleeson, and Hoyle 2011) or experience contra-trait emotions (Wolak and 
Marcus 2007), but personality traits imply that individuals maintain stable average ways of acting 
(Gallagher, Fleeson, and Hoyle 2011). Personality traits reflect habitual and typical ways of 
thinking, feeling and behaving (McAdams and Pals 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003), which, of 
course, does not imply that individuals who are low in neuroticism never experience anxiety and 
negative emotionality. By implication, more transient and contemporaneous considerations, e.g. 
emotions, may play a role no matter which personality traits (Wolak and Marcus 2007) or other 
dispositions, e.g. authoritarianism, one holds (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1981). We will have more to say 
about emotions and threat below. 
 Second, personality traits involve motivational, emotional and cognitive aspects (Denissen 
and Penke 2008; DeYoung 2010a; DeYoung 2010b, 2011). Some personality traits, like 
neuroticism with its proneness to experience negative emotionality, anxiety and sensitivity 
towards punishment or extraversion with its tendency to experience positive emotionality and 
reward sensitivity, have a strong affective component (Krueger and Johnson 2008; Watson and 
Clark 1992). Neuroticism and extraversion have consistently been found to relate to mood and 
correlate strongly with avoidance behavior, the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), and 
approach behavior, the Behavioral Approach System (BAS), respectively (DeYoung 2010b; 
Watson and Clark 1992). Openness to experience, and in particular the ‘intellect’ aspect of the 
trait, has a strong cognitive component and people who are high on openness to experience have 
been found to have a higher ‘need for cognition’ (DeYoung 2011), and it is not related to moods 
or basic emotional dispositions (Watson and Clark 1992).  
 If neuroticism and extraversion are related to individual variation in political tolerance, which 
has been suggested (Marcus et al. 1995), we see this as an indication of the fact that mood or 
emotional dispositions are important. Meta-analyses on related constructs like prejudice have 
been able to reproduce the findings by Marcus and associates for extraversion, but not 
consistently for neuroticism (Duckitt and Sibley 2010; Sibley and Duckitt 2008). Regarding the 
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directional effect of extraversion on political tolerance, it is not quite clear what to expect. We 
have to remember that tolerance by definition concerns the rights an individual finds that groups 
they dislike should enjoy. Thus, per definition you cannot be enthusiastic and experience positive 
emotions towards these groups. Marcus and colleagues find a negative association between 
extraversion and political tolerance and argue that this likely is because the intolerant are more 
intense in their attitudes and extraverts are dispositionally inclined to experience more intense 
feelings (Marcus et al. 1995, 165). 
 Third, personality traits concern typical and habitual motivations, thoughts and behaviors, not 
maximum performance which is the essence of cognitive ability constructs such as intelligence 
(Cronbach 1949). Scholars who have focused on the importance of cognitive factors for political 
tolerance usually stress the habitual character of these predispositions. In Rokeach’ work 
authoritarianism was seen as a closed-minded, cognitive style (1960). In Altemeyer’s learning 
perspective authoritarianism and political intolerance were related to a general, habitual lack of 
cognitive thinking (1996). In Sidanius work on constructs related to political tolerance the focus 
is on “cognitive functioning” (complexity and flexibility) conceptualized as a trait-like attribute 
(1985). Therefore, it is not surprising that in particular openness to experience can be seen as an 
antecedent to these constructs. 
 If openness to experience influences political tolerance we see this as lending support to the 
hypotheses on the importance of habitual cognitive styles. Much research supports this 
proposition. Not only did Marcus and colleagues find Openness to predict variation in political 
tolerance (Marcus et al. 1995). Openness is empirically related to other constructs related to 
cognitive styles, which are all predictors of political tolerance, such as authoritarianism 
(McClosky and Brill 1983; Stenner 2005), RWA (Crawford and Pilanski 2013; Duckitt and Farre 
1994; Sibley and Duckitt 2008) and dogmatism (McCrae 1996; Sullivan et al. 1981; Sullivan, 
Piereson, and Marcus 1982), intolerance of ambiguity (McClosky and Brill 1983; McCrae 1996)  
as well as conceptually linked to Stouffers ‘rigidity of categorization’ (Stouffer [1955] 2009). In 
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addition, openness is positively associated with support for democratic values (Mondak and 
Halperin 2008), one of the strongest predictors of political tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and 
Marcus 1982).  
 We do not have strong expectations concerning the effects of agreeableness and 
conscientiousness on political tolerance, the last two Big Five traits we have not discussed so far. 
Neither of these traits is associated with cognitive ability (DeYoung 2011), and they are only 
weakly related to experiencing positive and negative emotionality (DeYoung 2010b; Watson and 
Clark 1992). We know that conscientiousness is related to (social) conservatism (Gerber et al. 
2010; Mondak 2010) and attitudes towards immigration (Dinesen, Klemmensen, and Nørgaard 
2014) and perhaps also moral traditionalism and judgment (Mondak 2010-135), but it does not 
seem to be related to authoritarianism (Stenner 2005, chapter 6). Agreeableness is moderately, 
negatively associated with habitual feelings of anger and hostility (Watson and Clark 1992), but it 
is not related to ideology or moral judgment (Mondak 2010). We arguably tap general feeling of 
hostility towards groups when we include perception of threat in our models. Therefore, it is not 
clear if we can expect an additional dispositional effect of agreeableness on political tolerance. 
Even if we do not have strong expectations regarding the effect of conscientiousness and 
agreeableness on political tolerance we include them in the analyses below in order to have as 
comprehensive a control of habitual dispositions as possible. 
 
 
Threat  
Whatever the source of your inclination to be politically tolerant towards a group that you do not 
like, if you also feel threatened by that group your dispositional motivations and reactions may 
be strained (Stouffer [1955] 2009; see also Marcus et al. 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 
1982). In Sullivan and associates seminal paper The Sources of Political Tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1981)  
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the perception of feeling threatened by the least liked group for which tolerance was assessed 
was the single strongest predictor of tolerance and it was not related to psychological disposition.  
 So far, a general theory of differences in threat perceptions seems to be lacking (Gibson 2006, 
24). In a recent review of the literature on political tolerance Sullivan and Hendricks conclude 
that the important role  (Sullivan and Hendriks 2009, 379) “that political threat plays in shaping 
levels of political tolerance appears to be largely a subjective one, as perceived levels of threat do 
not correspond well with more objective measures” of individual differences.  Also in this study 
the correlations between threat perception and predispositions and controls are very low as 
outlined in table 1 below. 
 Still, the importance of threat for political tolerance has been theorized and modeled in 
different ways in the literature. Some argue that normative collective threat is activating and thus 
moderating individual predispositions such as authoritarianism (Feldman 2003; Feldman and 
Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005). Others argue that perception of threat and seeing the world as a 
dangerous place is mediating the influence of individual disposition on attitudinal manifestations 
akin to political tolerance (Sibley and Duckitt 2009; Wolak and Marcus 2007). Of particular 
relevance in this context is Affective Intelligence Theory, AIT, because the theory argues that 
threatening stimuli fuel thinking and cognitive effort. 
 In AIT all individuals posses the ability to reason and deliberate if habits and routines 
operating in the ‘disposition system’ are challenged by threats or unforeseen events. Threats in 
AIT make us anxious and attentive, and anxiety activates our ‘surveillance system’ that enhances 
cognitive functioning, thoughtfulness and information processing (Marcus et al. 2000, 53-57; 
MacKuen et al. 2010). Following this line of reasoning all people can engage in cognitive 
reasoning when they feel threatened, and Wolak and Marcus have shown that threat stimuli 
induced anxiety reactions were (largely) unrelated to individual predispositions, including 
personality traits (Wolak and Marcus 2007). However, so far nobody has examined if cognitive 
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ability conditions how individuals respond to threats. The fact that all can engage in cognitive 
reasoning does not imply that all are equally good at it and make the same inferences. If the gist 
of AIT is correct emotional and cognitive processes are interwoven, and only in conjunction 
with feelings of threat can we expect differences in cognitive ability to influence political 
tolerance judgments: without threat no principled reasoning.  
 As argued above it is fully to be expected that individuals no matter their habitual dispositions 
can experience different feelings towards groups depending on group characteristics. That is, if 
one is feeling threatened by a group that one dislikes this feeling may override habitual 
dispositional influences on political tolerance as well as the (potential) effect of cognitive ability. 
But as implicitly suggested in AIT feelings of threat may also catalyze cognitive processes and 
make differences in cognitive ability more important. Therefore, we both have to control for 
perceptions of threat and examine if an interaction between threat and intelligence influence 
political tolerance judgments.  
 The current consensus is that sociotropic threats i.e. collective threats aimed at society or groups, 
is a stronger predictor of intolerance than egocentric threat i.e. threats aimed at an individual’s 
safety and well-being (Davis and Silver 2004; Gibson and Gouws 2003). The importance of 
social threats, as opposed to personal threats, has also been found in the literature on the 
relationship between threat and authoritarianism (Feldman and Stenner 1997). We therefore 
focus on sociotropic threat.  
 
Intelligence  
There are good reasons to expect intelligence to be positively associated with political tolerance, 
and a number of studies of constructs related to political tolerance suggest that cognitive ability 
is an important source of individual variation in dispositions and tolerance judgment. But first 
what is cognitive ability as represented by the intelligence construct? 
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 Those who are more intelligent are generally speaking more cognitively able and have a larger 
capacity to “reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas” 
(Gottfredson 1997, 13). Although intelligence includes group factors of abilities (Carroll 1993; 
Johnson and Bouchard 2005; McGrew 2009) these group factors tend to correlate strongly. The 
notion that there is a general factor of intelligence, g, is broadly accepted today (Deary, Penke, 
and Johnson 2010; Johnson et al. 2004; Mackintosh 2011).  
 This is not the place to discuss the sources of intelligence at length, but the consensus is that 
intelligence is highly heritable with heritability estimates accounting for at least half of the 
individual variation in intelligence (Bouchard and McGue 2003). Environmental influences, and 
early-in-life interventions, are more important among children/individuals of parents of low 
social status (Nisbett et al. 2012). Also, and more importantly, general intelligence gets 
increasingly stable through childhood and early adolescence (Neisser et al. 1996).  
 The most obvious reason why intelligence may be a source of political tolerance is the fact 
that the cognitive mental route to tolerance judgments presumes a capacity of “principled 
reasoning” (Sniderman et al. 1989) and the application of general norms to concrete situations 
and groups. Charles Spearman argued that those with higher levels of general intelligence are 
better at “the eduction of relations and correlates” (Spearman 1927, 164-166). To be able to 
deduce the relationship between abstract norms and concrete applications as well as to actually 
grasp that the two are related on principle is exactly what the cognitive route to being politically 
tolerant presumes.  
 Traditionally, the literature on political tolerance has attributed this cognitive capacity (and 
inclination) to educational achievement (Jackman 1978; McClosky 1964; McClosky and Brill 
1983; Prothro and Grigg 1960).1 Sniderman and collaborators demonstrate that those who are 
more educated are more likely to be tolerant on principle (Sniderman et al. 1989); in their study 
                                                          
1 The correlation between intelligence and various measures of educational achievement is usually 0.4-0.5 in the United States 
(Neisser et al. 1996; Strenze 2007). In the sample used here level of education correlates .28 with intelligence, cf.t able 1 below. 
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of civil liberties McClosky and Brill found that ‘intellectuality’ was positively related to level of 
education (McClosky and Brill 1983); and Bobo and Licari argued that the educational effect on 
political tolerance towards concrete, disliked groups was substantially mediated by cognitively 
sophisticated styles of reasoning (Bobo and Licari 1989). Concepts like cognitive styles and 
intellectuality are associated with habitual, cognitive reasoning as discussed above and therefore 
probably more closely related to openness to experience, but they may be related to intelligence 
as well. However, none of the cited studies examined if cognitive ability confounds the proposed 
educational effect, nor did they include comprehensive measures of personality traits, most 
importantly Openness to experience. 
 As already argued, ability does not guarantee use. However, collaborative evidence on a host 
of constructs that correlate with political tolerance suggests that cognitive abilities are put to use 
when individuals form political attitudes and judgments. McCourt and associates found that 
those who are more intelligent are less likely to be right wing authoritarians (McCourt et al. 
1999;, see also Heaven, Ciarrochi & Leeson 2011). A recent meta-analysis estimates the 
correlation between RWA and intelligence at -0.26 (Van Hiel, Onraet, and De Pauw 2010). 
Recent studies demonstrate that intelligence is associated with pro-democratic norms and social 
liberal values (Deary, Batty, and Gale 2008; Schoon et al. 2010). Hodson and Busseri found 
socially conservatism and prejudice to be associated with lower levels of intelligence (Hodson 
and Busseri 2012). Holding socially liberal attitudes and favouring pro-democratic norms are 
both positively associated with political tolerance (Golebiowska 1995; Sullivan and Hendriks 
2009; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). If intelligence is based on principled reasoning, 
rather than based on holding social liberal values, its effect on political tolerance should remain 
even after controlling for social liberalism. 
 However, when it comes to establishing a theoretical and empirical link between cognitive 
ability and political tolerance Karen Stenner’s book The Authoritarian Dynamic (2005) offers the 
most compelling arguments and suggestive evidence. Focusing on authoritarianism as a more 
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proximate antecedent to political tolerance than cognitive ability and distinguishing carefully 
between dispositions, situational triggers and attitudinal and judgmental consequences Stenner 
shows that cognitive ability (measured by verbal ability) is the single strongest predictor of 
authoritarianism (2005, 169): “cognitive ability to deal with complexity and difference plays a 
major role, if not the primary role, in the development of the authoritarian predisposition”.  
 More importantly the effect of predispositions, Stenner argues, is not invariant across 
situations (cf. Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003). Authoritarianism will only influence 
normative judgment when authoritarians experience threats towards the normative order and 
social conformity (Stenner 2005; cf. Feldman 2003). Although Stenner focuses on the mediated 
effect of cognitive ability through authoritarianism normative threat may also activate principled 
reasoning and cognitive abilities. Leaving aside the emotional reactions that threat may trigger, 
which we have already discussed above, intelligence and a capacity to principled reasoning may 
be most important when normative threat is most pronounced. In general, political tolerance 
judgments are only relevant when they concern disliked groups. However, some disliked groups 
are more extreme and pose a larger threat towards society and democracy than others. It is very 
likely that differences in cognitive ability matter most when tolerance concerns the most extreme 
and normatively threatening groups. That is, when the principled reasoning involved in 
extending civil liberties to groups is mostly challenged. 
 
Political tolerance 
Following James Gibson (Gibson 2006, 23): “tolerance means putting up with that which one 
disagrees. It means allowing one’s political enemies to compete openly for political power. A 
tolerant citizen is one who would not support unreasonable or discriminatory restrictions on the 
rights of groups to participate in politics”. As already argued, this implies that political tolerance 
has to be ascertained in relation to political groups that one dislikes, perhaps even those that one 
dislikes the most.   
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 In order to assess whether people are in fact tolerant on principle we need to gauge the breadth 
of tolerance (Gibson 2007; Petersen et al. 2010; Sniderman et al. 1989). If people are tolerant 
towards both extreme and non-extreme groups that they dislike this would indicate that they are 
tolerant on the democratic principle that all groups should be granted the same set of civil 
liberties. Besides, it may very well be in relation to the most extreme groups that the more 
intelligent differ in their tolerance judgments because in these situations principled reasoning is 
most challenged. To interrogate the possible effects of intelligence on principled reasoning in 
relationship to political tolerance two steps have been taken.  
 First, we know that intelligence is mainly associated with left-wing political orientations and 
the least liked groups are therefore right-wing political groups. We have chosen Neo-Nazis and 
the Far Right, as our two examples of right-wing groups. In addition, we only include those 
respondents who explicitly dislike the groups (cf. below). If intelligence has an effect in relation 
to the two right-wing groups, the Far Right and Neo-Nazis, it is a strong indication that 
intelligence is associated with differences in principled reasoning in forming tolerance judgments.  
 Second, we also have to rule out that consistent tolerance judgments merely reflect 
consistency in answering patterns. To this end we have randomly assigned the one of the two 
right-wing groups to half of the respondents. Had we adopted the so-called fixed group 
approach (Bobo and Licari 1989; Gibson 2013; Petersen et al. 2010; Sniderman et al. 1989) in 
which all respondents make tolerance judgments for both groups we would not be able to rule 
out that the more intelligent simply are giving more consistent answers across groups.  
 The choice of Neo-Nazis and the Far Right as our target groups also enables us to examine if 
intelligence moderates the negative effect of normative threat on political tolerance judgments 
that we discussed above. A recent study using the same methodology and same questions as we 
do here found that Neo-Nazis were perceived as much more extreme and undemocratic than the 
Far Right (Petersen et al. 2010). After controlling for sociotropic threat, and a host of other 
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controls, the study found that the average citizen was still much less tolerant towards the more 
extreme Neo-Nazis compared to the Far Right, because this group is more extreme and 
undemocratic. 
 This design allows us to arbitrate between the two possible paths through which intelligence 
may influence tolerance judgments. If Affective Intelligence Theory is correct we should only, or 
at least primarily, see an effect of intelligence when individuals feel sociotropically threatened and 
engage in conscious thinking. That is, the emotional trigger, in this paper conceptualized as 
feelings of threat, is what activates the cognitive mental route to political tolerance and may 
make intelligence important. Emotional and cognitive paths are interwoven. If, on the other 
hand, principled reasoning is unrelated to emotions but particularly pertinent when principles are 
challenged the most we expect intelligence to dampen the target group effect according to which 
Neo-Nazis are less tolerated than the Far Right in the average citizen. The more intelligent 
should be able to extend the principles of tolerance to the more extreme group irrespective of 
how they feel about Neo-Nazis. The cognitive route to tolerance judgments is unrelated to 
emotional triggers such as feeling threatened.    
 
 
Datasets and measures 
To examine if cognitive ability influences political tolerance even when controlling for 
competing explanations we need solid measures of all constructs. In particular good measures of 
intelligence are not readily available in representative samples of the general population because 
intelligence tests have to comply with detailed protocols and time restrictions. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study of political tolerance that includes both a standardized, validated 
battery of all the Big Five personality traits and an excellent measure of intelligence. 
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 The sample used in the analysis is a sample of draftees drawn from the Danish draft registry, 
which means it is a representative sample of young males as all Danish men go to the draft board 
when they are about 18 years old.2 The registry has only been in operation since 2006 so most 
are young at the time when they were surveyed in 2012, and the mean age is around 23. A 
sizeable number of women, who self-select into the military, also take the test. Both men and 
women are however fairly representative in terms of demographics and personality traits when 
compared to the general population.3  
 The survey was fielded in the period 2nd of March 2012 to the 10th of April 2012. The total 
sample size is 1072 and has a response rate of roughly 28 percent.  
 The Big Five personality traits are measured using the 60 item NEO-PI-R (Costa and McCrae 
2003). For all traits correlations between the 60 item battery and the full personality battery are .9 
and above (Costa and McCrae 2003, 74). The NEO-PI-R is a highly validated and reliable 
measure of the Big Five personality traits (Costa and McCrae 2003).  
 The intelligence test used in the analysis is called Børge Priens Prøve (BPP) which all draftees 
appearing for the draftee board have to take before being admitted to military service 
(Kousgaard 2003). The test is highly g loaded as 50-60 percent of the total variance in BPP scores 
is accounted for by g (Hartmann and Teasdale 2004); this means that our measure of intelligence 
comes close to the construct of intelligence by relying on a test which is highly g loaded.. 
Furthermore the BPP has a correlation of .82 with the full Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS) (Mortensen, Reinisch, and Teasdale 1989), one of the most used and validated 
intelligence tests available. Thus, the validity and reliability of the test is very high (Hartmann and 
Teasdale 2005; Kousgaard 2003; Rasch 1980; Teasdale et al. 2011).  
                                                          
2 Around 5-15% do not take the test, primarily on medical grounds. (Teasdale et al. 2011; Teasdale and Owen 1989) 
3 See appendix 2  
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 Education is measured using two questions, one asking about schooling up to high school 
and another asking about further education; these variables are coded into one continuous 
variable, to reflect total years of school education.  
 Political tolerance is measured by asking four questions about the rights of groups, dealing 
with freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to speak at right schools and whether 
the police ought to have better opportunities to wiretap the phones from the group in question. 
The two groups used are the Neo-Nazis and the Far Right.  
  We also include a measure of sociotropic threat similar to the one used in previous studies 
(Petersen et al. 2010). This is measured by asking people how large a threat the two groups pose 
to Danish society on a zero to ten scale. 
 Finally our measure of social ideology is constructed using five items asking questions on 
attitudes toward punishment of violent crimes, preserving national customs, protecting the 
environment, taxes on gas, and finally whether crime is best prevented through rehabilitation, 
using a likert format.  
  Education, personality traits, threat, intelligence and our measure of social ideology, are all 
recoded to range from 0-1. Correlations between all important construct and controls are shown 
in table 1. Full question wording as well as descriptive statistics for these main variables as well as 
the controls can be found in appendix 1. 
19 
 
Table 1: Correlation table of constructs and controls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Tolerance 1                
(2) Openness 0.17 1               
(3) Conscientiousness -0.034 -0.003 1              
(4) Extraversion -0.150 -0.013 0.289 1             
(5) Agreeableness -0.074 0.007 -0.027 0.004 1            
(6) Neuroticism 0.029 0.261 -0.262 -0.330 -0.005 1           
(7) Social ideology 0.359 0.409 -0.251 -0.142 0.152 0.011 1          
(8) Intelligence x  target group -0.200 0.020 -0.038 -0.046 0.025 -0.023 0.092 1         
(9) Intelligence x threat -0.147 0.045 -0.014 0.027 0.141 0.065 0.116 0.103 1        
(10) Threat -0.260 0.016 0.025 0.082 0.123 0.071 -0.039 -0.017 0.870 1       
(11) Age -0.021 -0.015 0.077 -0.080 0.048 -0.013 -0.007 0.004 0.020 -0.005 1      
(12) Education 0.120 0.149 -0.020 -0.027 0.020 0.034 0.349 0.085 0.111 -0.029 0.100 1     
(13) Income -0.096 -0.230 0.239 0.091 -0.098 -0.157 -0.301 -0.040 -0.074 -0.017 0.315 -0.268 1    
(14) Intelligence 0.214 0.066 -0.118 -0.114 0.044 -0.052 0.304 0.298 0.348 -0.060 0.017 0.283 -0.095 1   
(15) Target group -0.312 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.921 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1  
(16) Gender 0.160 -0.030 -0.060 -0.082 -0.287 -0.270 0.094 0.016 -0.102 -0.104 -0.042 -0.024 0.123 0.046 0.000 1 
*This correlation table is based on model (4) below 
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Model estimation  
All models are estimated using structural equation modeling (SEM) via the statistical software 
Mplus version 7 using the MLR estimator that assumes multivariate normality and provides 
robust standard errors and robust test statistics.4  
 SEM takes the measurement error of our constructs into account and in this way avoid biased 
parameter estimates (Bollen 1989).5 By using SEM we also use a strong technique for handling 
missing values, i.e. full information maximum likelihood (FIML). This technique only requires 
the assumption of Missing at Random (MAR) i.e. that the missing values of the dependent 
variable are unrelated to the values on the dependent variable conditional on observables 
(Enders 2010).  
 The controls in this analysis are gender, age and personal income, and a dummy variable 
indicating whether respondents were assigned to either the Neo-Nazis or the far right in the 
experimental conditions; using these control variables are fairly standard in the literature on 
political tolerance (Gibson 2013). Social ideology, democratic rights or any other political source 
of political tolerance are not included as controls in the initial model because they are 
hypothesized to be endogenous to the psychological variables (Sullivan et al. 1981), i.e. political 
orientations are seen as “characteristic adaptations” of social and psychological sources in a 
given context (McAdams and Pals 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003). Somewhat similarly Marcus 
and associates argue that predispositions, a general term which for them also includes education, 
are the most stable long-term factors in determining tolerance judgments, and that both 
tolerance judgments and “standing decisions”, such as attitudes about democratic principles, are 
partly the outcome of these causally prior and stable predispositions (Marcus et al. 1995). We do 
                                                          
4 Sampling weights are used to account for unit nonresponse. Fit statistics for the various models can be found in appendix 2. 
5 Measurement models are available upon request as are the analyses of the items leading to the measurement model for 
personality traits. 
21 
 
however investigate whether the effect of intelligence on political tolerance is mediated by its 
effect on new social ideology. We implement this in a model in which we control for ideology.  
 In the analyses we examine if intelligence predicts political tolerance after personality traits, 
sociotropic threat, group membership, and education are taken into account. Four models are 
estimated: (1) a baseline model including only intelligence and the standard set of controls; (2) a 
model adding personality traits, a target group dummy, and sociotropic threat; and (3) a model in 
which social ideology is added. In model (4) we include interactions between intelligence and 
target group and between intelligence and threat to examine (a) if intelligence moderate the 
negative target group effect associated with extremism and (b) if threat activates reasoning and 
thus moderate the effect of intelligence.  
 In line with current practice we are only including those respondents in our analysis who 
express dislike towards the group as political tolerance by definition requires that the group is 
disliked, as argued by Sullivan and others (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982).6 Only those 
respondents who indicated they disliked the group i.e. had a score below our midpoint of 5 on 
our sympathy variable were included.7  
 
  
                                                          
6 There is also a methodological advantage of this approach as argued by Gibson in an analysis of different approaches towards 
measuring political tolerance (Gibson 2013, 54) : “Perhaps the general lesson is that the larger the percentages of the respondents 
not disliking the groups—i.e., groups not satisfying the “objection precondition”—the more measurement error is introduced 
into the indicators…”  
7 Changing the threshold to a lower point does not change our findings for intelligence but does increase the standard error 
because the sample size decreases.  
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Results 
Table 2: Effect of intelligence on political tolerance in alternative model specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Intelligence and controls Adding predispositions 
and threat 
Adding social ideology Adding interactions 
Constructs Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Intelligence (0-1) 0.175*** 
(0.049) 
0.149*** 
(0.044) 
0.104** 
(0.046) 
0.038  
(0.079) 
Education (0-1) 0.021 
(0.019) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
Gender 0.046*** 
(0.011) 
0.036***   
(0.011) 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
0.027** 
(0.011)   
Age 0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001   
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Income -0.018* 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.010)   
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.003   
(0.010) 
Openness (0-1)  0.122** 
(0.049) 
0.009 
(0.053) 
0.008** 
(0.053) 
Conscientiousness (0-1)  0.065 
(0.063) 
0.162** 
(0.071) 
0.166** 
(0.072) 
Extraversion (0-1)  -0.089** 
(0.046) 
-0.064 
(0.046) 
-0.058 
(0.045) 
Agreeableness (0-1)  -0.017 
(0.039) 
-0.058 
(0.042) 
-0.060 
(0.042) 
Neuroticism  (0-1)   0.018 
(0.035) 
0.057 
(0.039) 
0.063 
(0.040) 
Sociotropic threat (0-1)  -0.104*** 
(0.023) 
-0.104*** 
(0.024) 
-0.059 
(0.082) 
Target group dummy 
(Reference group: Far Right) 
 -0.086*** 
(0.012) 
-0.085*** 
(0.012) 
-0.185*** 
(0.048) 
Social ideology (0-1) 
 
  0.261*** 
(0.057) 
 
Sociotropic threat x intelligence    -0.085 
(0.132) 
Target group x intelligence    0.180** 
(0.075) 
N 838 838 838 838 
Standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
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 In the first model we notice that intelligence exerts a positive and significant impact on 
political tolerance even after controlling for educational differences 0.175 (p<0.000). There is 
also an important non-finding in model (1): Education does not exert a statistically significant 
influence on political tolerance; in fact it does not exert an independent impact on political 
tolerance in any of the models. This is quite surprising given the rather large literature pointing 
to education as an important construct to take into account if we want to understand individual 
differences in political tolerance judgments. If we exclude intelligence from model 1 above 
education becomes significant (p=0.036) and the unstandardized effect of education on political 
tolerance increases to 0.039, roughly double the size of the effect of 0.021 in model (1).  
 In model (2) including both personality traits, feelings of threat, and the effect of target group 
membership the effect of intelligence decreases somewhat to 0.149 but the effect is still strong 
and highly significant (p=0.001). Although there is thus some overlap between intelligence, 
predispositions and emotional responses toward tolerance of the Far Right and Neo-Nazis, most 
of the effect of intelligence on political tolerance is not overlapping with these constructs. Note 
in particular that the effect of intelligence is still strong and significant after we include Openness 
to Experience that taps habitual cognitive styles. As discussed above Openness is conceptually 
and empirically related to a host of constructs related to cognitive styles and ways of thinking 
such as intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, and authoritarianism.  
 In terms of the effect of personality traits on political tolerance there has, to our knowledge, 
only been a single study using validated measures of three of the Big Five on political tolerance 
namely the study by Marcus and collaborators (Marcus et al. 1995). The results of their analyses 
are to some extent reproducible here in model 3 and 4 above: Those who are more open to 
experience are more politically tolerant 0.122 (p=0.013) and those who are more extroverted are 
less politically tolerant -0.089 (p=0.050). Contrary to the results from Marcus and associates 
Neuroticism is not a predictor of political tolerance in this sample (p=0.612). The findings are 
thus more in line with those of Sibley and Duckitt in relation to prejudice, where Neuroticism is 
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not consistently predicting differences in this conceptually related construct (Duckitt and Sibley 
2010; Sibley and Duckitt 2008). 
 In terms of effect sizes intelligence is the strongest predictor of political tolerance with an 
unstandardized coefficient of 0.149, but also sociotropic threat (coefficient=-0.104), and 
Openness (coefficient= 0.122) strongly predicts political tolerance. These effect sizes are directly 
comparable as they are all scaled to range from zero to one. They thus represent the effect on 
political tolerance of going from minimum to maximum for the respective constructs.  
 As expected there is also a quite large negative effect of being asked to be tolerant towards 
the Neo Nazis compared to the Far Right, which is the reference group, as evidenced by the 
significant and negative target group dummy -0.086 (p<0.000). In fact the effect is almost 
unchanged after including social ideology in model (3). We are thus able to reproduce the finding 
by Petersen et al. (Petersen et al. 2010): people are less tolerant towards extreme groups, even 
after sociotropic threat and important additional controls like personality traits are included.  
In model (3) we include a measure of social ideology to investigate whether differences in 
ideological orientation is the reason why those who are more intelligent are more politically 
tolerant. However, most of the intelligence effect is retained in model (3). The effect of 
intelligence is still strong and significant (p=0.025) with a coefficient 0.104 compared to the 
effect of 0.149. Some of the effect of intelligence is mediated by social ideology which is 
consistent with the findings in the literature that intelligence is associated with holding social 
liberal values (Deary, Batty, and Gale 2008; Schoon et al. 2010). But most of the intelligence 
effect is not shared with social ideology.  
The direct effects of the personality traits Openness to experience and Extraversion on 
political tolerance disappear after including social ideology in the model. A number of previous 
studies have shown in particular Openness is strongly associated with social liberalism (Gerber et 
al. 2011; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010) and 
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ideology seems to fully mediate these personality effects on political tolerance. A similar kind of 
attitudinal/ideological mediation has been demonstrated for a number of other political 
behaviors (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 2012). Somewhat surprisingly, 
Conscientiousness becomes significant after controlling for the variance that is shared with social 
ideology.  
 
Intelligence, threat and principled reasoning 
So far we have ruled out three alternative explanations for why those who those who are more 
intelligent are more tolerant. It is not because they are more educated, i.e. model (1); because they 
possess a certain set of behavioral tendencies and habitual dispositions, i.e. model (2); or because 
they are more likely to hold social liberal values, i.e. model (3). In addition there is still an effect 
of intelligence even though the groups are perceived as sociotropically threatening. The results 
support the proposition that intelligence is associated with principled reasoning and represents a 
distinct cognitive route towards tolerance judgments. However, we have not examined if the 
inclination to use ones cognitive abilities is conditional which we may expect according to the 
literature. Those who are more intelligent may be more politically tolerant because they are better 
able to link abstract notions of civil liberties to the most extreme and disliked groups, i.e. when 
challenged the most they are more capable of “principled reasoning” than the average citizen. 
Alternatively, following the ideas in AIT the effect of differences in cognitive ability is 
contingent upon feelings of threat that make individuals rely less on habitual disposition and 
more on effortful thinking. 
 In model (4) we have included interaction terms between intelligence and target group as well 
as sociotropic threat. A significant interaction term for either of these would imply that cognitive 
ability is important in forming tolerance judgments but the interpretation would differ.. Since we 
26 
 
include both interaction terms simultaneously the target group term is not associated with 
sociotropic feelings of threat. 
 We find a significant interaction between intelligence and target group 0.180 (p=0.017) but 
not between intelligence and sociotropic threat -0.085 (p=0.522). This suggests that the effect of 
intelligence on tolerance judgments is strongest when the inclination to be tolerant is challenged 
the most. By any account, Neo-Nazis are more extremist and less democratic than populist Far 
Right groups (cf. Petersen et al. 2010). The implication of AIT does not find support. The effect 
of cognitive ability is not contingent upon feeling threatened. This suggests – but does not prove 
– that the cognitive, principled route to tolerance judgments is distinct and different from the 
emotional route. We will elaborate on this in the conclusion. 
 Figure 1 below illustrates the marginal effect of the target group effect as levels of intelligence 
increases. This figure demonstrates that for those with lesser cognitive abilities, there is a large 
negative effect of being asked to be tolerant towards the Neo-Nazis, compared to being asked to 
be tolerant towards the Far Right. As levels of intelligence increase people are more and more 
willing to also grant civil liberties to this extreme and highly disliked group. In fact, among the 
most intelligent there is no target group effect at all, as evidenced by the confidence bands 
crossing the zero point at a level of intelligence around .8. The general inclination to be less 
tolerant towards extreme groups is not found by the most cognitively able who, like most other 
people, strongly disagree with Neo-Nazis but still defend their civil liberties and rights to speak 
in public. 
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Figure 1: Effect of target group on political tolerance conditional on levels of intelligence with 95 % confidence bands 
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
We have long known that social sources, primarily education, and psychological sources, such as 
authoritarianism and “rigidity of categorization” are important sources of tolerance (Finkel, 
Sigelman, and Humphries 1999; Stouffer [1955] 2009; Sullivan and Hendriks 2009; Sullivan, 
Piereson, and Marcus 1982). Although previous research has focused on what might be termed 
cognitive styles, such as authoritarianism, dogmatism, and Openness to experience, this study 
demonstrates that differences in people’s cognitive abilities also matter for tolerance judgments. 
This is demonstrated after taking into account both habitual predispositions, in the form of 
personality traits, education, which has traditionally been perceived as an important social source 
of tolerance, as well as social ideology, which is an important political source of tolerance 
(Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982).  
 The fact that intelligence is a strong predictor of tolerance has implications for our 
understanding of the construct political tolerance. As Sniderman and associates and others have 
argued there is a difference between “principled tolerance” and tolerance based on emotions 
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(Bobo and Licari 1989; Kuklinski and Riggle 1991; Sniderman et al. 1989). Most agree that 
political tolerance is a prerequisite for “the marketplace of ideas” to function efficiently which is 
an integral part of a liberal democracy (Gibson 2007; Mill [1859] 2002). In terms of how deeply 
the support for democracy is engrained, being tolerant on principle, as opposed to being tolerant 
or intolerant based on emotional attachments and detachments, speaks positively toward the 
degree of support for democracy.  
 This study has demonstrated that there are in fact people, primarily those with high levels 
intelligence, who are tolerant on principle. We are able to infer this from the four steps we have 
taken to examine if cognitive ability was associated with a principled standpoint on political 
tolerance: First, we argued and showed that the construct intelligence defined as (Spearman 
1927) “the eduction of relations and correlates” comes very close to what principled reasoning 
implies: The ability to deduce the link between abstract notions of civil liberties and their 
concrete applications and extend this to groups which one dislikes. Second, we have focused on 
right wing groups, which are the most disliked groups for intelligent people that tend to be 
liberal. In doing so we provided a prima facie strong test for the application of principled 
reasoning, but in addition only the respondents who indicated they disliked the group were 
included in the analyses. Third, through experimental manipulation we randomly assigned 
respondents to different right wing groups that varied in terms of their extremism and how 
much they challenge democratic norms. In doing so we avoid response set effects and yet 
maintain the possibility to test if intelligence moderates the widespread negative reactions to 
extremist, undemocratic groups. Fourth, we were able to rule out three alternative explanations 
of why those who are more intelligent are more politically tolerant: Habitual dispositions as 
ascertained by personality traits, social liberal ideology and education were not able to account 
for the majority of the positive association between intelligence and political tolerance. Although 
previous studies have suggested that some people are tolerant on principle (Sniderman et al. 
1989) or because they are “cognitively sophisticated” (Bobo and Licari 1989), they have not 
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included the same set of exhaustive controls that we have adopted here nor have they examined 
if differences in cognitive ability may be the source of sophisticated reasoning.  
 The embedded survey experiment allowed us to test the argument on principled reasoning in 
more detail. For the average citizen it is more difficult to express tolerance for politically 
extremist groups (Petersen et al. 2010). However, the most cognitively able were willing to 
extend their tolerance towards least-liked extremist groups like Neo-Nazis because, as we argue, 
on principle all groups should enjoy the same rights. In addition, this reasoned judgment does 
not seem to be triggered by emotions since we found no interaction between feelings of threat 
and intelligence on political tolerance. This suggests that intelligence represent a cognitive 
pathway separate from the emotional pathway to tolerance and intolerance.   
 On the one hand this is at stake with the general idea in Affective Intelligence Theory that 
reasoning and deliberate thinking should be activated by threats (as mediated through anxiety) 
(Marcus et al., 2000, 2005). Hence, we could expect the more intelligent to be better able at 
principled reasoning when their surveillance system is activated. On the other hand the findings 
here are compatible with the idea that anxiety reactions are found to be unrelated to personality 
and other individual dispositions (Wolak and Marcus 2007). The present study does not examine 
in detail which emotions are triggered by feeling threatened nor does it fully explore the complex 
interrelations that may exist between emotional and cognitive routes towards tolerance. 
Although we can rule out that the effect of cognitive ability on political tolerance is moderated 
by feelings of threat we remain agnostic to exactly which emotions threats are triggering. More 
research on the complex relations between different emotions and principled reasoning as well as 
the different pathways is needed. But before embarking on this formidable research agenda 
future research should take into account that differences in cognitive ability may play a role in 
how individuals process information and what mental route they are likely to take when they 
form opinions and make judgments.  
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 In a democratic and normative perspective our findings may both be seen as promising and 
potentially dismaying. On the potentially pessimistic side the fact that principled tolerance is 
related to deep-seated individual differences in cognitive ability is somewhat disheartening. 
However, that depends. If cognitive ability matters because intelligent people are more politically 
knowledgeable as research seems to suggest (Hamil and Lodge 1986; Harvey and Harvey 1970; 
Luskin 1990; Neuman 1986; Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992) the results may not be that 
discouraging – because all people can become more politically knowledgeable. If cognitive ability 
is associated with harder and more effortful thinking and information processing there is also 
reason for cautious optimism – because given the right incentives and situations all people can 
engage in effortful thinking (Marcus et al., 2010; Valentino et al. 2009). Thus, also for normative 
reasons it is important to learn more about what principled reasoning implies and what the 
cognitive route to political tolerance comprises. 
 On the optimistic side it is comforting to note that not all people base tolerance judgments on 
negative emotions and gut-feeling reactions; individuals may also take a principled stance. In the 
aggregate and from a democratic perspective this implies that both emotional and cognitive 
appeals carry some weight in influencing public opinion. Compared to a situation in which only 
emotional appeals matter this is clearly preferable in a democracy that thrives on pluralism, 
arguments and a well-functioning marketplace of ideas. 
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Appendix 1 
Questions measuring political tolerance 
The police should have better opportunities for tapping telephones owned by [group] 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
N/a 
 
Representatives for [group] should have the right to speak at high schools or the like 
 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
N/a 
 
 
 
  
[Group] should be allowed to hold demonstrations. 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
N/a 
Representatives for [group] should be allowed to express themselves in public debate 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
N/a 
Measure of personal income 
Approximately how large is your yearly gross income i.e. the total income before taxes and other deductibles but 
including salary, pension and other incomes?  
Below 100,000 DKK 
100,000-124,999 DKK 
125,000-149,999 DKK 
150,000-174,999 DKK 
175,000-199,999 DKK 
200,000-249,999 DKK 
250,000-274,999 DKK 
275,000-299,999 DKK 
300,000-324,999 DKK 
325,000-349,999 DKK 
350,000-374,999 DKK 
375,000-399,999 DKK 
400,000 DKK or above.  
Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
  
Measures of education1 
What is your schooling? 
Primary school 7 years or less 
Primary school 8/9 years  
10th grade 
High school  
Don’t know 
Which vocational or higher education have you completed or are in the process of completing apart from your schooling?  
(If you have taken multiple degrees, please only indicate the highest level of education). 
Basic vocational education  
Vocational education  
Short-term higher education (1-2 years) 
Medium term higher education (3-4 years)  
Long-term higher education (more than 4 years) 
None  
Don’t know 
 
  
                                                          
1 The two educational variables are recoded into one continuous variable. This strategy is chosen to reflect the “years of 
school education”. The categories are: 
1. 9 years or less (primary school) 
2. 10-11 years (basic vocational education and vocational education) 
3. 11-12 years of education (high school) 
4. 13-14 years of education  (short-term higher education) 
5. 14-16 years of education (medium term higher education) 
6. 17-18 years of education (long-term higher education) 
Questions measuring ideological differences 
For each of the ideological variables the answer categories were:  
 Totally agree, agree, disagree, totally disagree, don’t know 
Crime is best prevented through rehabilitation  
Taxes on gas should be increased  
Protecting the environment must not hurt private business 
In Denmark we should protect our national traditions 
Crime is best prevented through rehabilitation 
Sympathy  
To what extent do you like the following groups on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates you like the group very 
much and 10 indicates you dislike the group? 
  
The 
Far 
Right 
0  
Like 
the 
group 
very 
much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
 Dislike 
the 
group 
very 
much 
Don’t 
know  
Neo 
Nazis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
 
 
 
 
 
Perceived group threat 
How great a threat do you believe the following groups pose to Danish society? 
 
The 
Far 
Right 
0  
Not 
threate
ning at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
 Very 
large 
threat 
Don’t 
know  
Neo 
Nazis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
 
 
  
Descriptive statistics  
Construct Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Political tolerance Speak at high schools 987 0.34 0.30 0 1 
Wiretapping 963 0.47 0.31 0 1 
Right to hold demonstrations 971 0.50 0.31 0 1 
Right to publicly debate 991 0.57 0.28 0 1 
Education Recoded education variables 1056 0.65 0.32 0 1 
Income Income  1010 0.73 0.67 0.25 3.25 
Intelligence BPP-score 1071 0.58 0.14 0 1 
Gender Gender 1072 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Age Age 1072 22.92 1.92 19.17 33.31 
Openness Openness parcel 1 1072 0.51 0.22 0 1 
Openness parcel 2 1072 0.51 0.25 0 1 
Openness parcel 3 1072 0.61 0.24 0 1 
Conscientiousness Conscientiousness parcel 1 1072 0.73 0.16 0 1 
Conscientiousness parcel 2 1072 0.70 0.18 0 1 
Conscientiousness parcel 3 1072 0.75 0.16 0 1 
Extraversion Extraversion parcel 1 1072 0.73 0.19 0 1 
Extraversion parcel 2 1072 0.77 0.18 0 1 
Extraversion parcel 3 1072 0.71 0.20 0 1 
Agreeableness Agreeableness parcel 1 1072 0.57 0.22 0 1 
Agreeableness parcel 2 1072 0.62 0.22 0 1 
Agreeableness parcel 3 1072 0.60 0.21 0 1 
Targetgroup-dummy Targetgroup-dummy 1072 0.49 .50 1 2 
Group sympathy Group sympathy 966 2.42 2.36 1 11 
Sociotropic threat Sociotropic threat 1004 0.49 0.29 0 1 
Social ideoogy Violent crimes 1018 0.27 0.30 0 1 
National customs 959 0.33 0.26 0 1 
The environment 1006 0.47 0.29 0 1 
Taxes 941 0.39 0.31 0 1 
Crime and rehabilitation 998 0.63 0.31 0 1 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
The draftee sample is in the following compared to a random sample of the entire Danish 
population. For further information on this sample see (Dinesen, Nørgaard, and Klemmensen 
Forthcoming). In addition age groups 19-27 are also separately compared since 95% of the draftee 
sample are in this age group. First I will compare demographics and then compare personality traits. 
Demographics 
 Draftee sample Full representative sample 
Representative sample 
ages 19-27 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Max  Min  count Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Max Min count Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Max Min count 
Income 1.8 .89 5 1 1010 3.5 1.7 11 1 3437 1.7 .93 5 1 231 
Age 23 1.9 33 19 1072 52 16 90 18 3612 23 1.8 26 20 252 
Gender .46 .5 1 0 1072 .53 .5 1 0 3612 .47 .5 1 0 252 
Education 4.2 1.6 6 1 1056 2.7 1.7 1 6 3612 3.2 1.2 6 1 252 
 
 Demographics are similar when the same age group is compared although it seems the draftee 
sample is slightly better educated than the representative sample when comparing the same age 
group. Obviously the mean and standard deviation in the full representative sample is larger. 
Personality traits  
The table below illustrates the differences in latent factor means across the representative sample 
and the draftee sample. As is clear, the differences are very slight given the range of the variable is 
one.1 
                                                          
1 Before comparing latent means we have to impose metric invariance and scalar invariance, which is indeed possible to do. Results of these 
analyses are available upon request. 
 Differences in latent factor means 
 Women Men 
Openness -0.030 0.042* 
Conscientiousness 0.028* 0.042* 
Extraversion 0.068* 0.077* 
Agreeableness -0.025 -0.051* 
Neuroticism -0.031 -0.034 
*Reference category with latent mean constrained to zero is the comparison sample 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fit statistics 
Different interpretations of approximate fit statistic exist. The approach taken here is one where 
they are considered qualitative measures of fit (Kline 2011, 205; Marsh, Hau, and Wen 2004). The 
table below outlines some “heuristics” used when determining how well fitting the models are. 
Overview of measures of fit 
Test statistic Measure of good/acceptable fit Measure of excellent fit 
RMSEA 0.06-0.08 (Hu and Bentler 1999) RMSEA≤0.06 (Hu and Bentler 1999) 
RMSEA≤.05 (Browne and Cudeck 1992) 
SRMR SRMR≤0.08 (Hu and Bentler 1999)  
CFI ≥.90 (Bentler 1990) ≥.95 (Hu and Bentler 1999) 
 
Fit statistics for model estimated: 
Number CFI RMSEA SRMR Model chi-square (df), 
p-value 
1 0.950 0.058 0.034 76.052 (20), 0.0000 
2 0.910 0.044 0.045 631.332 (238), 0.0000 
3 0.896 0.042 0.050 898.597  (361), 0.0000 
4 0.931 0.041 0.049 949.083 (397), 0.0000 
* All fit statistics use a robust chi-square (Satorra and Bentler 1994). 
According to the guidelines outlined above all models either display excellent or good/acceptable fit, 
although the CFI for model 3 is slightly low. This is however not the final model. 
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Disentangling the role of education, intelligence and political knowledge in policy voting 
 
 
Abstract 
We know that those who are more politically sophisticated are more likely to cast a vote which best 
represents their ideological principles, i.e. policy vote, but few have investigated why. This study 
demonstrates that there are different paths to policy voting: Those who are more educated gain more 
political knowledge through their motivation and opportunity to become informed and those who 
are more intelligent are better able to link abstract ideological principles to a concrete vote choice i.e. 
they are more constrained. The results demonstrate being more intelligent is more effect full, than 
being more highly educated, in terms of ensuring a consistent vote choice. Furthermore, being 
intelligent has an effect on policy voting above and being politically knowledgeable. The implications 
for our understanding of education, intelligence and political sophistication and their roles in a 
democratic society are discussed. 
  
2 
To ensure the stability and development of a democratic society the demos need to possess a certain 
set of skills in addition to their general participation in political life.1 For quite some time the 
conventional wisdom in political science has been that the sophisticated citizen is also the 
democratic citizen, or as Delli Carpini and Keeter put it in one of the most comprehensive 
investigations on political sophistication and its implications (Carpini and Keeter 1996, 272):  
“…informed citizens are demonstrably better citizens, as judged by the standards of democratic theory and practice underpinning 
the American system. They are more likely to participate in politics, more likely to have meaningful, stable attitudes on issues, 
better able to link their interests with their attitudes, more likely to choose candidates who are consistent with their own attitudes, 
and more likely to support democratic norms, such as extending basic civil liberties to members of unpopular groups”. 
This investigation takes as its point of departure the established wisdom that the political 
judgment of sophisticates are different from that of the mass electorate (Carpini and Keeter 1996; 
Goren 1997; Neuman 1986; Sniderman, Glaser, and Griffin 1990; Zaller 1992), what Paul Goren has 
recently termed the “sophistication interaction” model (Goren 2013). This article takes a step back 
to ask why this is. As outlined by Delli Carpini and Keeter above, there are many positive 
consequences of being sophisticated. This study will focus on one of the most important elements in 
ensuring a democratic process on which sophisticates and non-sophisticates differ, namely their 
degree of policy voting (Goren 2013).  
 As discussed by Robert Dahl, “voting equality at the decisive stage” is extremely important in 
terms of ensuring a democratic process (Dahl 1989, chapter 8). As Dahl also discusses, however, 
voting equality is not enough if it is not based on a full understanding of what the vote choice entails 
and whether the vote choice is in line with the interests of the voter; what Dahl terms “enlightened 
understanding” (Dahl 1989, chapter 8).    
We know that those who are more politically sophisticated are more likely to be policy voters, i.e. 
vote for a party that best represents their ideological positions(Carpini and Keeter 1996; Goren 
                                                 
1 Especially for so-called “developmental” models of democracy (Held 1996). 
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1997, 2013; Sniderman, Glaser, and Griffin 1990), but we do not quite know why. This will be 
investigated by studying how education and intelligence affect consistent party choice. Education is an 
important predictor of political sophistication (Bennet 1989; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jennings 
1996; Lambert et al. 1988; Neuman 1986; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Smith 1989) as is 
intelligence (Hamil and Lodge 1986; Harvey and Harvey 1970; Luskin 1990; Neuman 1986; 
Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992). Investigating the impact of these causally prior constructs on 
policy voting allows us to take a step back in the causal chain to examine why political sophisticates 
are more likely policy voters.  
Nowadays political sophistication is most often operationalized using a measure of political 
information (Luskin 2002), although a common definition of political sophistication posits that 
(Luskin 1987, p860): “A person is politically sophisticated to the extent to which his or her PBS 
[political belief system] is large, wide-ranging, and highly constrained”. The reason empirical studies 
employ a measure of political information is thus not only that political information is an important 
attribute of political sophistication, but also that those who are politically informed tend to possess 
constraint as well (Luskin 1987; Luskin 2002). By investigating the effects of intelligence and 
education on policy voting, we will thus get a better grasp of which elements of the construct 
sophistication, information or constraint is most likely to affect an individual’s degree of policy 
voting as each construct primarily relates to one of the elements of sophistication.  
According to a mainstream definition (Gottfredson 1997, 13): “Intelligence is a very general 
mental capacity that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think 
abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience”. If intelligence is 
therefore important for ensuring a consistent vote choice, this would imply that the ability to deduce 
the link between abstract principles and concrete applications is what primarily drives the 
relationship in the “sophistication interaction” model. Intelligence mostly speaks to the constraint 
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part of political sophistication. If education is important for individual differences in vote choice 
consistency, this suggests that the information part of political sophistication drives the relationship. 
As argued by Luskin (Luskin 1990, p335): “…most of education’s effect [on political sophistication] 
must be informational. Classes, informal discussions, and readings expose many students to large 
quantities of political information”.  
The results demonstrate that both intelligence and education moderate the degree of policy 
voting, although intelligence has a comparatively larger moderating effect than education. This 
suggests that there are different pathways to policy voting: One based on differences in ability and 
one based on differences in opportunities and motivations. Furthermore, intelligence moderates the 
effect of ideology on policy voting even after differences in political knowledge are taken into 
account. In fact, the moderating effect of intelligence on policy voting is as large as the moderating 
effect of political knowledge and in some cases even larger.  
The article will progress in the following manner: First, three conditions for policy voting are 
introduced, and the likely effects of education and intelligence on each of the conditions are outlined 
based on current literature. After this, the measures, dataset, model estimation and results are 
presented. The discussion and conclusion outline the implications for our understanding of the 
importance and contents of education, political knowledge and intelligence as well as the democratic 
implications.  
Policy voting 
According to Paul Goren’s recent review and elaboration on the role of political sophistication in 
policy voting, three conditions must be met for a person to policy vote (Goren 2013): (1) “attitude 
availability”: a voter has a genuine attitude on the matter investigated; (2) “attitude centrality”: the 
attitude studied functions as a central heuristic in a person’s belief system; (3) “position matching”: a 
voter figures out which party bests reflects her own position. I will briefly discuss how each 
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condition is addressed in the present investigation with focus on the effects of education and 
intelligence; see Goren’s book length treatment for a full account and elaboration of the model 
(Goren 2013). 
 Regarding attitude availability, it has been posited ever since Converse’s original claim that much 
of the electorate possesses non-attitudes (Converse 1964, 1970) and, following this conclusion, that 
there are no meaningful ideological differences between left and right (Jost 2006); a claim most 
researchers will see as an exaggeration (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). This condition will be 
addressed by using multiple items for my measure of ideological principles since a good case can be 
made that a large part of the perceived instability in attitudes is due to measurement error, which 
decreases with the number of items in an index (Achen 1975; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 
2008); in addition there is no great difference between sophisticates and non-sophisticates with 
regard to measurement error (Achen 1975; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008) although see 
(Feldman 1989; Norpoth and Lodge 1985). Although this does not alleviate all problems concerning 
the non-attitude debate, it does seek to address it in the best way possible. 
 As far as attitude centrality goes, a fairly extensive literature already demonstrates that those who 
are more sophisticated are also more vertically (Goren 2001; Jacoby 1991, 2006; Kuklinski, Metlay, 
and Kay 1982; Sniderman, Brody, and Kuklinski 1991) and horizontally (Carpini and Keeter 1996; 
Converse 1964) constrained. Here the focus is on vertical constraint.2 Vertical constraint concerns 
the extent to which those who are more educated and/or intelligent are also more likely to use 
                                                 
2 As discussed by Luskin, it is also more methodologically sound to use individual level measures to 
investigate individual level constructs (Luskin 1987), which is possible to do when investigating 
vertical constraint, but difficult when estimating horizontal constraint, i.e. whether attitudes at the 
same level of abstraction are linked, as this is traditionally done by looking at constraint in different 
groupings of sophisticates, see e.g. (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Stimson 1975).  
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abstract principles when making concrete political judgments. As argued by Feldman, as well as 
Hurwitz and Peffley, abstract core values are important in explaining an individual’s concrete policy 
attitudes, or at least values are important for some individuals (Feldman 1988; Peffley and Jon 1985). 
Although some authors have used a person’s ideological self-identification as a proxy for core 
ideological values (e.g. (Zaller 1992), this is problematic insofar as the relationship between 
ideological values and ideological self-identification is stronger for those who are more sophisticated 
(Goren 2001), and generally speaking the correlations between opinions on concrete issues and 
ideological self-identification are fairly low (Levitin and Miller 1979; Stimson 1975). In addition, we 
also know that ideological self-identification is much less stable than indices based on multiple items, 
which is fairly counterintuitive if self-identification also denotes stable core principles 
(Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008). I will therefore use ideological self-identification as a 
measure of a concrete application of abstract ideological principles and investigate whether the 
correspondence between these differ for those who are more educated and/or intelligent.  
 Regarding position matching, we know from extant literature that those who are more 
sophisticated are also more likely to vote for a party that reflects their core principles (Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Goren 1997, 2013; Knight 1985; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Neuman 1986; Sniderman, 
Glaser, and Griffin 1990). We also know that in addition to sophistication, a host of important 
constructs contribute to a consistent party choice. For instance, we know that issue ownership, party 
cues, and schemas as well as informal channels and networks can help people decide when they 
make their vote choice (Conover and Feldman 1989; Feldman and Conover 1983; Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 1995; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Petrocik 1996). Knowing that sophistication is an important 
determinant of policy voting therefore does not imply that these other factors are unimportant in 
terms of making a consistent party choice; nor does it imply that this consistency is also indicative of 
consistent policy voting.  
7 
One of the first theoretical models of party choice is the “funnel of causality”, which details many 
important choices and determinants in making a party choice (Campbell et al. [1960] 1976 ; Lewis-
Beck et al. 2008). Acknowledging that other aspects of the funnel are important, the focus here is on 
the impact of ideological differences on vote choice. 
Education and policy voting 
Some scholars have used education as a measure of political sophistication in their studies on 
“sophistication interaction”, e.g. (Sniderman, Glaser, and Griffin 1990), but this can be problematic 
(Goren 2013, 76 footnote): “Author’s sometimes employ education as a proxy for political 
sophistication, an admittedly crude, though empirically defensible approach as the correlation 
between education and knowledge scales typically lies in the neighborhood of .50”. However, and 
more correctly, education per se should not be seen as a proxy for political sophistication, but rather 
as a determinant and therefore causal prior of sophistication. In fact, most studies do see education 
as a causal prior to sophistication (Bennet 1989; Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jennings 1996; Lambert et 
al. 1988; Neuman 1986; Smith 1989).  
 Three reasons are usually given why education has an impact on political sophistication (Carpini 
and Keeter 1996; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995): Education 
makes people more motivated to engage in politics, education confers people the cognitive skills to 
navigate in the political landscape and, finally, education grants the opportunity to become politically 
sophisticated through the formal and informal networks to which education grants people access. 
Since we are including a measure of general intelligence, most of the ability part of this threefold 
classification is therefore taken into account; at least for general and not specific abilities; more on 
this below. The other two reasons, motivation and opportunity, may therefore potentially explain 
why those who are more educated are more politically sophisticated. This also means that education 
most likely influences political sophistication on the information part as opposed to the constraint 
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part, as argued by Luskin in the quotation above (Luskin 1990). There are several reasons why 
education may influence the motivation and opportunity to become politically informed. First, 
educational institutions themselves convey political information to students through the curriculum 
they offer (Galston 2001). Second, most educational institutions, at least in modern, consolidated 
democracies embody democratic and usually liberal values and socialize their students to become 
active and enlightened citizens (Hyman and Wright 1979). Third, education grants access to social 
networks which provide opportunity and motivation to become politically informed (Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Hence, education bolsters individuals’ opportunity 
and motivation to become politically informed in several ways.   
 The constraint aspect of political sophistication is about the use of abstract principles to organize 
a belief system (Converse 1964; Luskin 1987). The ability to deduce a link between abstract 
principles, in our case ideological position, and concrete applications, in our case an informed party 
choice, is more likely to be related to intelligence. And even if intelligent people also tend to be more 
highly educated, there is not a one to one correspondence between the two constructs (Deary and 
Johnson 2010).  
Intelligence and policy voting 
Previous studies have demonstrated that differences in intelligence predict individual differences in 
political attitudes (Bouchard and McGue 2003; Deary, Batty, and Gale 2008b; Hodson and Busseri 
2012; Kemmelmeier 2008; Stankov 2009), turnout (Denny and Doyle 2008) and other forms of 
participation as well as vote choice (Deary, Batty, and Gale 2008a) and political sophistication 
(Hamil and Lodge 1986; Harvey and Harvey 1970; Luskin 1990; Neuman 1986; Neuman, Just, and 
Crigler 1992). Although intelligence is thus likely to be an important construct to consider in politics, 
no one has so far investigated the relationship between intelligence and policy voting.  
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 As briefly discussed above, intelligence denotes the ability to “comprehend complex ideas” as 
well as “quickly learn from experience”; both the information aspect and the constraint aspect of 
political sophistication are thus likely to be affected by intelligence. The primary aspect of political 
sophistication that intelligence taps into is, however, the constraint aspect. In fact, there is a strong 
conceptual affinity between the core characteristic of intelligence and the constraint aspect of 
political sophistication. Charles Spearman, the father of modern intelligence research, argued that 
those who are more intelligent are better at deducing logical relationships between different 
constructs; what he termed “the eduction of correlates and relations” (Spearman 1927). This 
conception of intelligence is closely related to the focus among current intelligence researchers on 
so-called general intelligence or g (Jensen 1998). General intelligence denotes the tendency of those 
who are cognitively able in one type of mental domain, such as reading, to also be a cognitively able 
in another type of mental domain, such as algebra (Deary, Penke, and Johnson 2010; Jensen 1998); 
i.e. general intelligence denotes the ability to perform most types of mental tasks well.3 Most would 
agree with Spearman, perhaps phrased differently, that this general factor of intelligence includes 
“eduction of correlates and correlations”. Even if those who are more intelligent are more likely to 
learn from experience and thus gain knowledge of politics, they are not necessarily more interested 
and therefore not more motivated to be informed about politics than less intelligent individuals. 
What really sets intelligent people apart, in relationship to policy voting, is their ability to structure, 
                                                 
3 I do not mean to imply that specific abilities are not important. Although general intelligence 
usually accounts for around 40 percent of the variance in intelligence tests (Deary, Penke, and 
Johnson 2010), which makes it the single largest source of individual differences in intelligence, and 
thus of prime importance, this conversely also means that around 60 percent of the variance 
potentially consist of specific abilities. Different taxonomies exist for specific abilities (Carroll 2003; 
Johnson and Bouchard 2005; McGrew 2009). 
10 
organize and deduce relationships between constructs, issues and parties’ policy stances. Or put 
somewhat differently, independent of motivation and opportunity to be informed, and by 
implication for any level of political information, more intelligent people should be more able and 
inclined to see relations between abstract principles and values and policy preferences, i.e. attitude 
centrality, and they should be more able and inclined to choose the party that best corresponds with 
these values and preferences, i.e. position matching. Hence, general intelligence is more related to 
the constraint than the information aspect of political sophistication. 
 To sum up, intelligence and education are different constructs that tap different aspects of the 
political sophistication construct that may be important for the extent to which individual’s policy 
vote. This is not to say that education and intelligence are entirely unrelated. The correlation 
between education and intelligence is usually around .5, and in the sample used here they correlate at 
.3 (Deary and Johnson 2010). The fact that education and intelligence arguably tap different aspects 
of political sophistication allows us to achieve a more detailed and full understanding of why those 
who are more sophisticated are more likely to be policy voters. Although we could theorize that 
intelligence is causally prior to education, and in some respects it probably is, we also know that 
differences in levels of education can affect levels of intelligence (Deary and Johnson 2010). In fact, 
the causal sequence is not critical in this context precisely because they are theorized to tap different 
aspects of political sophistication. In this investigation they are therefore simply treated as “causal 
equals”. The table below summarizes the discussion above and sets forth the hypotheses to be 
tested. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
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Dataset and measures  
The dataset is based on an age-restricted random sample of the Danish population of males based 
on the Danish draft registry and is therefore representative of the Danish male population.4 Draftees 
have to take an intelligence test called Børge Priens Prøve (BPP), which is also used in the present 
investigation. The mean age of respondents is 23 since the registry has only been in operation since 
2006, which means that most respondents are relatively young. Quite a few women self-select into 
the military and they also have to take the BPP. The men and women in the sample are quite 
representative in terms of personal income and education when compared to the general 
population.5 The survey was fielded in the period 2 March 2012 to 10 April 2012, i.e. not long after 
the national election on 15 September 2011. The sample size is 1072, and the response rate roughly 
28 percent. People were contacted through regular mail and asked to fill out an online survey using 
the unique password in the letter they received. 
 Education is measured via a question about the respondent’s primary and secondary education 
and one about their tertiary education; the two questions are recoded into one continuous variable 
to reflect the total years of school education. The recoded categories are listed in appendix 1.  
 The intelligence test used in this article, BPP, has a correlation of .82 with the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS), and the two tests thus measure the same construct to a very high extent 
(Mortensen, Reinisch, and Teasdale 1989). In addition, the test-retest reliability is .77, which speaks 
positively toward the reliability of the test.6 Finally, a general factor of intelligence accounts for 
                                                 
4 Around 5-15 percent of Danish men are not drafted primarily on medical grounds (Teasdale 2009). 
5 See appendix 2. 
6 For further discussion on the reliability and validity of the test, see (Hartmann and Teasdale 2005; 
Kousgaard 2003; Rasch 1980; Teasdale et al. 2011) 
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roughly 50-60 of the variance in test scores, and the total BPP score, which is used in the present 
investigation, has a correlation of .99 with this general factor (Hartmann and Teasdale 2004).  
 Two measures of ideology are employed to assess policy voting: Ideological self-identification 
and a measure of general left-right ideology. The general left-right measure has six items with four 
response categories ranging from totally agree to totally disagree. A high score indicates a more 
leftist attitude. Ideological self-identification is measured by asking respondents to place themselves 
on a 0-10 scale, where 0 indicates leftist and 10 means rightist. This variable is also recoded so that a 
high score indicates a more left leaning attitude.  
 Political knowledge is measured using a series of 12 factual questions on politics, which is the 
most common way to measure political knowledge (Carpini and Keeter 1996). See appendix 1 for 
full question wording. 
 The measure of party choice is created as the mean score of the ideology variable for all 
respondents who voted for that particular party as done by Alvarez and Nagler in a similar context 
(Alvarez and Nagler 1998). This way we obtain an interval level variable instead of a nominal 
variable.7 A high score on this variable also indicates a more leftist party choice. 
 Descriptive statistics as well as full question wording for the constructs and controls can be 
found in appendix 1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Although this variable is based on this particular dataset, the relative positioning of the parties is 
very similar to that obtained from a representative sample, see appendix 2, using the same questions. 
In fact, the correlation between this variable and a variable based on a representative sample using 
the same technique is .97. Results are available upon request. 
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Model estimation 
The models are estimated using the statistical software Mplus version 7. Missing data is handled 
using full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which is one of the best ways to handle missing 
data currently available (Enders and Bandalos 2001; Schafer and Graham 2002). Standard errors are 
estimated using a bootstraps procedure with 1000 repetitions since product terms are not normally 
distributed (Aroian 1947; Craig 1936) and in such cases a bootstrap procedure is superior to 
normality based inference (MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Williams 2004).  
 By using multiple items for our measure of ideology, we reduce the impact of measurement error 
that tends to provide biased parameter estimates (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008; Bollen 
1989). As mentioned above, peoples’ apparent non-attitudes can be mainly ascribed to measurement 
error. Using a multiple items scale rather than self-placement is our attempt to address this issue in 
the best way possible.  
 All models contain only a very limited number of controls including age, gender, and personal 
income. The goal is not to create a fully specified model of policy voting to assess the relative 
importance of e.g. retrospective evaluations (Fiorina 1981) vs. partisanship (Campbell et al. [1960] 
1976 ).8 The goal is more modest, namely to investigate the moderated effect of ideology on vote 
choice.9 To ease interpretation, all variables are scaled to range from zero to one. 
 Three initial models are estimated in the analysis of attitude centrality: All models containing 
interaction terms between ideology and education, intelligence and political knowledge respectively. 
These three models serve as baseline models. Next, combinations of the models are presented 
                                                 
8 For a recent attempt at surveying the factors influencing vote choice see e.g. (Krosnick, Visser, and 
Harder 2010). 
9 This approach is very similar to Carpini and Keeter’s in their investigation of the moderating 
influence of political sophistication (Carpini and Keeter 1996, 254-261).  
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followed by a model including all interaction terms. This way we can track the changes in size and 
significance of the coefficients and thus the potential overlap in the explanatory power of the 
different constructs. 
 The subsequent analysis focuses on the position matching aspect of the sophistication effect 
using the same procedure as the one just outlined. 
 In both analyses which investigate the relationship between abstract principles and concrete 
applications, i.e. the investigations of attitude centrality and position matching, the presence of an 
interaction effect can be investigated by testing the significance of the interaction term since the 
model is linear (Franzese and Kam 2007).  
The link between abstract principles and concrete applications - attitude centrality 
This section outlines the results for the second condition for policy voting, namely that voters are 
vertically constrained. If policy principles are to shape vote choice they must exert a significant 
influence on other elements in a person’s belief system, i.e. act as a central organizing principle 
(Goren 2013). This is investigated by estimating the link between abstract ideological left-right 
principles and ideological self-identification. The results are outlined in the table below. 
[Insert table 2 here] 
The first three models investigate whether the effect of left-right ideology on ideological self-
identification is moderated by education, intelligence or political knowledge when neither of the 
other two factors is held constant. This is confirmed in all three cases as indicated by the significant 
interaction terms. The next three models investigate the partial overlap between the constructs. First 
we will look at the interplay between education and intelligence and the interplay between political 
knowledge and intelligence and education respectively. 
 In model (4) there is no longer a moderated effect of education 0.139 (p=0.298) after the 
moderated effect of intelligence is included nor after political knowledge is included in model (5) 
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0.090 (p=0.467). The moderated effect of intelligence in model (4) only decreases slightly after 
education is included. Education and intelligence are treated as causal equals, i.e. neither mediates 
the effect of the other, but the effect of one can confound the effect of the other as discussed 
above. The results suggest that the ability to apply abstract principles related to ideology to an 
individual’s ideological self-identification is only moderated by levels of intelligence, not by levels of 
education. But although the effect is no longer significant, the effect size is not zero; only in model 
(7), in which all interaction terms are included, is the effect close to zero 0.025 (p=0.851). It is 
notoriously difficult to estimate precise standard errors in models including interaction terms 
(Franzese and Kam 2007), and this problem is only exacerbated in models in which multiple 
interaction terms are included. It is thus most accurate to note that a major part of the effect of the 
moderating effect of education is confounded by intelligence, but the exact proportion is difficult to 
estimate.  
 Regarding the interplay between education or intelligence and political knowledge, the findings 
have somewhat different implications than those above. Education and intelligence are theorized to 
be causally prior to political knowledge and if they decrease in magnitude after the inclusion of an 
interaction term including political knowledge, they are theorized to be mediated by their effect on 
political knowledge. The expectations are also confirmed here: The effect of education decreases 
substantially, after the interaction term between political knowledge and general left-right orientation 
is included and is not statistically significant (p=0.467), whereas the moderating effect of intelligence 
is still highly significant (p=0.006). This confirms our hypothesis that the effect of education on 
political sophistication is primarily informational and the moderating effect of intelligence is 
primarily based on constraint. The size of the moderating effect of intelligence is on a par with 
political knowledge in model (7) with coefficients of 0.874 and 0.926 respectively. 
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The link between abstract principles and vote choice – position matching 
The second and most important part of the test is whether those who are more educated, intelligent 
or politically knowledgeable are more likely to match their ideological principles to a party choice 
that matches their ideological orientation.  
[Insert table 3 here] 
 The results mirror those obtained above: All three constructs moderate the effect of ideological 
principles on vote choice when considered separately. In addition, the effect of education decreases 
in size and significance after the moderating influence of intelligence is included in model (11) at 
0.157 (p=0.207), whereas the moderating effect of intelligence is still much larger and highly 
significant at 1.037 (p<0.000). As above we can therefore confirm hypotheses 1 and 2, i.e. that 
constraint, as indicated by intelligence, exerts independent influence on policy voting after 
differences in opportunity and motivation, as measured by the education variable, are held constant, 
and that the effect of education has traditionally been overestimated. 
 As for the mediated effect of education and intelligence on political knowledge, we observe a 
pattern of results which echoes the findings above: The moderating effect of education is highly 
mediated by political knowledge since the size of the coefficient decreases to 0.188 and no longer 
significant (p= 0.152) in model (12), whereas the moderating effect of intelligence is still strong with 
a coefficient of 0.832 and highly significant (p=0.004) in model (13). The moderating effect of 
intelligence on position matching is even larger than the effect of political knowledge in model (14) 
with coefficients of 0.779 and 0.439 respectively. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
All hypotheses have been confirmed, which means that the implications derived based on our 
theoretical apparatus have been corroborated. These results have implications for our understanding 
of the three constructs, education, intelligence and political knowledge, and they have democratic 
implications as well. I will touch upon them in turn.  
 This article has demonstrated that intelligence has a larger effect than education on differences in 
policy voting; both in terms of ensuring policy-attitude consistency, “attitude centrality”, and of 
ensuring a vote choice that is consistent with a person’s basic ideological principles, “position 
matching”. Hypothesis 2, that intelligence should have an independent impact on policy voting after 
differences in intelligence are accounted for, is thus confirmed. This means that ability, in the form 
of intelligence, and motivation and opportunity, in the form of education, are different pathways to 
policy voting.  
 In many cases education moderated the effect of ideological principles on policy voting when 
investigated separately, but the effect decreased substantially after differences in intelligence were 
held constant. We can therefore confirm hypothesis 1 that education as a moderator of policy voting 
has traditionally been overestimated. The reason it has traditionally been overestimated is that we are 
able to partial out the ability part, usually ascribed to education, by including intelligence in our 
model specification, thus only leaving motivation and opportunity as predictors of policy voting.  
 We also used the distinction between ability, motivation and opportunities to derive different 
hypotheses for the mediated effect of education and intelligence on our measure of political 
sophistication, which was operationalized as political knowledge. In fact, we hypothesized that 
education via its effect on motivation and opportunity was more likely to affect the knowledge 
aspect of political sophistication, whereas intelligence was more likely to affect the constraint aspect 
of political sophistication, i.e. implication 4. This was also confirmed insofar as the moderating 
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effect of education on policy voting was highly mediated by political knowledge, whereas the 
moderating effect of intelligence only changed to a smaller extent after the introduction of political 
knowledge.  
 These results have implications for our understanding of the multifaceted construct political 
sophistication, which Robert Luskin defined some years ago in terms of size, range and constraint 
(Luskin 1987). Education primarily explains differences in size and range of a political belief system, 
i.e. political knowledge, whereas intelligence primarily explains differences in constraint of a political 
belief system. Although most current studies operationalize political sophistication as political 
knowledge (Luskin 2002), this is mostly a matter of convenience, but arguably also because political 
knowledge to some extent taps the constraint aspect (Luskin 1987; Luskin 2002). This study 
demonstrates that we should be careful when interpreting the results using a knowledge battery: 
political knowledge means political knowledge and not necessarily the broader construct political 
sophistication. Furthermore there are already studies demonstrating that these different 
operationalizations can lead to different results (Weisberg and Nawara 2010). Of special relevance 
for this discussion, Goren has recently demonstrated that whereas abstract ideological differences 
between left and right are moderated by levels of political knowledge, lower order “policy 
principles” are not (Goren 2013). It remains to be demonstrated whether this is a function of his 
operationalization of political sophistication as political knowledge or whether “policy principles” 
are genuinely independent of political sophistication, i.e. also independent of constraint as measured 
by intelligence. 
 The finding that intelligence has an impact on policy voting above and beyond political 
knowledge, i.e. the confirmation of implication 3, also has implications for our understanding of the 
importance of intelligence in politics. Many recent studies in political science use personality traits as 
important constructs to consider for traditional political science constructs such as political 
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participation and political ideology (Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 1999; Gerber et al. 2011; 
Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak et al. 2010), but very few have focused on the role of intelligence in 
politics; although see e.g. (Deary, Batty, and Gale 2008a; Denny and Doyle 2008). No one has so far 
investigated the effect of intelligence on policy voting. Not only are we able to demonstrate that 
intelligence exerts a significant influence on policy voting; its moderating effect is equal to that of 
political knowledge for attitude centrality, and its moderating effect is in fact larger than political 
knowledge for position matching. Intelligence is clearly an extremely important, but so far 
overlooked, source of policy voting. At a more theoretical level, the results suggest that intelligent 
people, independent of their level of political knowledge, are able to deduce the relationship 
between abstract principles and concrete applications in terms of ensuring a consistent party choice. 
Evidently there are different pathways to policy voting that need to be taken seriously. 
 Conversely, the fact that education exerts a smaller effect on individual differences in policy 
voting than previously held has implications for our understanding of this important political 
construct. This study, demonstrating the traditional view that the importance of education is 
overestimated, is situated within the current debate on the “causal effect of education”. A series of 
recent studies using various statistical techniques have demonstrated that there is no effect of 
education on political participation (Berinsky and Lenz 2010; Kam and Palmer 2008) and political 
sophistication (Highton 2009). Other studies question these results (Dee 2004; Milligan, Moretti, and 
Oreopoulos 2004), some even using field experiments (Sondheimer and Green 2010). The critics’ 
argument is that the effect of education is confounded by predispositions, such as intelligence and 
personality traits, and preadult experiences such as a person’s socioeconomic status while growing 
up. This study informs this debate in two ways: First of all, it demonstrates that the claim that 
“education is confounded by predispositions” is obviously too general in scope to further our 
understanding of the interplay between education and predispositions. Instead, we need to focus on 
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a specific political construct, in this case policy voting, and derive theoretically based implications for 
our understanding of the relationship between education and predispositions (Henderson and 
Chatfield 2011). Second, we are able to demonstrate that the ability aspect of education, which is 
especially important for policy voting, is likely to be confounded by intelligence. Still, we are able to 
demonstrate that education in fact does have an effect on policy voting since a large part of the 
effect is mediated by political knowledge since education affects the motivation and opportunity to 
become informed.  
 Finally there are democratic implications. Education has featured prominently in many theories 
of democracy (Held 1996). Contemporary studies on civic education focus on the role of formal 
education in terms of ensuring political knowledge (Galston 2001), in turn producing more 
democratic citizens. As discussed by Robert Dahl, “enlightened understanding” is important for a 
democratic process (Dahl 1989), and the fact that formal education does not predict policy voting to 
the extent previously thought might cause people to erroneously conclude that education does not 
play an important role in policy voting. First of all, this study is a snapshot in time of the country of 
Denmark with, comparatively speaking, few educational differences. Most people attend a common 
primary school “Folkeskolen”, which means a quite equal quality of education (Rangvid 2008). Most 
people are thus fairly educated, which means that the differences are caused by levels of intelligence, 
not by education. In the past, when educational differences where larger, education may have played 
a larger role. We can also not rule out that absolute levels of policy voting have increased over time 
as a function of mass education, although not creating differences between citizens. Second, the fact 
that the age group studied is fairly young means that the maximum variation is not obtained, thus 
perhaps attenuating the effect of education.  
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Table 1: Implications and hypotheses for the effect of education, intelligence and political knowledge on policy voting 
 Education Intelligence Political 
knowledge 
Implications Hypotheses based on implications 
Is theorized to affect 
political sophistication 
via 
Motivation  
Opportunity 
Ability N.A. I1: The moderating effect of education on 
attitude centrality and position matching 
has traditionally been overestimated. 
 
 
I2: The moderating effect of intelligence 
on attitude centrality and position 
matching should have an independent 
impact on attitude centrality and position 
matching.  
H1: The interaction terms including 
education, when we estimate attitude 
centrality and position matching, should 
decrease after the interaction terms including 
intelligence are included. 
H2: The interaction terms including 
intelligence, when we estimate attitude 
centrality and position matching, should 
remain significant after differences in 
education are taken into account.  
Primarily taps which 
elements of political 
sophistication? 
Political 
information 
(size and 
range).  
Constraint Political 
information 
(size and 
range) 
I3: Political knowledge only partially 
accounts for differences in attitude 
centrality and position matching. 
 
 
 
I4: The moderating effect of education on 
attitude centrality and position matching is 
mediated by political information. 
H3: The interaction terms including 
intelligence should remain significant, when 
we estimate attitude centrality and position 
matching, even when we introduce 
interaction terms including political 
knowledge. 
H4: The interaction terms including 
education should become insignificant once 
we introduce interaction terms including 
political knowledge in the models estimating 
attitude centrality and position matching  
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Table 2: The moderated effect of ideology on ideological self-identification 
 Separate models Partial overlap between models All predictors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
New left ideology (0-1) 0.612*** 
(0.105) 
0.058 
(0.175) 
0.084 
(0.153) 
0.013 
(0.183) 
0.048 
(0.166) 
-0.260 
(0.199) 
-0.266 
(0.205) 
Education (0-1) -0.175*** 
(0.061) 
-0.061** 
(0.026) 
-0.035 
(0.026) 
-0.120* 
(0.064) 
-0.073   
(0.061) 
-0.038 
(0.026) 
-0.048 
(0.062) 
Intelligence (0-1) -0.096 
(0.063) 
-0.672*** 
(0.146) 
-0.082 
(0.064) 
-0.643*** 
(0.150) 
-0.084 
(0.064) 
-0.458*** 
(0.159) 
-0.455*** 
(0.161) 
Knowledge (0-1)   -0.585*** 
(0.093) 
 -0.571*** 
(0.094) 
-0.499*** 
(0.103) 
-0.496*** 
(0.103) 
Education x Ideology 0.283** 
(0.127) 
  0.139 
(0.134) 
0.090 
(0.124) 
 0.025 
(0.131) 
Intelligence x Ideology  1.341***   
(0.289) 
 1.263*** 
(0.298) 
 0.883*** 
(0.321) 
0.874***   
(0.330) 
Knowledge x Ideology   1.156***    
(0.209) 
 1.122*** 
(0.209) 
0.933*** 
(0.236) 
0.926*** 
(0.234) 
N 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Controls are age, gender, personal income in all models.  
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Table 3: The moderated effect of ideological principles on vote choice 
 Separate models Partial overlap between models All predictors 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        
Ideology 0.743*** 
(0.099) 
0.308* 
(0.158) 
0.491*** 
(0.122) 
0.253 
(0.171) 
0.409*** 
(0.137) 
0.174 
(0.168) 
0.138 
(0.177) 
Education -0.147** 
(0.058) 
-0.036 
(0.029) 
-0.042    
(0.029) 
-0.102*   
(0.056) 
-0.122** 
(0.061) 
-0.046 
(0.029) 
-0.100* 
(0.057) 
Intelligence -0.040 
(0.055) 
-0.439*** 
(0.119) 
-0.011 
(0.057) 
-0.408*** 
(0.116) 
-0.017 
(0.059) 
-0.365*** 
(0.128) 
-0.346*** 
(0.124) 
Knowledge   -0.188** 
(0.075) 
 -0.163** 
(0.079) 
-0.104 
(0.081) 
-0.092 
(0.082) 
Education x Ideology 0.275** 
(0.127) 
  0.157 
(0.125) 
0.188 
(0.131) 
 0.127 
(0.126) 
Intelligence x Ideology  1.120*** 
(0.257) 
 1.037*** 
(0.252) 
 0.832*** 
(0.290) 
0.779*** 
(0.282) 
Knowledge x Ideology   0.683*** 
(0.181) 
 0.624***   
(0.193) 
0.465** 
(0.203) 
0.439** 
(0.208) 
N 1072 1072 1072  1072 1072 1072 
Standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Controls are age, gender, personal income in all models.  
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Appendix 1: Question wording and descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for recoded variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gender 1072 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Age 1072 22.92 1.92 19.17 33.31 
Income 1010 0.73 0.67 0.25 3.25 
Education 1056 0.65 0.32 0 1 
Børge Priens Prøve (BPP) 1071 45.56 8.03 0 1 
General left-right ideology 785 0.41 0.19 0 1 
Party choice 724 0.36 0.29 0 1 
Ideological self-identification 1011 4.89 2.76 0 10 
 
Crosstab of vote choice 
 Frequency  Percent 
Social Democrats 149 15.63 
The Danish Social Liberal Party 177 18.57 
The Conservative People’s Party 54 5.67 
The Socialist People’s Party 93 9.76 
Liberal Alliance 108 11.33 
The Danish People’s Party 71 7.45 
The Liberal Party of Denmark 209 21.93 
The Red-Green Alliance 92 9.65 
Total 953 100.00 
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Question wording 
 
The BPP battery is protected against publication so questions from this battery are not shown. 
 
Questions measuring political knowledge 
Here is a series of questions about politics in general. Politics can be complicated but try to answer the following 
questions as best you can.    
How large do you think the expenditures for the health care sector in Denmark were as a percentage of GDP in 
2009?  
Approximimately 5 % 
Approximimately 12 % 
Approximimately. 22 % 
Approximimately. 54 % 
Don’t know 
 
Which of the following are referred to as the executive power? 
The Ministry of Justice 
The Police 
The government  
The Parliament  
Don’t know 
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Which of the following persons is Denmark’s minister of finance? 
A B C D 
    
 
 
    
A B C D 
 
 
Do you have to be a Member of Parliament (Folketinget) to be eligible for cabinet minister in Denmark? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
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Which party is the politician in the picture a member of? 
The Social Democrats 
The Danish Social-Liberal party 
The Conservative People’s Party 
The Socialist People’s Party 
Liberal Alliance 
The Christian Democrats 
The Danish People’s Party 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Red-Green Alliance  
Don’t remember party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which of the following parties would you consider to be most rightist? 
The Liberal Party of Denmark 
The Social Democrats 
The Socialist People’s Party 
The Red-Green Alliance  
Don’t know 
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What percentage of GDP do you think Denmark spent on foreign aid in 2010? 
Approximately 0.9 % 
Approximimately 0.5 % 
Approximimately 2.4 % 
Approximimately 5.1 % 
Don’t know 
 
Who was Denmark’s Prime Minister from 1982-1993? 
Poul Schlüter 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
Anker Jørgensen 
Poul Hartling 
Don’t know 
 
How many members does Parliament have, not counting the four from Greenland and the Faroe Islands? 
Number __________ 
Don’t know 
 
 
Which of the following persons is not a member of Parliament? 
A B C D 
 
 
A B C D 
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What is the number of member states in the EU? 
Number __________ 
Don’t know 
Which party do you think the politician Mette Frederiksen is a member of? 
The Social Democrats 
The Danish Social-Liberal party 
The Conservative People’s Party 
The Socialist People’s Party 
Liberal Alliance 
The Christian Democrats 
The Danish People’s Party 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Red-Green Alliance  
Don’t know 
 
Which party do you think the politician Søren Pind is a member of? 
The Social Democrats 
The Danish Social-Liberal party 
The Conservative People’s Party 
The Socialist People’s Party 
Liberal Alliance 
The Christian Democrats 
The Danish People’s Party 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Red-Green Alliance  
Don’t know 
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Personal income 
Approximately how large is your yearly gross income i.e. the total income before taxes and other deductibles but 
including salary, pension and other incomes?  
Below 100,000 DKK 
100,000-124,999 DKK 
125,000-149,999 DKK 
150,000-174,999 DKK 
175,000-199,999 DKK 
200,000-249,999 DKK 
250,000-274,999 DKK 
275,000-299,999 DKK 
300,000-324,999 DKK 
325,000-349,999 DKK 
350,000-374,999 DKK 
375,000-399,999 DKK 
400,000 DKK or above.  
Don’t know 
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Education 
What is your schooling?1 
Primary school 7 years or less 
Primary school 8/9 years  
10th grade 
High school  
Don’t know 
 
Which vocational or higher education have you completed or are in the process of completing apart from your schooling?  
(If you have taken multiple degrees, please only indicate the highest level of education). 
Basic vocational education  
Vocational education  
Short-term higher education (1-2 years) 
Medium term higher education (3-4 years)  
Long-term higher education (more than 4 years) 
None  
Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The two educational variables are recoded into one continuous variable. This strategy is chosen to reflect the “years of 
school education”. The categories are: 
1. 9 years or less (primary school) 
2. 10-11 years (basic vocational education and vocational education) 
3. 11-12 years of education (high school) 
4. 13-14 years of education  (short-term higher education) 
5. 14-16 years of education (medium term higher education) 
6. 17-18 years of education (long-term higher education) 
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Questions measuring ideological differences 
For each of the ideological variables the answer categories were:  
 Totally agree, agree, disagree, totally disagree, don’t know 
Crime is best prevented through rehabilitation  
Taxes on gas should be increased  
Protecting the environment must not hurt private business 
Differences in income are too high. Therefore people with smaller incomes should have higher wage increases than others 
Competition is healthy. It stimulates people to work hard 
People earning high incomes pay too little in taxes  
 
Ideological self-identification 
Talking about politics people often use the phrases “leftist” and “rightist”.  Where on this scale would you place 
yourself, if 0 means leftist and 10 means rightist? 
0    
Leftist 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
Rightist 
  Don’t 
know  
 
Voting 
Did you vote at the national election the 15th of September 2011? 
Voted 
Did not vote 
Was not eligible to vote 
Don’t remember 
Refuse to answer 
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Which party did you vote for?2 
The Social Democrats 
The Danish Social Liberal Party 
The Conservative People’s Party 
The Socialist People’s Party 
Liberal Alliance 
The Christian Democrats 
The Liberal Party of Denmark 
The Red-Green Alliance 
Don’t remember party 
Voted blank 
                                                 
2 The Christian Democrats. 
1 
Appendix 2: Comparison of demographics between the draftee sample and a representative 
sample 
The draftee sample is in the following compared to a random sample of the entire Danish 
population. See (Dinesen, Nørgaard, and Klemmensen Forthcoming) for further information on this 
sample. Only the age groups 19-27 are compared since 95% of the draftee sample are in this age 
group. First I will compare demographics and then compare personality traits. The educational 
variable in the representative sample is recoded to fit the categories in the draftee sample. 
Demographics 
Descriptive statistics for women in the draftee sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income 535 1.78 0.78 1 5 
Education 569 4.61 1.05 1 6 
Age 574 22.98 1.96 19.17 31.58 
 
Descriptive statistics for women in the representative sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income 119 1.70 0.85 1 4 
Education 134 3.00 1.51 1 6 
Age 134 23.23 1.88 20 26 
 
Descriptive statistics for men in the draftee sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income 475 1.87 1.00 1 6 
Education 487 4.60 1.24 1 6 
Age 498 22.86 1.91 19.50 33.31 
 
 
 
Descriptive statistics for men in the representative sample 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income 112 1.78 1.02 1 5 
Education 118 2.62 1.15 1 6 
Age 118 23.38 1.77 20 26 
 
 Most demographics look similar although it seems the draftee sample is better educated than the 
representative sample. This probably has to do with question wording. In the draftee sample people 
are asked whether they are currently pursuing or have a finished degree, whereas in the representative 
sample only actual educational attainment is ascertained. The table below therefore compares those 
in the draftee sample who have only finished their education and adds probability weights to 
increase the representativeness of the results. When we do this the differences are very slight. 
Comparison of men and women in draftee sample and representative sample restricting the sample in the draftee sample to only those who have finished their 
degree and using sampling weights 
 Mean CI N 
Women representative sample 3.03 (2.78-3.28) 134 
Women draftee sample 3.60 (3.46-3.74) 143 
Men representative sample 2.70 (2.47-2.94) 118 
Men draftee sample 3.35 (3.15-3.56) 142 
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Disentangling the Role of Education and Personality Traits for Political Behavior: 
Cognition and Motivations vs. Resource Effects in External and Internal Efficacy  
 
 
Abstract 
Recent studies have questioned that the effect of education on political behavior is as strong and 
unequivocal as traditionally held. In particular, personality traits have been argued to confound the 
effect of education. However, previous studies have not paid enough attention to the differential 
effects of education. Distinguishing between cognitive and motivational effects and relative resource 
effects we argue that personal predispositions confound the former, but not the latter. Focusing on 
internal and external efficacy we demonstrate: (a) the motivational and cognitive effect of education is 
strongly confounded by personality traits, whereas (b) the effect of education on resources is less 
confounded by personality traits. The theoretical and normative implications are discussed. 
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A burgeoning, but prolific literature has argued that personality traits are as important or even more 
important than traditional socio-economic resources like education in accounting for a host of 
political behaviors such as political ideology, vote choice, partisanship and political participation 
(Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 1999; Gerber et al. 2011; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak and 
Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010). In addition, recently a series of sophisticated studies have 
questioned the causal role of education for political behaviors and argued that dispositional traits 
that are established early in life, like personality traits, may be more important (Berinsky and Lenz 
2010; Highton 2009; Kam and Palmer 2008; Tenn 2007). The rediscovery of personality as a 
potential confounder of the educational effect makes sense theoretically: Education has been argued 
to influence motivations and cognitions, such as political sophistication and political interest 
(Carpini and Keeter 1996; Neuman 1986; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and personality traits 
also concern motivations and cognition (McAdams and Pals 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003). 
However, there is also more to the educational effect than motivation and cognition.  
 Previous studies of the effect of personality traits on political behavior have paid little attention 
to these differential effects of education, and they have not examined if both the motivational and the 
resource effect is confounded by personality traits. Moreover, they have not examined if the 
educational and personality effects are context dependent. Examining internal and external political 
efficacy allows us to differentiate these effects. Education primarily matters for external efficacy, i.e. 
whether political elites and government are perceived to be responsive to your needs, (Balch 1974; 
Converse 1972; Craig 1979; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Niemi, Craig, 
and Mattei 1991), because it influences the resources and relative standing of individuals and the 
ease with which they can gain access to political decision makers and political networks (Nie, Junn, 
and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
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Furthermore the advantage of having resources is dependent on the resources other commands; it is 
– at least partially – a zero-sum situation. Put short resources are competitive.    
 Conversely, education primarily matters for internal efficacy, i.e. the extent to which individuals 
find that they understand politics and the process of governing (Balch 1974; Converse 1972; Craig 
1979; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991), 
because education influences motivational and cognitive factors. As opposed to external efficacy the 
effect of education on internal efficacy is not context dependent: my level of internal efficacy is not 
dependent on your level of internal efficacy; this is a positive-sum situation. Motivations and 
cognitions are thus non-competitive.  
 This paper argues and tests if personality traits confound the motivational and cognitive effects 
of education on internal efficacy to a higher degree than the resource effects of education on 
external efficacy. This is investigated in two ways: Firstly, we investigate whether education loses a 
larger part of its effect on internal efficacy, after controlling for personality traits as well as standard 
measures of motivation, i.e. political interest, and cognition, i.e. political knowledge, relative to 
education’s effect on external efficacy using the same set of controls.    
 Secondly we test the hypothesized mechanism underlying the effect of education on internal and 
external efficacy, i.e. motivations and cognitions versus resources, by taking advantage of the fact 
that resources are competitive, whereas cognitions and motivations are not. If the effect of education 
on external efficacy is indeed based on granting resources, the effect of education should decrease 
when the competitors are highly educated or otherwise resourceful; i.e. the effect of education is 
moderated by environmental competitiveness. Conversely, if the effect of education on internal 
efficacy is indeed cognitive and motivational, the effect of education on internal efficacy should not 
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be moderated by environmental competitiveness since cognitions and motivations are not 
competitive. 
 In testing these predictions we use a large representative sample from Denmark. The dataset 
includes highly reliable measures of personality traits, the 60-item NEO-PI-R, along with standard 
measures of internal and external efficacy. Furthermore we take advantage of the excellent registry 
data available in Denmark to obtain measures of actual environmental competitiveness, rather than 
an estimate of this construct. 
 As will be shown, we find substantial evidence for our arguments: Personality traits as well as 
political interest and political knowledge primarily reduce the educational effect on internal efficacy 
and less so for external efficacy. We are also able to confirm that the effect of education on internal 
and external efficacy is driven by different mechanisms i.e. cognitions and motivations versus 
resources respectively: Using four measures of environmental competitiveness, i.e. municipal levels 
of educational attainment, wealth, current income, and an index of the three, we demonstrate that in 
all four cases the effect of education on external efficacy decreases when environmental 
competitiveness increases, whereas the effect of education on internal efficacy is unaffected by 
environmental competitiveness. If the effect of external efficacy is indeed driven by resources, and 
the effect of education on internal efficacy by cognitions and motivations this is exactly what we 
would expect. We therefore conclude that personality traits strongly confound education when the 
effect of education is primarily driven by cognitions and motivations whereas the effect of education is 
minimally confounded when the effect is primarily driven by resources. The implications for the 
current debate on the causal power of education is outlined as are the democratic implications.  
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 The structure of the paper follows conventions. We elaborate on the argument first and then 
present the hypotheses on internal and external efficacy. Discussion of data, measures and model 
estimation follows before we turn to the analyses and conclude.  
Education, personality traits and political outcomes  
There are two distinct reasons why education is potentially a cause of political outcomes: (1) 
Education influences cognitions, motivations and behaviors, and (2) education grants access, 
influence and status to highly educated individuals. In outlining these reasons we will contrast them 
with the reasons why personality traits are important for political outcomes. 
 Education has traditionally been thought to influence cognitions and motivations. For instance 
we know from extant research that those who are educated are more politically interested (Carpini 
and Keeter 1996; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), a motivational factor, as well as more 
knowledgeable and sophisticated (Carpini and Keeter 1996; Neuman 1986; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995) a cognitive factor. As argued by Philip Converse (Converse 1972, 324, emphasis added): 
“Whether one is dealing with cognitive matters…[or]…motivational matters… education is everywhere 
the universal solvent”. 
 However, education is only an indirect measure of cognitions and conations; to measure these 
constructs, predispositions such as personality traits offer a more direct path. Personality can be 
defined as (Caprara et al. 2006, 3):  
“a set of dynamic, self-regulatory systems that emerge and operate over the life course in the service of personal 
adaptations (Caprara & Cervone, 2000). These internal systems guide affective, cognitive, and motivational processes, 
directing people toward achieving individual and collective goals.” 
 It is in fact quite common to include cognitive and motivational processes in a definition of what 
personality traits are (Denissen and Penke 2008; McAdams and Pals 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003). 
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Personality traits are theorized to give rise to characteristic adaptations which are a person’s acquired set 
of skills, beliefs, and values and are developed as a function of a person’s general dispositional traits 
as well as by environmental and cultural influences (McAdams and Pals 2006; McCrae and Costa 
2003). We know that personality traits are established early in life, stable across the life course 
(Caspi, Roberts, and Shiner 2005; Roberts and DelVecchio 2000; Shiner and DeYoung 2013) and 
genetically influenced (Bouchard and McGue 2003; Hopwood et al. 2011). Furthermore personality 
traits, especially Openness and Conscientiousness, are positively correlated with education (Poropat 
2009; Richardson, Abraham, and Bond 2012). It is precisely these properties which make it likely 
that personality traits are confounding the effect of education. 
 In recent years personality trait researchers have settled on five basic traits, the so-called Big Five 
model (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008). The Big Five traits are Openness, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. The Big Five model of personality traits has been the 
standard model in political science for studying the relationship between personality and political 
outcomes. Fairly consistently Openness and Conscientiousness have been shown to predict leftist 
and rightist ideological outlooks respectively (Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 1999; Carney et 
al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010) and Extraversion has quite consistently been linked to political 
participation (Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010). 
 The second explanation of why education is linked to politics focuses on the role education plays 
for the attainment of resources such as access, influence and status. Having a college or a law degree 
increases a person’s status, job opportunities and life chances, being extrovert or conscientious does 
not. Whereas education directly affects access, influence and status, via social network centrality (Nie, 
Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996), personality traits only indirectly influence network position e.g. through 
the effect personality traits exert on network size (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010). Even though 
being extrovert will help you gain friends and, hence, attain a larger social network, only education 
7 
 
will ensure that these friends are people with proximity to political power. While personality will 
help you get friends, education will help you get the ‘right’ sort of friends.  
 More specifically Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry argue that one of the most important determinants 
of social network centrality is education. Social network centrality is important (Nie, Junn, and 
Stehlik-Barry 1996, 45): “Centrality in politics is defined by proximity to governmental incumbents 
and political actors who make public policy and to those in the mass media who disseminate and 
interpret the issues, events, and activities of people in politics”. Focusing on mobilization and 
recruitment somewhat similar arguments have been put forth by Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) 
regarding the effect of education on political participation. Thus, whereas education increases 
politically relevant resources personality traits do not, at least not in any direct and meaningful way. 
 
Internal and external efficacy – different educational effects  
We expect the educational effect on internal efficacy to be primarily motivational and cognitive, and 
therefore absolute, whereas the educational effect on external efficacy primarily is resource-based, 
and therefore relative and contingent upon competitive context.  
 Internal political efficacy refers to an individual’s subjective feeling of competence in the political 
realm and the extent to which a person sees politics as complicated whereas external efficacy refers 
to an individual’s perception of the extent to which government is responsive and care about 
“people like me” (Balch 1974; Converse 1972; Craig 1979; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig, Niemi, 
and Silver 1990; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). Just because a person feels capable of 
understanding politics, i.e. is internally efficacious, it does not prevent others from feeling the same; 
internal efficacy is thus unrelated to the relative resources individuals possess. Since this is a positive-
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sum situation, education should have an absolute effect on internal efficacy (Campbell 2009; Nie, 
Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Persson 2011; Tenn 2005).  
 External efficacy is different. Citizens compete for governmental attention (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2009; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996) and if government is 
perceived to be responsive to “people like me” it cannot be equally responsive to people “unlike 
me”, at least this will be hard to sustain if people acknowledge the competitive character of politics. 
There are only so many people to which government can be responsive (Baumgartner and Jones 
2009; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Assuming that individuals 
are aware of this zero-sum character of government responsiveness, the extent to which people feel 
externally efficacious depends, at least partially, on the resources they can bring to bear on 
influencing decision makers and letting their voice be heard, and it depends on the amount of 
resources they have compared to other people. In other words the effect of education on external 
efficacy is moderated by environmental competitiveness. Motivations and cognitive capacity is not 
enough. Several studies have demonstrated this relative effect of education; primarily in relationship 
to political participation (Campbell 2009; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Persson 2011; Tenn 
2005). 
 In addition to providing an excellent test case for the varying effect of education on political 
attitudes and behaviors there is an added benefit to focus on political efficacy: By comparing the 
effect of education on internal and external efficacy we are not comparing apples and oranges. We 
know that internal and external efficacy are positively correlated (Acock, Clarke, and Stewart 1985; 
Craig 1979; Craig and Maggiotto 1982); in the sample used in the present analysis around .2. If we 
find that education has a different effect on these conceptually and empirically related but still 
distinct constructs we have a strong case for our argument. Put in methodological terms we are 
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maximizing the degree of similarity, i.e. using a most similar method (Gerring 2007, chapter 5), in 
order to be sure that the primary difference in the effect of education is in fact related to the 
theorized difference in the importance of the resource component in education vs. the cognitions 
and motivations aspect.  
Hypotheses: Education and personality effects on internal and external efficacy 
Ample evidence shows that those who are more educated are also more efficacious (Hayes and Bean 
1993; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Several more recent 
studies have also shown that personality traits play a role in determining who see themselves as 
politically efficacious (Anderson 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Schoen and 
Steinbrecher 2013). Both personality traits and education are thus likely to predict differences in 
political efficacy, but previous studies have not carefully distinguished between the different effects 
on internal and external efficacy. 
 If the effect of education on internal efficacy is primarily due to cognitive and motivational 
factors the educational effect on internal efficacy should decrease when personality traits, which are 
a more direct expression of motivations and cognitions, are included. We expect a larger decrease in 
the effect of education on internal efficacy than on external efficacy, because the resource effect of 
education is more important for external than for internal efficacy and, by implication, because the 
relative significance of motivations and cognition matters less for external efficacy.  
 Related to this point, we also expect the effect of education on internal efficacy to decrease when 
we include political interest and political knowledge as predictors in our model of the effect of 
education on internal efficacy since these are the archetypical indicators of motivational and 
cognitive factors that education is supposed to bestow upon individuals. In this context the chain of 
causality between these constructs and education and internal efficacy is less important; what matters 
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is that their effect on internal efficacy should be shared with education. If the effect of education on 
internal efficacy is primarily driven by motivational and cognitive factors the effect should decrease 
substantially once these cognitive and motivational constructs are included. Conversely the effect of 
education on external efficacy should decrease to a lesser extent.  
 The last hypothesis concerns our distinction above between outcomes that reflect zero sum and 
positive sum situations and is a moderation hypothesis. Since external efficacy is theorized to be 
substantially influenced by resources like access, influence and status the effect of education should 
decrease when the comparative advantage of resources is reduced, i.e. when others possesses an 
equal amount of education or level of income or wealth. Conversely the effect of education on 
internal efficacy should remain unaffected when competition increases because relative resources are 
unimportant. The table below summarizes on the expectations: 
Table 1: Expectations for the effect of education on internal and external efficacy 
 Internal efficacy External efficacy Hypothesis  
The effect of effect of education on political efficacy is  
 
Positive Positive H1 
More confounded by 
personality traits 
Less confounded by 
personality traits 
H2 
When political interest and political knowledge are included as 
predictors the effect of education on political efficacy 
Decrease substantially Remain relatively 
unaffected 
H3 
When the proportion of highly educated or rich people in a person’s 
surroundings increases the effect of education on political efficacy should 
Remain constant Decrease H4 
 
Dataset and measures 
The dataset is based on a Danish internet panel which was fielded between May 25 and June 6 2010 
and has a response rate of around 45 percent, which gives a total number of respondents of 3612. 
The internet panel is a representative sample of the Danish population constructed by TNS Gallup.1  
                                                 
1 Sampling weights provided by TNS Gallup are used in the analyses below to deal with unit non-response. All 
dependent variables were screened for non-normality since we are relying on a normality based estimation technique 
(Bollen 1989). Using the rules of thumb that a skew larger than 2.0 and a kurtosis larger than 7.0, represents a potential 
problem (Curran, West, and Finch 1996) we transformed all the measures of competitive environments using the inverse 
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 To measure personality traits we are relying on one of the best measures of the Big Five model 
currently available namely the 60 item version of the Neo-PI-R. There is a correlation of .9 and 
above between each of the traits in the 60 item version and the 240 item version, which means that 
if one is only interested in the broad personality traits and not any specific facet the 60 item version 
is a good choice (Costa and McCrae 2003). Scores are based on scoring in the manual. Cronbach’s 
alpha is above .7 for all personality traits. 
 Internal political efficacy is measured using three items and external efficacy is measured using 
two items. The first two items measuring internal efficacy are a Danish translation of the 
UNDERSTAND and COMPLEX items used by Niemi, Craig and Mattei (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 
1991). The last item is inspired by an item used in the European Social Survey and asks the 
respondents whether they find “it is difficult to make up one’s mind” about politics. Cronbach’s 
alpha is 0.72 for internal efficacy. The two items measuring external efficacy are those most often 
employed in the American National Election surveys; what Niemi, Craig and Mattei refer to as 
NOSAY and NOCARE (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). Cronbach’s alpha is .78 for this construct. 
For question wording see appendix 1. 
 Education is a continuous variable measuring last completed education based on registry data 
from Statistics Denmark on respondents. The categories can be seen in appendix 1. Before outlining 
our measures of competitive environments a brief elaboration on how this has been addressed in the 
literature is needed. 
There has been different ways to specify the effect of relative versus absolute education 
(Campbell 2009; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Persson 2011; Tenn 2005). A general consensus 
has emerged that we need to specify a geographically local context when we model the relative effect of 
                                                                                                                                                             
function 1/X since these constructs were very positively skewed (Kline 2011, 63) except educational competitiveness as 
this did not pose a problem according to these guidelines.  
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education as competition does not take place at the national but the local level (Campbell 2009; 
Helliwell and Putnam 2007; Persson 2011). The argument is that competition for politicians 
attention, which is an important aspect of external efficacy, must be seen in a local context: Having a 
college degree does not necessarily make a person feel that politicians are relatively more responsive 
to him in the affluent municipality of Gentofte north of the Capitol Copenhagen but might have a 
rather large and highly different impact in a poor municipality in the western part of the peninsula 
Jutland. The most local measure available in the survey is the municipality respondents live in and 
this is the measure that is used in the current study. 
There is also a general consensus that we need to take into account that usually citizens compete 
with each other in different age groupings when modeling competitive environments (Campbell 2009; 
Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Persson 2011; Tenn 2005). Tenn takes this argument to its logical 
endpoint and argues that we should disaggregate at year of birth (Tenn 2005), while Campbell 
divides the population into three age cohorts (Campbell 2009). Using the same argumentation as 
above the most precise measure of one’s competitors is obtained by a fairly narrow measure of 
competitors.2 The most disaggregated level of competition, based on data availability, is therefore 
chosen. Table 3 below lists the level of disaggregation for each of the measures.  
 We employ three measures of competitive environments. All three are based on data from public 
registries that provide information on the actual resources that other citizens have rather than 
estimated parameters based on survey data. We measure competitive environments on the 
municipality level that is the lowest administrative unit in the Danish political system. The first 
                                                 
2 To test the effect of education as consisting of resources versus cognitions and motivations it makes most sense to 
only look at those who are likely to have had a chance of finishing their education and those still in the work force since 
these are those most likely to be affected by the competition (Campbell 2009; Persson 2011). Students or people outside 
the workforce that for the most part are retirees are therefore not included in the analysis. Besides, students cluster in a 
rather few municipalities, but many move upon completion of their education. See appendix 1 for the categories of the 
variable used to include respondents. 
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measure of a competitive environment is the educational environment in the Danish municipalities 
in different age groupings in 2010 based on data from Statistics Denmark.3 The other two measures 
of competitive environments are the wealth in the Danish municipalities, measured by land value, 
and the tax base i.e. income in the different municipalities in 2010. These are based on the 
municipalities’ key figures collected by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior.4 In 
addition, based on these three measures of competitive environments, we have created an index 
consisting of all three indicators to improve the reliability of the measure of competitiveness.  
 Personality traits, education, items measuring efficacy, and the measures of competitive 
environments, are rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Full question wording and original scaling can be 
found in appendix 1 and descriptive statistics for the recoded variables can be found in appendix 2. 
The competitive environments are scaled so that a higher score means the environment is more 
competitive.  
Model estimation 
The model is estimated using structural equation modeling in the statistical software Mplus version 
7. Mplus’ so-called MLR estimator is used and assumes a multivariate normal distribution but 
provides robust standard errors (Browne and Cudeck 1992).5 We are thus able to use a strong 
technique for handling missing values namely full information maximum likelihood (FIML) (Schafer 
and Graham 2002; Yuan, Yang-Wallentin, and Bentler 2012). Missing values are a source of 
potentially biased parameter estimates (Enders 2010; Little and Rubin 1987) so if we use listwise 
deletion we are potentially introducing bias. In addition the SEM framework provides a flexible and 
                                                 
3 www.statistikbanken.dk . Based on the same educational variable as in the survey and it is recoded in exactly the same 
way. 
4 http://www.noegletal.dk/  
5 In addition, clustering, based on age groups and geographical dispersion, is also taken into account when calculating the 
standard errors for the models estimating the effect of education in competitive environments. 
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general way of estimating multilevel models (Curran 2003; Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 
2004).6  
 To disentangle the relationship between education and personality traits only a very limited set of 
controls are employed; only those which are arguably exogenous to education and personality traits 
are included. This means that only age, and gender are included as controls, whereas for instance 
income, which is partly an outcome of educational differences, is not included as this would 
constitute bad control (Angrist and Pischke 2009, chapter 3). These controls are also fairly common 
in the literature on political efficacy; those who are older are generally less efficacious and men are 
generally more internally efficacious but less externally efficacious than women (Abramson 1983; 
Chamberlain 2013; Hayes and Bean 1993; Sullivan and Riedel 2001).7 We include these controls in 
all models. 
 To investigate hypotheses 1-3 we estimate three models for internal and external efficacy: One 
including education and controls, one where we add personality traits and a final model where we 
also add political interest and political knowledge. In this way we are able to investigate the changes 
in the size of the coefficient of education on internal and external efficacy as more constructs are 
added to the model.8 
                                                 
6 For additional information on how this is implemented in Mplus see e.g. (Geiser 2013) 
7 It is customary to control for whether people have recently moved in the investigation of environmental 
competitiveness. Unfortunately based on the current dataset we cannot control for this, but by excluding students we 
minimize the problem. If we find that the environmental competitiveness is an important moderator, even without this 
control, it is strong evidence that it is in fact important. 
8 This is strictly speaking not the way the models are estimated, although the interpretation is exactly the same. In order 
to be able to conduct a statistical test of the differences in the effect of education before and after including personality 
traits, political interest, and political knowledge path analysis is used instead. The effect of education in the first model 
including only controls is calculated as the sum of the direct effect of education and the indirect effect of education 
through personality traits, although this might seem counterintuitive given our causal framework outlined above. The 
sum of the direct and indirect effect, i.e. the total effect, exactly corresponds to the effect of education on political 
efficacy in a model without personality traits since this is a linear regression model (MacKinnon 2008, chapter 3). The 
indirect effect therefore corresponds to the degree of confounding and a test of the significance of this parameter is 
therefore easy in this model specification. In fact the results from estimating three separate models are, within rounding 
error, the same as the estimates obtained above. These results are available upon request. 
15 
 
To investigate hypothesis 4, i.e. the relative effect of education in different competitive settings, 
we include a set of interactions between the environment and education (Campbell 2009; Persson 
2011). A negative sign of the interaction signifies that the effect an individual’s level of education 
decreases as the competition increases. Since this is a multilevel context this interaction is also 
referred to as a cross-level interaction, which requires that we estimate a random intercept and 
random slope model in addition to including the cross-level interaction (Aguinis, Gottfredson, and 
Culpepper 2013). Only one competitive environment, education, income, wealth, is investigated at a 
time to reduce problems of multicollinearity, but we also include a composite measure of 
competitive environment that includes all three indicators. 
The effect of education on internal and external efficacy: Confounding by personality traits 
This section investigates hypothesis 1-3. The models shown in the first two columns test hypothesis 
1, i.e. whether education has a positive effect on internal and external efficacy. The effect of 
education on external efficacy is 0.152 (p<0.000) and the effect of education on internal efficacy is 
0.176 (p<0.000) which means those who are more educated are more internally and externally 
efficacious as expected. The effect of education in these model specifications includes the resource 
effect as well as the motivational and cognitive factors that we theorized to be mostly confounded 
by personality traits.  
 In model (3)-(4) we therefore control for the effect of personality traits. If the effect of education 
is primarily based on cognitive and motivational matters its effect should decrease once personality 
traits are accounted for because these traits more directly measure motivations and cognitions. 
Following our argument the confounding should be strongest for internal efficacy. This is 
confirmed: The effect of education on internal efficacy in model (4) decreases to 0.082 (p<0.000) 
whereas external efficacy only decreases to 0.126 (p<0.000). The difference in the sizes of the two 
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decreases is significant at a .05 level (p=0.022). Perhaps more informative are the percentage 
changes: The effect of education on internal efficacy, when not controlling for personality traits, is 
almost double the size, whereas the effect of education on external efficacy, when not controlling 
for personality is roughly fifty percent larger. This marked difference in the effect of education on 
the two dimensions of political efficacy, suggests that the effect of education on political outcomes 
is more confounded by personality traits when the education effect is based on motivations and 
cognitions.  
Table 2: The effect of education on internal and external efficacy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 External efficacy Internal efficacy External efficacy Internal efficacy External efficacy Internal efficacy 
       
Construct Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Education (0-1) 0.176*** 
(0.021) 
0.152***  
(0.016) 
0.126*** 
(0.021) 
0.082***  
(0.016) 
0.103*** 
(0.022) 
0.043*** 
(0.016) 
Gender -0.017 
(0.012) 
0.081*** 
(0.010) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
0.073*** 
(0.010) 
-0.033** 
(0.013) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
Age  0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Openness (0-1)   0.260*** 
(0.052) 
0.344***  
(0.042) 
0.222*** 
(0.052) 
0.209*** 
(0.039) 
Conscientiousnes (0-1) 
 
  -0.034 
(0.068) 
0.268*** 
(0.055) 
-0.053 
(0.067) 
0.197*** 
(0.039) 
Extraversion (0-1)   0.153*** 
(0.054) 
0.054 
(0.043) 
0.144***   
(0.054) 
0.015 
(0.041) 
Agreeableness (0-1)   -0.038 
(0.056) 
-0.170*** 
(0.043) 
-0.040   
(0.056) 
-0.160*** 
(0.040) 
Neuroticism (0-1)   -0.224*** 
(0.053) 
-0.254*** 
(0.043) 
-0.216*** 
(0.052) 
-0.241*** 
(0.039) 
Political interest (0-1)       0.077*** 
(0.024) 
0.370***   
(0.023) 
Political knowledge (0-1)     0.097*** 
(0.026) 
0.072*** 
(0.025) 
N  2167 
Standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
 To further substantiate our argument we included the two classical cognitive and motivational 
predictors of efficacy: Political knowledge and political interest. If the effect of education on internal 
efficacy is indeed driven by motivational and cognitive factors the effect of education should 
decrease further and more markedly for internal efficacy compared to external efficacy when we 
include political knowledge and interest in our models. This is not a test of the degree of 
confounding; it is a further test of why education is related to internal and external efficacy. As 
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models (5) and (6) illustrate we do indeed observe the expected pattern of results: The effect of 
education on external efficacy decreases to 0.103 (p<0.000), whereas the effect of internal efficacy 
decreases to 0.043 (p=0.006). The difference in the sizes of the decreases is again significant 
(p=0.049). As before the percentage changes are more informative: The effect of education on 
internal efficacy is almost double the size when not holding political interest and knowledge constant 
whereas the effect of education on external efficacy when not holding political interest and 
knowledge constant is only around twenty percent larger.  
 Taken together, education retains almost 60 percent of its effect on external efficacy but less than 
30 percent on internal efficacy when controlling for personal predispositions, political interest and 
political knowledge.   
 The fact that personality traits do indeed measure motivational and cognitive effects is also 
evident by the fact that the effect of personality traits decreases substantially when including political 
interest and knowledge such as the effect of Openness in model 4 and 6. We will return to this point 
in the conclusion.  
The effect of education on external efficacy: Competitive context effects 
The analyses so far show that motivational and cognitive effects cofound the educational effect less 
for external efficacy than internal efficacy. This suggests but does not test that the conjectured 
resource effect may be more important for external efficacy. If this is the case, the educational effect 
on external efficacy should be dependent on the competitive context in which educated individuals 
find themselves. Hypothesis 4 suggested that the effect of education on external efficacy but not 
internal efficacy differs across different competitive environments. 
 The models in table 3 below illustrates whether the effect of education decreases when the degree 
of competitiveness increases. In all cases for external efficacy the effect of education decreases when 
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the environmental competitiveness increases: There is a negative and significant cross-level 
interaction for all models. This confirms our theoretical expectation: When competition over a 
political outcome is a zero-sum game, such as external efficacy, and the effect of education on a 
political construct is caused by a resource effect, i.e. access, influence and status, the effect decreases 
when others possess a high level of resources, whether measured in terms of income or education.  
Table 3: The effect of education in different competitive environments on internal and external efficacy  
 External efficacy Internal efficacy 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Educational 
environment  
Income environment  
(Tax base) 
Wealth environment  
(Land value)  
Index Educational 
environment  
Income environment  
(Tax base) 
Wealth environment  
(Land value)  
Index 
Within Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Education  
(0-1) 
0.305*** 
(0.080) 
0.289*** 
(0.040) 
0.243*** 
(0.045) 
0.309*** 
(0.059) 
0.156** 
(0.063) 
0.109*** 
(0.030) 
0.050 
(0.034) 
0.085** 
(0.043) 
Openness  
(0-1) 
0.245*** 
(0.052) 
0.229*** 
(0.046) 
0.238*** 
(0.046) 
0.233*** 
(0.046) 
0.329*** 
(0.042) 
0.327*** 
(0.042) 
0.338*** 
(0.042) 
0.334*** 
(0.042) 
Conscientiousnes  
(0-1) 
-0.053 
(0.067) 
-0.057 
(0.066) 
-0.054 
(0.067) 
-0.056 
(0.067) 
0.190*** 
(0.055) 
0.195*** 
(0.054) 
0.211*** 
(0.054) 
0.207*** 
(0.054) 
Extraversion  
(0-1) 
0.155*** 
(0.050) 
0.158*** 
(0.050) 
0.156*** 
(0.050) 
0.157*** 
(0.050) 
0.011 
(0.042)   
0.015 
(0.042)   
0.019 
(0.042)   
0.018 
(0.042)   
Agreeableness  
(0-1) 
-0.066 
(0.053) 
-0.072 
(0.053) 
-0.066 
(0.054) 
-0.066 
(0.054) 
-0.192*** 
(0.041) 
-0.187*** 
(0.041) 
-0.180*** 
(0.041) 
-0.182*** 
(0.041) 
Neuroticism  
(0-1) 
-0.245*** 
(0.052) 
-0.246*** 
(0.052) 
-0.249*** 
(0.052) 
-0.249*** 
(0.052) 
-0.326*** 
(0.041) 
-0.320*** 
(0.041) 
-0.311*** 
(0.041) 
-0.314*** 
(0.041) 
Gender -0.021* 
(0.012) 
-0.020 
(0.012) 
-0.020 
(0.012) 
-0.020 
(0.012) 
0.062*** 
(0.010) 
0.064*** 
(0.009) 
0.065*** 
(0.010) 
0.065*** 
(0.009) 
Age  -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Between         
Environmental 
variable (0-1) 
0.097 
(0.062) 
0.240*** 
(0.053) 
0.131*** 
(0.038) 
0.155*** 
(0.041) 
0.130**   
(0.057) 
0.104** 
(0.042) 
0.034 
(0.040) 
0.039 
(0.032) 
Cross-level 
interaction 
        
Education x 
Environment (0-1) 
-0.353** 
(0.152) 
-0.572*** 
(0.118) 
-0.271*** 
(0.090) 
-0.345*** 
(0.100) 
-0.188* 
(0.113) 
-0.085 
(0.085) 
0.074 
(0.064) 
-0.002 
(0.070) 
N 2167 2167 2167 2167 2167 2167 2167 2167 
Level of 
disaggregation 
Five year 
cohorts within 
municipalities 
Municipal level Municipal level Municipal level Five year cohorts 
within 
municipalities 
Municipal level Municipal level Municipal level 
Standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
 As to the effect of education on internal efficacy we should, based on our theoretical framework, 
not expect the effect of education on internal efficacy to decrease just because others are educated or 
wealthy since internal efficacy is not a zero-sum game. This is also confirmed: None of the 
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interactions between education and the four competitive environment indicators are significant at 
conventional levels of significance. This corroborates our evidence that competition matters for the 
effect of education on external but not internal efficacy.   
 The graph below illustrates the effect of education on external efficacy for model (10) to illustrate 
the effect of education when the competitiveness increases as measured by the index of 
competitiveness.9 We notice for the graph displaying the marginal effect that the effect of increasing 
competitiveness is quite dramatic: When the degree of competitiveness is around .7 the effect of 
education on external efficacy ceases to matter as indicated by the confidence bands crossing the 
point zero. 
 
Figure 1: Marginal effect of education on external efficacy as a function of environmental competition with 95 % confidence bands  
 
* The marginal effect measures the effect of education on the conditional mean of external efficacy of a change in the index of environmental competition controlling for 
the other variables i.e. the partial derivative. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Using the approach outlined by (Bauer and Curran 2005) as implemented in Mplus 
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Conclusion and discussion 
In this article we have developed and tested an argument that posits that the effect of education on 
internal efficacy is highly confounded by personality traits since its effect is primarily based on 
cognitive and motivational factors. The effect of education on external efficacy will be less 
confounded by personality traits since its effect is primarily based on relative resources such as 
status, power and influence, and since personality traits only indirectly affect access, influence and 
status. When the relative resource effect is important the competitive context in which individuals 
find themselves conditions resource effects. Focusing on these differential effects of education on 
internal and external efficacy and relying on strong measures of both personality traits and 
competitive contexts we proposed several observable implications of the argument and found 
considerable support for its validity. There are at least four reasons why we find the evidence 
compelling. 
 First of all the effect of education on internal efficacy decreases substantially when personality 
traits are held constant and the effect decreases less on external efficacy. Because personality traits, 
by definition, measure motivations and cognitions that are more important for internal than external 
efficacy this suggests that the motivational and cognitive aspect of the educational effect on political 
behavior is considerably confounded by personality traits. Second, the effect of education on 
internal efficacy decreases further and more markedly than on external efficacy when we include 
more direct measures of motivation and cognition like political interest and political knowledge in 
our model specification. Also this suggests that a major part of the educational effect on internal 
efficacy is cognitive and motivational and it gives further credence to our argument.   
 Third, the effect of education is context dependent for external but not for internal efficacy. The 
effect of education on external efficacy decreases when the degree of competition increases whereas 
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for internal efficacy it does not. This provides additional evidence to the validity of our distinction 
between relative resource effects versus absolute cognitive and motivational effects. When the effect 
of education is based on resources, as in the case of external efficacy, its effect decreases in 
competitive environments because finite resources such as central network positions have a zero 
sum character. Conversely, when the effect of education is based on cognitive and motivational 
factors, such as the effect of education on internal efficacy, the effect does not depend on levels of 
competition: Just because I feel subjectively competent and capable of understanding the 
complexities of politics and government decision making this does not imply that others cannot feel 
the same way.  
 Fourth and finally, the case is well suited to test the more general argument on the differentiated 
effects of education. By focusing on internal and external efficacy, which are conceptually closely 
related, we are ensuring that the two constructs are most similar except regarding the theoretically 
conjectured, differential effect of education on these two constructs. In addition the context for the 
study, Denmark, is a least likely case for testing the effect of education on political efficacy after 
taking predispositions into account. Denmark is an extremely equal society, education is free, and 
there are relatively few social barriers to become educated. If, in this context, education still has an 
effect above and beyond predispositions and if we find the conjectured relative resource effect, it is 
likely that similar effects can be found in other contexts as well. However, needless to say more 
comparative analysis and cross-cultural replication is needed to examine whether our findings can be 
generalized beyond the Danish case. 
 The argument developed here is fairly general in scope and may shed light on the relationship 
between education and predispositions more generally. Future studies should seek to elaborate in 
two ways. First, in this article we have only set out the broad contours of a framework for starting to 
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understand the complex and multifaceted relationship between education and predispositions. 
Digging deeper into which types of cognitive and motivational dispositions are more or less affected 
by education, after predispositions are taken into account, would be an enterprise worth 
undertaking. Personality traits, it seems, do not confound all the motivational and cognitive effects 
of education that are important for political behaviour. 
 Second, other political behaviours related to our conceptual distinction between resource effects 
and motivational and cognitive effects ought to be investigated to examine the boundaries of the 
argument. A logical next step would be to examine the effect of personality traits and education on 
political participation. Network effects, such as recruitment and mobilization effects, are of prime 
importance for the effect of education on political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Furthermore, current research has demonstrated that the effect 
of education on political participation decreases in a competitive educational environment which 
suggests the effect of education on this political construct is also related to resources rather than 
(merely) cognitive and motivational effects (Campbell 2009; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; 
Persson 2011; Tenn 2005). Hence, the education effect on political participation is unlikely to be 
strongly confounded by predispositions. 
 Our study also has democratic implications. Decades ago Philip Converse argued that education 
was the “universal solvent” pointing to its many positive effects on democratic citizenship such as 
political participation, political interest, political knowledge and political efficacy (Converse 1972). 
Some years later Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry argued that democratic citizenship included two 
aspects, political engagement and political enlightenment (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). They 
argued that education had a relative effect for constructs related to political engagement, such as 
political participation, whereas it had an absolute effect when it came to political enlightenment. 
23 
 
Thus, although education only worked as a sorting mechanism for constructs related to political 
engagement, at least it still served to increase levels of political enlightenment in an absolute fashion, 
thus retaining the importance of education for good democratic citizenship. While we are able to 
reproduce the first part of the story in this article, we are also able to cast some serious doubt on the 
optimistic second part of the story: Cognitive and motivational factors, which are integral to their 
conceptualization of political enlightenment, are those factors which are most likely to be 
confounded by personal predispositions. This means that not only is the positive effect of education 
on political engagement conditional upon context, its effect on political enlightenment may also be 
exaggerated. Two brief notes of caution are needed before completely dismissing the importance of 
education for good democratic citizenship however. 
 First of all, the effect of education on internal efficacy remains significant across all model 
specifications. Thus although its effect size in relation to altering a person’s basic motivational and 
cognitive set up may have been inflated in previous studies that have not included personality traits 
this does not imply that there is no effect of education. Secondly we should also be humble about 
the fact that this study relies on cross-sectional data. Although education, in the relatively wealthy 
and educated country of Denmark contributes little to make people more or less internally 
efficacious, this does not imply that increasing mass levels of education over the last hundreds of 
years have not.  
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Appendix 1: Question wording  
The NEO-PI-R short version is copyrighted so questions from this battery are not shown. Also the 
BPP battery is protected against publication. 
Socio-demographics 
What is your last finished education? 10 
Primary school 
High school  
High school (Vocational high school) 
Short-term higher education (1-2 years) 
Medium term higher education (3-4 years)  
Long-term higher education (more than 4 years) 
Researcher/PhD  
 
 
Questions measuring internal efficacy 
Sometimes politics seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Neither/nor 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
 
                                                 
10 The educational variable is recoded to reflect “years of school education”. The categories are: 
1. 9 Years or less (Primary school) 
2. 10-11 Years (Basic vocational education and vocational education) 
3. 11-12 years of education (High school) 
4. 13-14 years of education  (Short-term higher education) 
5. 14-16 years of education (Medium term higher education) 
6. 17-18 years of education (Long-Term higher education) 
7. 19 years of education (PhD) 
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I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Neither/nor 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
 
I often think it is difficult to make up my mind about political issues 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Neither/nor 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
 
 
Questions measuring external efficacy 
People like me have don’t have any say about what government does 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Neither/nor 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
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I don’t think government cares much what people like me think 
Agree completely 
Agree somewhat 
Neither/nor 
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree completely 
Don’t know 
 
Question measuring political interest  
How interested are you in politics? 
Very interested 
Somewhat interested 
Not particularly interested 
Not at all interested 
 
 
Questions measuring political knowledge 
Which parties are ruling parties in the current government? 
Don’t know 
 
The Social Democrats 
The Liberal Party of Denmark, The Conservative People’s Party 
The Liberal Party, The Conservative People’s Party, The Danish People’s Party 
The Social Democrats, The Socialist People’s Party 
The Social Democrats, The Socialist People’s Party, The Red Green Alliance  
The Social Democrats, The Socialist People’s Party, The Danish Social Liberal Party 
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How many members does Parliament have if we disregard the four from Greenland and the Faroe Islands? 
 
 
 
 
 
Which party is Troels Lund Poulsen a member of? 
 
 
 
 
Which party is Christine Antorini a member of? 
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Social Democrats  
The Danish People’s Party  
The Danish Social Liberal Party  
The Socialist People’s Party  
 
 
 
  
171  
175  
179  
183  
187  
Don’t know  
The Liberal Party of Denmark  
The Social Democrats  
The Danish People’s Party  
The Danish Social Liberal Party  
The Socialist People’s Party  
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Measures of competitive environments based on data from the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and the Interior  
Definition of tax base 
The municipalities’ budgeted tax base from income taxes including taxes from foreigners with 
limited tax obligations in DKK per citizen 1st of January  
Definition of land value 
The municipalities’ budgeted land values which are levied in DKK per citizen 1st of January.  
 
 
 Question used to include people in the investigation of competitive environments 
What is your current occupation?11 
1. Worker, unskilled (not semi-skilled worker) 
2. Worker, unskilled (semi-skilled worker) 
3. Worker, skilled 
4. Employee/civil servant, lower 
5. Employee/civil servant, higher 
6. Self-employed farmer/horticulture/fisheries 
7. Self-employed retailer/craftsman 
8. Self-employed, other 
9. Apprentice/student 
10. Student 
11. Not in the labor force (retired, on pre-retirement benefits) 
12. Married without own employment/housewife 
13. Assisting spouse 
14. Unemployed  
 
                                                 
11 Categories 9 through 11 are not included in the analysis  
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for full sample of respondents 
 
variable Mean N Min Max Standard 
deviation 
Age 52 3612 18 90 16 
Openness .55 3612 .1 .96 .13 
Conscientiousness .67 3612 .21 1 .11 
Extraversion .61 3612 .1 1 .13 
Agreeableness .67 3612 .1 1 .11 
Neuroticism .4 3612 0 .98 .15 
Education .29 3612 0 1 .29 
Gender .53 3612 0 1 .5 
Internal efficacy .65 3466 0 1 .22 
External efficacy .41 3529 0 1 .27 
Measure of 
educational 
environment 
.48 3612 0 1 .16 
Measure of income 
environment 
.19 3580 0 1 .16 
Measure of wealth 
environment 
.21 3612 0 1 .19 
Index of 
environmental 
competttion 
.21 3580 0 1 .19 
Political knowledge .72 1972 0 1 .25 
Political interest .72 3612 0 1 .23 
*The measure of political knowledge is collected at a second point in time, starting in October 2011, which not all 
participants in the first survey answered.  
 
